جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « طباطبایی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) serves as the basic and fundamental pillar of transcendent philosophy, and all the ingenuity of Mullā Ṣadrā is a direct result of it. Various interpretations of Mullā Ṣadrā about the posteriority and unreality of quiddity (māhiyyah) have led to the formation of a range of interpretations by the proponents of transcendent philosophy. This article examines the correct interpretation of the role and position of quiddity in four stages. At the first stage, the locus of conflict between the primacy of existence and the primacy of quiddity is elucidated. At the second stage, by accepting the primacy of existence, various interpretations of the position of quiddity are examined. The third stage addresses the impact of different interpretations of the primacy of existence on the theory of substantial motion. The fourth stage demonstrates which interpretation the theory of substantial motion fundamentally supports and endorses. The findings of the article, based on a descriptive-analytical approach, indicate that in the issue of the primacy of existence, considering quiddity as a mental concept (i'tibārī) is akin to a mirage, as interpreted by ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. It appears that the theory of substantial motion, while confirming this interpretation, has a greater compatibility with it. Some researchers have suggested that accepting ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's interpretation somehow negates nativism and leads to falling into idealism or perhaps nominalism. However, it must be noted that: Firstly, in this interpretation, the external existence of physical universal is not only not negated, but it also has a greater compatibility with the foundations of the primacy of existence. Secondly, the interaction of the mind with objective reality demonstrates that quiddity is not solely a construct of the mind, but due to existence of a real source of abstraction, it signifies the external reality.

One of the topics that has been examined in different interpretations is the discussion of the embodiment of deeds. Two contemporary commentators, Allameh Tabatabai and Dr. Zaheili, have also addressed this issue in their commentary and have explained whether the punishment of deeds is evolutionary or conventional, based on their own perspectives. In his works, Dr. Zaheili has not raised the issue of the embodiment of deeds as an independent title, but among the Tafsir Al-Munir's commentary, he has presented two views about the embodiment of deeds, which are: the presence of deeds in the Day of Judgment as punishment and reward, which is the embodiment of deeds, and conventional reward and punishment of deeds. Allameh Tabataba'i also in Tafsir al-Mizan, by criticizing and examining different points of view, has proved the issue of the embodiment of deeds and the evolutionary relationship between worldly deeds and the appearance and presence of the deed in the hereafter as a reward or punishment for deeds. Finally, he interpreted the verses that refer to conventional reward and punishment and considered them suitable for the understanding of the people of the time of revelation. The method of this research is descriptive-analytical, and based on the interpretation provided by Allameh, it can be understood that the embodiment of deeds has no rational meaning

The key to understanding Wittgenstein's late philosophy is to pay attention to grammatical research. This concept of grammar is different from the traditional usage and does not care about language because it is a system of signs. With this approach, the nature of religious propositions finds a special feature that is different from other epistemological categories. From Wittgenstein's point of view, propositions are divided into two categories, "intersubstitutable " and " not intersubstitutable", which religious propositions are not intersubstitutable; therefore, they cannot be explained or interpreted in other sentences. Also, the nature of the language of religion is "internal" and finds meaning only in itself and, they are not such as "external" propositions that find a clearer meaning with the other propositions. Thus, religious propositions are disconnected from other propositions, such as scientific propositions. Although religious categories are used significantly in the field of religion, they are beyond reality or truthfulness and falsity. By the importance of the language of religion in understanding religious issues, this article, by descriptive-analytical method answers two main questions: What is the cognitive or non-cognitive status of the language of religion from Wittgenstein's point of view? From Tabatabai's point of view, what are the criticisms of this view? Accordingly, after examining the characteristics of the language of religion from Wittgenstein's point of view, its consequences are discussed with Tabatabai's views.

Comparison of the views of Wittgenstein and Allameh Tabatabai on the meaningful of religious propositions The meaning of religious propositions is considered by religious thinkers and even devout. Some philosophers of religion emphasize the meaninglessness of religious propositions; While some consider religious propositions meaningful. The early Wittgenstein considered religious propositions meaningless; But in his later philosophy, he has dealt with the issue of the meaning of religious propositions in a special way. Accordingly, religious propositions are considered meaningful only in a particular field and by users in the same field. From Tabatabai's point of view, religious propositions have characteristics that are meaningful and knowledgeable for the general public; Hence, Wittgenstein's method in describing the meaning of religious propositions is different from Tabatabai's attitude. This article answers the two main questions on the subject in a descriptive-analytical method From the point of view of Wittgenstein and Tabatabai, what is criterion the meaningful of religious propositions? What results will we achieve by comparing the thought of the two philosophers? Therefore, after examining the views of two philosophers on the meaningful of religious propositions, their views are compared and the results are stated. Finally, some of Wittgenstein's views on the meaningful of religious propositions are criticized.

