مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال چهل و سوم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1389)

“Welfare” can be hardly defined. We defined it simply as enjoyment from life facilities in three dimensions: being, becoming and belonging. “Welfare culture” which is our keyword in this essay, designates the centrality of body welfare accompanied by self-expression of humanist subject. In present era, welfare culture has been immensely formed and alongside new values, ideas and concepts which has impressed the milieu of Religiousness. Subjectivism and humanism along with superficial sentimentalism has been a good base for transfiguration of Religiousness. The relation between god and human has turned from obligation to arbitrary and romantic relation. Also, religion has been defined as an esoteric affair compatible with welfare. Religiousness, under these circumstances, has been reclined qua “new religious movements” in which esoteric dimensions of religion are reduced to some instruments for human welfare.

In this article the impact of Mulla Sadra’s philosophical opinions concerning necessary being on his understanding of the Qur’anic verses is critically reviewed. To this end, all exegetical and philosophical books of Mulla Sadra have been studied and the instances in which he has–under the influence of the above opinions– inferred meanings other that the apparent meanings from the Qur’anic verses, have been collected. Then, with reference to other verses, narrations, apparent meanings, Revelation occasions, content of the verses in question, and their evidences and, in view of the absurdity of the intellectual requirements of some of Mulla Sadra’s interpretations, the validity of the aforementioned inferences were verified and this conclusion is drawn that from among the seven interpretations that Mulla Sadra has presented under the influence of the above opinions, only one instance can be confirmed.

In al-Ta‘liqat–which is most likely a collection of Avicenna’s lectures– it is intended to answer to a paradox concerning the knowledge of the substance. This paradox can be reconstructed this way: if, by knowing something, its quiddity comes to mind, then with knowing a substance its quiddity–which is a substance–comes to mind. Conversely, according to Peripatetic Philosophy, knowledge is a quality in the soul and an accident. In this way, a paradox rises which says our knowledge of substance must be substance and accident–and not substance – at the same time. Al-Ta‘liqat’s response to this paradox is that what is substance is the concept of substance which is the concept of “not being in subject”; and what is accident is our knowledge of substance which is a quality in the soul. Therefore, the subjects in the two apparently paradoxical statements are not identical but in one of them the subject is the concept of substance and in the other one the subject is the mental existence of substance. From here, it is clear that the response Mulla Sadra– using the concepts of primary essential and common technical predications– presents to this paradox and similar paradoxes like those of absolute nonexistent and individual and universal can be found in Avicenna’s books.

Abu `al-Barakat al-Baghdadi, before explanation of his selected view about the problem of the quality of emergence of multitudinous from unit, expresses the theory of Peripatetic philosophers with a historical outlook. He then critics the viewpoint of peripatetic philosophers and finally explains his view in the course of four descriptions. The following points are proposed when criticized his views: He has a historical fault when criticizing Peripatetic point of view. There are similarities and dissimilarities between his view and some of theologians’ one. Abu `al-Barakat doesn`t have perfect mastery over Farabi`s and Avicenna`s views, even is unstable in expressing his theory. In his point of view, the relationships between the existences in different worlds aren`t expressed exactly. Abu `l-Barakat is inattentive toward Ptolemaic astronomy, and his critic is not correct about the theory of peripatetic philosophers.

The appearance of new sciences and conflicts arising from reductionism in domain of science and knowledge, explains the necessity of interdisciplinary studies. Some scientists believe the history of interdisciplinary studies is rooted in ancient Greece, but in fact interdisciplinary studies started in industrial laboratories, the first center for interdisciplinary studies, about 150 years ago. Like every phenomenon interdisciplinary studies base on some foundations. What kind of sorts do they have? How these foundations explain this approach? This article proposes three foundations; logical base, epistemological base and cognitive base. The methodological pluralism is the most important logical base for interdisciplinary studies. Integration is the most important epistemological base in this approach. Finally complicated systems and their formulas are the most important cognitive base in Interdisciplinary approach. This article tries to explain interdisciplinary studies by these bases and then tries to explain traits of these bases. It also surveys some offshoot problems such as definitions of interdisciplinary approach, kinds of it and its expansion in all of fields. The interdisciplinary approach is multiple origins. The multiple origin problems are rooted in various sciences and they cannot be survey by single science. The study of religion and professional ethics are samples of multiple origin disciplines. Interdisciplinary studies are necessary for humanities because of its complex subject, that is, human. So it cannot study by single science.

The distinction between Primitive Predication and Common Predication is applied to solve some problems in Islamic philosophy, some of which are incorrect in our point of view. Some of the problems contain paradoxes and some others include independent philosophical 1. stating about absolute non-existents, 2. problems of subjective existence, 3. Liar Paradox and Russell’s paradox, 4. the paradox of “referring by quotation marks” and the paradox of horse, 5. why “complete definition” is not regarded as one of “the five universals,” 6. why quantified propositions need the existence of their subjects, and 7. a proof of the nobility of existence by dint of the kinds of predication. In this paper, by resorting to Faramarz Qaramleki’s analysis of Primitive Predication and Common Predication, I show that the seven applications are all involved by some fallacies.

Aristotle sometimes presents the subject of first philosophy, immutable being or God, and sometimes presents it being qua being. Are these Two Positions agreeable, or do we must consider them Two incompatable positions that he replaces the latter with the former? Result of the latter is no application of existence to God and separating of metaphysics from theology.