مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال چهل و هفتم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1393)

This paper intends to find an answer to the problematic description of the difference between Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabaei’s views on the ontological explanation of “predication” and also، tries to find the origin of this difference. Since subject and predicate are different degrees of one existence in Mulla Sadra’s philosophical structure، the reality of predication is the union of two things with one existence; moreover، the sufficient condition for a valid predication is a kind of causal relation between subject and predicate. But in Allameh’s philosophical structure، the in-itself existence of the subject differs with the predicate’s one; so، they are not unitary existence. But the “existence for something-else” of predicate is united in “existence foritself” of subject and makes a relationship between them through copulative existence.

Some logicians as Avicenna، Khaja Nasir al-Din Tusi، and Dabiran Katebi believe that denotation (dilala) is dependent on volition (irada)، and as long as there is no volition، there is no denotation. Some others like Qutb al-Din Razi completely reject this idea and maintain that denotation merely depends on “knowledge of designation” (al-ilm bi al-wad’). Some of Methodologicians of jurisprudence have presented a new interpretation of Avicenna and Khaja Nasir al-Din Tusi’s views. This article tires to check these views and shows that Qutb al-Din Razi’s view is right.

Tashbih and Tanzih (Immanence & transcendence of God) are the most enduring discrepancy in great religions، in this respect the following issues are raised: His power، knowledge، and free-will may alter like that of man. With a glance on some holy religious texts man-like God is found to be subject to change. This paper indicates that contrary to Ashʿarite determinism، Molawī believes in the limitless generosity of the Lord which may perpetually be applied for creatures. According to Molawī، this characteristic of God don’t is an indicative of His power rather than His disability. Molawī argues that rejecting the alteration in the divine will (means Bada'') makes praying a useless activity. he regards resurrection as an arena of alteration in the divine will and human destiny and entitles the other world as a trade city. This sort of belief results in continuous and limitless hope and prayer.

In this research، my problem is what the major criteria of Supreme Bliss in al-Ghazali''s Thought are. The methodology in this investigation is analytic-descriptive. In his works، al-Ghazali offers different criteria، such as knowing God، Proximity to Him، meeting Him، to love Him and so on. To actualize the last one، al-Ghazali suggests two one: interruption of concern with mundane world and abandoning any love but love to Him، and the other is to increase the knowledge of God. He، also، believes that the supreme bliss، theoretically speaking، is to discover Divine Glory and، practically، to have good beliefs and morals. I think that، al-Ghazali’s criteria are not exclusive، but they are compatible.

Virtue epistemology is a class of recent approaches to epistemology that، in contrast with analytic epistemology، focuses on epistemic evaluation of persons’ properties، rather than properties of beliefs. This paper seeks to explain the nature of virtue epistemology as well as its main approaches. Explaining the nature of epistemic virtue as a reliable belief-forming faculty and the character traits led to two approaches in virtue epistemology: reliabilism and responsibilism. Since the nature of virtue epistemology is better understood according to the nature of epistemic virtue، this element will be focused more than the others. This paper first addresses the origin of virtue epistemology and، finally، after referring to some critiques، including divergent accounts of epistemic virtue، insists that understanding the nature، importance and complication of virtue epistemology requires a more comprehensive، flexible and reasonable definition of epistemic virtue.

Comparing the Islamic logic and jurisprudential principles، and based on the separation between minor and major authorities (hujjiyyat sughrawi wa kubrawi)، it can be proved that (1) minor authority of suitable verbal text per nexum (al-mantuq al-muwafiq al-iltizami)، minor authority of suitable concept per nexum (al-mafhum al-muwafiq al-iltizami)، and minor authority of contrary concept (al-mafhum al-mukhalif)، if authoritative are not incompatible with obsolescence of the indication per nexum (mahjuriyyat dilalat al-iltizam). (2) Major authority of suitable concept per nexum (al-mafhum al-muwafiq al-iltizami) and major authority of contrary concept (al-mafhum al-mukhalif)، in the sense of argumentation for per nexum significant of the premise، is incompatible with obsolescence of the indication per nexum. (3) Major authority of contrary concept، because of rationality of significance، and major authority of suitable concept، due to existence of circumstantial evidence over prerequisites'' instantiation، are out of obsolescence of the indication per nexum.

The Mulla Sadra’s ontological system and all his innovations in this field is based on the theory of the “primacy of existence” and “non-primacy of quiddity”. The accuracy and validity of this theory depends on the soundness of his arguments for primacy of existence and his responses to the criticism and related doubts. Through an analytic approach، this article addresses Sadra’s responses to the Shaikh al-Ishraq’s criticism on this issue. The article shows that Mulla Sadra’s responses to Shaikh al-Ishraq’s criticism are not successful.

Averroists are accused of believing the «Double Truth» theory، based on which a proposition might be true in religion، and، at the same time، its contradict is philosophically true. In this article، at first، the history and significance of this theory is investigated، second، the Averroes'' view about the post-mortem existence of the soul is studied، and، third، through investigating his views، in his philosophical and theological works، we show that his points of view on material intellect and its being common and single for all human beings in the afterlife (unity of Intellect) in his Philosophical works do not contradict his views on post- mortem existence of individual souls in his Theological works.