One of the concepts mentioned in the Qurchr('39')an is that of khaza`in, which is introduced as the source of the world of creation and is within the power of God Almighty. In this descriptive-comparative study, the concept of khaza`in and its ontological dimensions has been studied analytically and comparatively from the perspective of Allameh Tabatabai in Al-Mizan and Rashid al-Din Meybodi in Kashf al-Asrar. Regarding the ilmi and/or `ayni nature of khaza`in, the research findings show that divine khaza`in consist of two worlds of ilmi and `ayni, which is evident in Allameh Tabatabaichr('39')s theory, but a one-sided view of khaza`in in Meybodichr('39')s commentary (taking the realm of `ayn only), it is obvious. In the realm of treasures and levels of existence, Allameh Tabatabai considers khaza`in as the supreme source of divine grace, the degradation of which is in the form of a sequence from a higher origin based on a causal relationship, while in the latter view, khaza`in oversee Godchr('39')s knowledge of managing affairs and surrounding the graces and levels of the worlds and the soul in the realm of human ability and authority, but there may not be found any reference to the quality of the establishment of the hierarchical system and the way of expressing grace.

Examining the role of ta`wīl in understanding religious texts and passing from the appearances of the words of Quranic verses has been one of the most challenging issues for Muslim scholars. In the last century, appearance of the school of tafkīk, and specifically denial of ta`wīl and emphasis on the necessity of the purity of the appearances of Qur'anic texts, has led to two poles of proponents and opponents of ta`wīl in the field of religious studies. This article examines the issue with an analytic method and library-based technique and compared of the works of professor Hakimi and Allameh Tabatabai in the field. The findings indicate maximum difference between the two views in the type and method of explanation. Also, due to the revelation`s state of being of various levels, no sect or school has escaped from ta`wīl. The way to separate the appearances of religious texts to avoid ta`wīl will remain an impractical idea and dream.

God`s being of a child is of those attended issues in different religions and denominations. The question of the study follows as: what may one say about God`s childbearing on the basis of Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabataba`i`s reasonable principles on the third verse of the chapter Tawhid? The method of the study is analytical and descriptive and the findings are offered in tables and logical propositions. On the findings of the research, Ibn Sina has based God`s impossibility of childbearing on the necessity of common nature of the father and the child; Mulla Sadra has proposed three proofs in the field of which the third is more defensible with regard to his philosophical foundations; while the first and the second are not defensible as not being correctly explained and not being in agreement with his principles of the departure movement. And Allameh has based the impossibility on God`s uniqueness of Existence.
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Discourse about the world of descendants is always accompanied by two questions: the place of the descendant's world in the existence system? And why does no human remember this covenant (compact)? There have been several answers to these two questions, and the answers of Allameh Tabataba'i and Javadi Amoli are more accurate and important. The library method has been used in this article, and we have tried to refer to the primary sources of theorists of this issue. The answer of Allameh Tabataba'i and Javadi Amoli is that they are initially opposed to each other. In this article, while examining the answers of these two thinkers, it is clear that the theory of nature of Javadi Amoli solves problems better and easier. In the following, according to Mullā Ṣadrā's innovations in the topics of transcendent theosophy, such as the issue of separation of existence and “simplicity of the truth of all things” (Arabic: بسیط الحقیقه کل الاشیاء) and especially Rarefied and real predication, it is clear that the theory of innate natural disposition (nature) is complementary and compatible with the theory of collective existence.

Unlike peripatetic and Sadraic philosophers who, despite their differences, investigated the soul-related issues through psychology, Tabatabaei was inclined toward investigating these issues through self-knowledge. Though in the mechanical and mathematical structure of modern medicine showing consideration for human soul and psyche and its faculties in treating illnesses seems meaningless, in non-modern medicine it is a standard and inevitable practice. The current research is intended to delve into self-knowledge and its effects on medicine (while emphasizing health). This study is a fundamental and theoretical research which has adopted a descriptive and analytical methodology. Describing and qualitatively analyzing the content of Tabatabaei’s thoughts and thinking system, the researcher has collected data through library note-taking to describe and analyze the problem. Contemplating and thinking about Quranic verses and tradition, Tabatabaei transits from the distinctions between psychology and self-knowledge to the distinction between subjective knowledge and outer-world knowledge (objective knowledge) which can impose some obligations on the medicine, change it dramatically and lay the groundworks for adopting a new look toward health and illness. In medicine, taking self-knowledge into account, does not mean knowing about self and its characteristics and the way it affects body but it means self-knowledge-based medicine in which the physician leads a different life and develops a different understanding of patient, illness and heath and accordingly treats the illness.

