مجله نامه مفید
پیاپی 50 (آبان 1384)

Though presupposed the possibility of the knowledge of realities of things in their different doctrines, Muslim philosophers considered man unable to know realities of things and their true differentiae. This led some to think that in this issue, which is one of the main issues of epistemology, Muslim philosophers contradicted themselves. In this article, I study this issue and show Muslim philosopher's success in solving the fundamental problem of knowledge. Meanwhile, I insist that most Muslim philosophers neither considered acceptance of limitation of man's ability in knowing ends skepticism, nor did they see themselves imprisoned in groundless dogmas so that they might stress on validity of the assumption of quiddal correspondence between perceptions and perceived.

In his book, On the Essence of Truth, Martin Heidegger suggests, “the essence of truth is freedom”. The article tries to clarify this claim and thereby Heidegger’s more fundamental understanding of the sense of truth and its relation to human being’s freedom. In this discussion, freedom is not used in a social, political meaning but in an existential, ontological discourse.

Scrutinizing under-determination of Theories by Empirical Evidence, I purport to show this argument, in itself, does not provide a sufficient ground for skepticism about the (approximate) truth of theories. The upshot is that driving anti-realistic consequences from this argument in virtue of some other non-evident implicit assumptions is a contentious issue.

If we assume that words are a kind of symbols, then a semantic theory goes to enlighten meanings of these symbols. In natural language, we consider terms like “Scott” and “Socrates”, as proper names. There are two strategies – descriptive and non-descriptive – about semantics of proper names.In description theories of proper names, to which Frege, Russell and Searle are committed; a definite description or a cluster of descriptions identifies semantic content of a proper name. However, Mill holds that a proper name has not any connotation and its meaning is the very object to which it refers. Kripke, too, denies all sorts of description theories of proper names and holds that a proper name has not any descriptive content, so we may consider him as a Millian. The non-descriptive view of proper name comes across some problems such as: How can we justify the difference in cognitive values of some identities? How can we justify the difference in truth conditions of attitude ascriptions? How the sentences, which contain empty names, are meaningful?Millians such as Kripke, Salmon and Braun have attempted to solve these problems. In this article, their solutions will be explained and criticized.

Postmodern philosophers are usually accused of being indifferent to any political principle and that cannot advocate any particular political idea; therefore, their political position promotes undemocratic trends. Thus, they have been called as fellow travelers of non¬-democratic political forces. For critics, anti-foundationalism and relativism are responsible for creating such a situation.I reject both of these theories by arguing that, first, philosophical opposition of postmodernism to foundationalism does not lead to political agnosticism, and for this matter, postmodernism is not politically relativist. Secondly, postmodernism not only advocates democracy, but also gradually prepares situation suitable for establishing a new civic culture. We must seek the traces of these new civic cultures in modernity.

The comparison between Greek and Islamic thoughts, in general, and between Plato’s and Farabi’s, in particular, can demonstrate, to some extend, the tendency of the former to philosophy and the latter to Shariah although the founders of these philosophers emphasize their considerable common aspects. The epistemology and ontology presented by these two thinkers end in prominence of knowledge in their views. In Plato’s thought, knowledge, in terms of theory, results in philosophy whereas in terms of practice, it results in law. This law constitutes natural law in the reign of the philosopher king and after this period, this is the philosopher who leaves his written law and trains some lawmakers.In Farabi’s view, however, knowledge, in terms of theory, results in philosophy as well as knowing Shariah whereas, in terms of practice, it ends in law. Law in the First King era constitutes Divine Nomos that is Sharia, after that era, all affairs will be governed in accordance with figh’h (Islamic jurisprudence), and apparently a faghih (Islamic jurisprudent) does not need philosophy.

‏ First, I investigate the Fundamental tenets in gnosticism with regard to dualism of spirit and body and its captivity in the body. I mention that Orphic–Pythagorean and Plato’s stance and Alexandrian attitudes testify the history of such thoughts. Also, two Gnostic schools, Syria–Egyptian and Iranian, are introduced. In the second part, significant verses of Ghasideh-ye Einieah are explained by the means of Rasail-e Ikhwanalsafa (Epistles of the Brethren of purity), and by comparing Ghasideh-ye Einieah with a Gnostic text, It becomes evident that the Former has a Gnostic theme. Finally, by emphasizing the role that Ikhwanalsafa played in Familiarizing Muslim sages and mystic, with Gnostic and Hermetic thought, I demonstrate the history of the introduction of such thoughts to Islamic civilization.