فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و سوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 90، تابستان 1397)

Contextualism is a semantic theory according to which intra- and extra-linguistic contexts play a role in processes of producing and understanding the meaning, as opposed to conventionalism or core-oriented dualism. This view is surrounded with worries when it comes to the Quranic exegesis, since it approaches the exegesis with intentions in the context of the time of Quranic Revelation, the views of ethnicists, and intentions of the time of the exegete, culminating in an audience-oriented view. In my view, problems raised against contextualism are rooted in its misinterpretations by both its proponents and critics. Thus, I set aside various formalist, pragmatist, behavioristic, conceptualist, and semantic versions of the view, espousing instead a hermeneutic version of contextualism which provides a philosophical account of the intersubjective nature of linguistic understanding, arguing for normative fluidity of Quranic meanings by relying upon distinct contextualist features of the Qur’an. In this way, we can reply to objections such as non-objectivity of contextual meanings, the fluidity of contextual meanings, and culturalism about contextual meanings. Contextualism can result in changes within methods and maxims governing the exegesis of a text, changes in one’s view of the text, and meaning and elements affecting one’s understanding.

Throughout history, an inward (or bāṭinī) understanding of sharia has had ups and downs among Shiite scholars. Although there are few Shiite scholars who deny an “inward” aspect for the religion, ignorance of the inward aspect of sharia has culminated in a radical and austere anti-mystic outward (ẓāhir) approach among Shiite scholars. Shahīd Thānī’s inward approach is in line with the common approach adopted by Muslim mystics. For him, assigning an original place to the inward and a subsidiary place to the outward adds to the importance of the inward aspect of the religion. On this approach, official scholars are in need of true scholars who master true knowledge and whose place is superior to outward scholars. According to Shahīd Thānī, among human body parts and actions, the main focus of the religion consists in the heart and actions related to it. As a prominent faqīh (jurisprudent), he has always observed the inward aspect of the reality as the authentic, in addition to outward knowledge such as fiqh (jurisprudence), worships, and understanding the Qur’an, without denying or diminishing outward aspects. By considering the inward approach of prominent Imāmī scholars and jurisprudents, one can avoid the dangers of the outward approach that has begun to be popular among some Sunni, and even Shiite, scholars today.

Modern mysticism is an encounter with the transcendent in terms of an experientialist religiosity formed on the basis of the thoughts and poems of Sohrab Sepehri. Modern mysticism has its own ontological, anthropological, ethical-jurisprudential, political, and social constituents and components. In its anthropological aspect, the “self”-“other” contrast, the problem of annihilation in Allah and the spiritual traveler’s will are conceived of in a different way conflicting with traditional mysticism, including Islamic mysticism. This paper seeks to respond to the question of the annihilation in God within the anthropological aspect of modern mysticism—what does it mean? What are its grounds? And what problems does it have? In this paper, I have focused on, and criticized, the identity and nature of annihilation in Allah and subsistence with Allah in Islamic mysticism as formulated by the theoretical founder of modern mysticism (Soroush Dabbagh). I argue that annihilation in Islamic mysticism does not amount to nothingness. Instead, it is an intuitive annihilation consisting in an emancipation from nonexistential restrictions and limits, existential attachments and determinations, and a migration from plurality to unity which is the same as subsistence with Allah. In Islamic mysticism, mystical annihilation is an expansion and ascent, or an existential extension and development or transcendence, and the spiritual traveler’s will becomes stronger as it integrates with God’s will, culminating in divine unity and wilāya (guardianship).

As a discursive science, practical wisdom is part of wisdom in general, which has been ignored throughout the history of Islamic philosophy. Human sciences based on Islamic wisdom can be discovered if we pay adequate attention to functions of the practical aspect of Islamic philosophy and its presence in people’s daily lives. Also, given its role in understanding the practical doctrines of the religion and the achievement of human happiness, we expect to see a widespread movement for a revival and development of practical wisdom. Of course, there have always been challenges for its expansion, such as the identity of its doctrines with the laws of sharia and the Islamic theology, its roots in Greek philosophy, certain political and social obstacles, and its role in raising skepticisms about practical doctrines. After assessing these challenges, it will turn out that they can never provide a justification for the marginalization of practical wisdom in academic and philosophical communities of Muslims. In this paper, I have examined practical wisdom and some of its problems in the view of Muslim philosophers, and in particular, Farabi and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli.

The problem of resurrection and the quality of post-mortem life has always been a concern for intellectuals, with Muslim theologians and philosophers providing various accounts thereof. Some of them restrict the resurrection to the human soul, while others believe in its corporeality, and still others take it to be both bodily and spiritual. With regard to the bodily resurrection, there is a dispute over the body with which the soul will be resurrected. Some theologians suggest that the soul will return to the natural elemental body, while others believe that the soul will be resurrected with an imaginal (mithālī) body. According to the Transcendent Wisdom (al-ḥikmat al-muta’ālīya), the soul will be resurrected with an imaginal body arising from the soul itself. The philosopher, Aqā ‘Alī Mudarris Zunnūzī has offered a novel view within the framework of the Transcendent Wisdom, followed by prominent philosophers such as his pupils Mīrzā Muḥammad Bāqir Iṣṭahbānātī and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Iṣfahānī (Muḥaqqiq Kumpānī), as well as others including Rafī’ī Qazvīnī. According to Zunnūzī, resurrection does not consist in the return of the soul to the body; instead, it is the body that returns to the soul in the Afterlife. In a short posthumous essay, published recently, Kumpānī has elaborated this theory in terms of five principles and premises. In this paper, I elaborate his own view of bodily resurrection and then point to some of its ambiguities.

There is always an inevitable conflict between Hume’s naturalistic ambitions and his skeptical judgments. Some of his contemporary critics accused him of atheism because the foundations of his naturalistic system restricted the human knowledge to the human nature, thus destroying his contemporary naturalistic apologies. After Hume’s death, his critics provided a naturalistic interpretation of his philosophical system. In this paper, we will first show that Hume’s ambitions for establishment of ethics led him to the human nature, making his research fall into a skeptical trap. We will then evaluate the truth or falsity of the atheistic or skeptical accusation through an analysis of the Humean thought, an investigation of his critics and advocates, and an exposition of hidden motivations behind his skepticisms. In the end, we seek to free his naturalism from skepticism, showing that even his skeptically-oriented research is in conflict with consequences of denying God. We have found that skepticism is not an instrument for undermining intellectual foundations; it is instead a bridge for reaching the goal. Thus, Hume deserves to be called a “Rational Moralist.”

A well-known idea in modal epistemology is that conceivability of a proposition is a good guide for its possibility. Yablo analyzes the conceivability as a guide for possibility in terms of imaginability. In his paper, “Conceivability, Imagination, and Modal Knowledge,” Fiocco argues against appealing to imagination-based conceivability in modal epistemology. Fiocco’s first objection is levelled against Yablo’s view that one can make a mistake about exactly which world she has brought into her mind. Fiocco argues that this view should be rejected since it leads to implausible consequences. Furthermore, in his argument against appealing to imagination in modal epistemology, Fiocco draws upon the legitimacy of stipulation in modal issues. For him, it is permissible to stipulate in one’s imagination-when one is asked to bring a possible world to her mind, she can stipulate the world she wants to consider. From this, Fiocco concludes that any understandable proposition will be conceivable; therefore, imagination-based conceivability cannot be a guide for possibility. In this paper, I will defend Yablo’s model against Fiocco’s objections, showing that none of these objections goes through.