In this article, we examine and evaluate the theological perspective of the two prominent Shiite commentators, Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i and Sayyid Mohammad Husayn Fadlallah, on the infallibility of divine prophets and other related issues, which are reflected in the Quranic interpretations of these two interpreters, and thereby present a view that is stronger and closer to reality. The views of the aforementioned scholars on analysing and explaining the reality of infallibility, in spite of having some similarity and closeness, differ in expressing and evidencing the reality of infallibility. Concerning the timing of the infallibility of the prophets, there is no difference between the two scholars and the two theories are in complete agreement with each other. However, with regards to the subject area and the realm of infallibility, with a profound look and analysis of the expressions contained in these interpretations, there are clear and profound disagreements, and certainly, for each of these views, it is possible to find some parallel intellectual works in various Islamic schools of thought. The authors of this study, while carefully analysing the views expressed and considering the arguments of both scholars, view Tabataba’i's viewpoint on conflicting issues to be consistent, more convincing and sometimes closer to innovation.

Compulsion and free will are one of the bones of contention between the theologians and philosophers whereby each one of them has come up with a solution for it. Following the Ash’arite doctrine, Fakhr al-Razi has opted for the view of disguised predetermination. Nonetheless, he interprets in it in such a way that it is very close to the view of free will and he even explicitly elaborates the view of free will in the form of the expression (neither total compulsion nor total free will, rather, an affair between these two extremes). On the other hand, he considers man to be compelled in his free will which apparently negates free will. Due to his lack of distinction between the relationship between God and the creatures, the relationship of the soul and the attribute of free will, the relationship of man and his actions, Fakhr al-Razi has a different opinion in explaining and analyzing the issue of free will. His statement is apparently contradictory but finally, he accepts the view of free will. Tabataba’i adopts the view of free will, and by accepting the principle of causality, the level of being, and the degree of agency, he considers man as the agent of his actions and does not believe that the agency of God is incompatible with that of man. He has analysed the issue of free will by making distinctions between the relationship of the Almighty God with the creatures, the relationship of the soul and the attribute of the free will, and the relationship of man and his actions. He believes that the occurrence of any optional act depends on three essential principles namely: 1) The longitudinal relationship between divine agency and human agency; 2) The cause of defective human will; 3) The compulsory occurrence of an action in comparison with the will.

Seyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba'i “Theory of Etebariat” is a theory for explaining the mechanism of a set of human perceptions which have not counterparts in the external world and are the fictions of the active powers of man. Some of these perceptions consist of our perceptions of Goodness (Husn) and Badness (Qubh). By knowing Goodness and Badness as Etebari (conventional), it can be assumed that Tabataba'i Theory of Etebariat is a contractualist theory. In this paper, we have tried to compare Tabataba'i theory with one of the contemporary contractualist theory, i.e., John Rawls’ “Justice as fairness” theory, to consider their points of similarities, and to get, by this comparison, a better understanding of Tabataba'is Theory of Etebariat and it's being a contractualist or non-contractualist theory. So, in this paper, we will discover, extract, and state, by an analytic method, the presuppositions, arguments, and implications of these two theories. We claim that, in these three aspects, there are similarities in Tabataba'i’s and Rawls’ theories, which justifiably support our assumption.

One of the issues having attracted the attention of those philosophers focusing the necessities of a “good life” is that how a belief, regardless of its correspondence to reality, affects one`s life. This issue has been assumed of greater importance in the case of those beliefs whose falsity and truth may not be easily perceieved. The paper views creating a life making sense only from this aspect. If we believe in a life making sense, depending on the factors which gives meaning to life, we will think of diverse consequences of this meaningfulness. The present study investigates the effect of human life`s taking meaning in the method of Allamah - i.e. through holding communication with God – from different perspectives and provides for comparing any positive effect of the methods taken by others. Such a communication is accompanied by a look toward world and human which answers the fundamental questions of human life, interprets sufferings and pains as groundwork of mental growth and sees death as an entrance to the eternal life and then leads human beings to encounter life responsibly and seriously; in this way, not becoming sorrowful and joyful of what missed and what attained respectively, one may arrive at mental peace and satisfaction. In addition, such a view brings about an indescribable bilateral love from which a joyful state originates. In the path toward absolute perfection, feeling love to others as the Divine manifestations would support one in the way.

Secondary philosophical intelligibles are general philosophical concepts such as existence, non-existence, cause, effect and accident on which the life of Islamic philosophy depends. Muhammad Husayn TabatabaI has tried to propose a comprehensive theory about the way through which secondary philosophical intelligibles are originated. He believes that these intelligibles are first understood through relational concepts and then non-relational concepts are abstracted from those relational ones and generalized. This article tries to give a clear formulation of the theory with four phases (in addition to its foundations) using Tabatabai's works and Motahhari's comments. The resuts of this research study shows that these concepts are not delusion. It also depicts that these concepts are not extracted from internal or external experiences or primordial human nature (fitrah) but are created from perceptive faculty. In addition, some other key issues to which Allameh has not paid enough attention, such as how to generalize the concept of secondary intelligible which has been abstracted from a special mental state to the whole world and the relationship between secondary intelligible obtained in the mind and the object to which the secondary intelligible refers, have been stated and the researcher has tried to find answers for these questions.

This paper, with a critico-comparative approach, has intended to examine Allamah Tabatabaei and Alvin Plantinga`s views on the philosophical foundations needed for proving the existence of God. The purpose lies in explaining, comparing, and surveying Allameh Tabatabaei and Alvin Plantinga`s views in the field. As Allameh Tabatabaei believes, the existence of God is self-evident, and the proofs denote solely on Its being self-evident. And as Plantinga views, there may be found a number of minor propositions not acceptable without the belief in the existence of God. It is God who introduces these partial propositions to a religious scholar of a truly basic proposition. Although Plantinga knows the existence of God as a base, he dose not know the existence of God to be eself-evident. So there is a considerable difference between the two. The claim of self-evidence of God's existence and confirming Allameh's view is extremely difficult, as Plotninga`s view will be based on induction.

The Question of the existential relationship between the Quranic words and concepts to the essence of revelation and the how of their validity has been raised in theology. This paper is an attempt to analyze the truth of revelation as an existential issue, using documentary research and philosophical explanations of Professor Tabatabaei and Javadi Amoli in describing a rational process for understanding Divine word with regard to the end of Divine act. As is concluded, revelation and Divine word is an action by God; as by Divine word is intended human guidance, it is necessary for him/her to understand it. So, revelation, from its essence to its being perceived and expressed would be a single reality and the Prophet`s soul would be a middle agent in the process of revelation

Seyyed Mohammad Hakkak*
Mutual Hindering proof is one of the proofs for God's unity. This proof is mentioned in Verse 22 of Surah Anbia'. Philosophers and theologians have extracted and set this expression based on the content of this verse. They believe this proof concerns the unity of the Creator and the necessity of being and also believe, in addition to presenting a theological and philosophical proof, they have in fact interpreted the verse as well. For example Professor Motahhari is among this group while Allameh Tabatabai believes this proof concerns the unity of Divinity because this has been the conflict between Quran and the idolaters not the unity of the Creator which was accepted by the idolaters. He explains the proof in his Al-Mizan and Nahayat-ol-Hekmah such that it ends up with the unity of Divinity, i.e. the owner and manager of the world. In fact he does not mention the verse in Nahayat-ol-Hekmah and does not mention the discussions of the theologians and philosophers in Al-Mizan such that he even avoids using the word mutual hindering. Recounting the discussions of professor Motahhari and Allameh Tabatabai, I will compare and evaluate them from the point of view of philosophy and interpretation.

Murtaḍā Mutahharī believes that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī is the first philosopher in the history of Islamic philosophy who has addressed the quality of abstracting secondary intelligible. He does not mean that this issue has not been paid attention to before ‘Allāma; it can even be said that the main elements of ‘Allāma’s explanation are available in Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn’s words. The elements inspired by Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn’s doctrines in ‘Allāma’s explanation include: 1. Secondary ineligibles are acquired knowledge preceded by presential knowledge; 2. Self-mental knowledge, its faculties and actions as well as sensual perception, are presential knowledge; 3. Studying the process of abstracting secondary ineligibles should be started with one of these presential knowledge; 4. The secondary ineligibles are the product of independent look at the relation between the found phenomena, mental or external.

The modern human, from one side, by different causes was involved in running away from the devoutness; and from other side, for getting the more freedom in thought and deed, denied essence and innate in human being.But does the human really lacking essence and innate? Can human sellect every goals and meaning and then any styles of life free from this problem?
Without doubt, purpose and meaning of fortunate life should be setting proportionate to natural structure (for example protection from the equable temperature of body) and instenctive structure (as suitable feeding). But, in addition to nature and instinct, dose human have a innate structure that needs to observe its circumstances for earning happiness?
In Aristotelian philosophy the beings was defined according to their "substance" and accidents (essence and appearance) in ways "complete essential definition" and "complete or defect descriptive definition". For example for human definition it was applied "rational animal" statement and for horse "neighing animal" statement. The assumption of such definitions is accepting "essence" (substance) or special quiddity structure, including natural, instinctive and innate structure in human and other live or no live beings (essentialism). And those people such John Locke and existence philosophies considered the human as a "tabula rasa" or unwritten tablet.
In view of Allame Tabatabaee, that he retrieved it from Islamic tradition and rational and historical documents, because the species of created beings are leaded naturally toward their ideal aims or happiness by God, the human being that was made with innate structure is leading toward resolving the defects and earning the happiness life. Of course the human, because of his free will and power of election, sometimes is ignoring this innate structure and acts opposite it and thus makes damage and misfortune for him. But Kierkegaard, as "the father of existentialism", takes precedence the existence of man on his essence and he originally denies essence, substance and special innate for man.
Allame believed the man have common fortunate and misfortune, because they have common knowledges and tendencies, thus they need common dirrection, tradition and religion. But Kierkegaard believed the paths of fortunate and misfortunate for men are differents, because they have not common essence and innate. Every body make his special essence and substance with his free will. He can ellect one of the triple directions or spheres (aesthetic, moral and religious) and anyone shouldnot be fuss and blame.
In view of Allame, the religion and Sharia law that descended from Heaven is compatible with innate and essence of human and fortunate of whole of human depended on following it. But Kierkegaard, as an fideist christian, believed the way of his fortunate and salvation depended on following Holy Book and he has most recommendated, pointly or clearly, about following this way.
Allame believs that to determine aim and meaning of life without considering the essence and innate is unrealistic deed and harmfull for man's fortunate and safety. But Kierkegaard, in his famous opinion, do not think a limitation about acceptence in electing one of the triple spheres; because he thinks the human is nothing, hollow and pure contengent. However in his non-celebrity opinion, he clearly or explicitly believes the man has a substance and original innate and evantually he respected of his living in religious sphere and maybe his instability in selecting a meaning of life for himself due to such instability and dichotomy in his theory about innate.
In view of Allame the properties of innate matters are non-adventitious public, stableness at the same ability to strenthen and weaken and self-explaining. It is obtained such signs in second view of Kierkegaard.
In most remarks of Allame it is obvious that he believes some innate matters are actually at birth and immediate knwoledge (in presence). And he believes other innate matters are potential. Kierkegaard, in his famous view that repudiates innate and substance, indeed denies it's actuallity and opptionality. But his second view suggests that he accepts actually and involuntary innate that of course human can pass from it's unnecessary items with his free will.
Allame believes the factors as the false education and training remove man from his first primitive innate and involve him following his or other's carnal desires and causes him unfortune. In despite of the acceptence first innate, this changing way suggests man's freedom. Kierkegaard, as other opponents of innate for the purpose of genetic and legislative freedom, disagreed with innate; unaware that the agreement for innate don,t conflict with freedom. Of course he, in his second view, accepted this compatibility within innate and freedom.
Allame agrees with innate acknowledge and tendency to truth, beauty and generality of religion, however in the details of religion he clarifies that the knowning God, tends to God, monotheism in person, adjectives and actions, prophecy, Velaya (guardianship) and Islamic law are innates. Kierkegaard, in his first view, believed the human even is empty of innate of God knowing. But in his second viewpoint and specially in his opinion that agreed with "subjectivism", he confesses the being of God and His attributes as oneness, power, knowledge, mercy and etc. Then with rejection of materialism, he declares that the only way for salvation is christianity.
In view point of Allame, throldom, worship, purification and knowledge of soul are primary and middle meanings of life. The main and final meaning of life is divine knowledge or approach to God. And these are according to man's substance and innate. In this condition human in this world gets tranquility, happiness, hopeness, justice, freedom and security; and in afterlife he gets fotunate. Kierkegaard confesses that the morality is innate and moral is a passage to religiousness and faithfully life and man's fortunate are depending to haltering carnall desires and as a result religiousness. He believes the life in aesthetic sphere and even in moral sphere led to failure and hopelessness.
Thus the most important common points in views of Allameh and Kierkegaard, the material, spirituall, worldly and heavenly fortunate depend on faith to God, religiousness and thraldom to religious teaches and following this way to devine knowlegde and mysthetic nearness to God.