فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال چهارم شماره 3 (پیاپی 15، بهار 1386)

The philosophy of Islamic politics, or the political philosophy of Islam, represents both the conceptual and affirmative foundations that can be employed in the explanation of the Islamic political theory. In this process, one can benefit from either descriptive or normative propositions, because in methodological issues one can make use of normative propositions. Even some normative propositions can be established through descriptive and factual premises.Normative disciplines can be dealt with in three levels: first is the philosophical level dealing with the principles of a certain discipline, as we see in the philosophy of law, the philosophy of ethics, and the philosophy of politics. At a second level, with a narrower approach, one deals with the essential accidents of the subject matter of the discipline. Still at a third level, practical proficiency is concerned, a proficiency based on the philosophical principles and disciplinary findings. For instance, regarding law, there is a philosophy of law, the discipline of law, and the practice of law. Not all who study the philosophy and the discipline of law are good lawyers or judges. A judge should be professional in determining the actual cases of a legal norm, in addition to a complete grasp of the philosophy of law and legal codes.In the domain of politics also, there are political philosophy, the discipline itself, and the actual engagement in political affairs. We should inquire about the Islamic ideas at all three levels.

If political philosophy has a methodology of its own, like any other discipline, what is the methodology of John Rawl's political philosophy? Is it the well-known method of "contract theory" or else? And if it is based on contract theory, is it the Kantian version that passes structuralism and leads to deontologism, or is it similar to the Hobbesian version that is content with compromise?The author inquires about such questions by first reviewing the import of methodology, and then by trying to explain Rawl's methodology through introducing his "original position" and its features, and finally appraising his methodology by the help of the words of his commentators.

To find the essential truth-bearer is one of the concerns of those epistemologists who defend correspondence theory in describing "truth". This article wants to explain a view acceptable to its author, while introducing and criticizing major viewpoints in this regard. It argues that neither "sentence" as a complete and well-structured series of words in a natural language can be the real truth-bearer, nor Tarski's "affirmative sentence", nor Quine's "eternal sentence". Furthermore, it is shown that despite Russell's idea, "belief" cannot be the real truth-bearer either, because "belief" in the verbal sense (to believe) is an instance of the category of action and hence, out of the domain of truth and falsehood. "Belief" in the sense of "affirmation" also belongs to a later stage than truth and falsehood. "Affirmation" means "understanding the truth of a sentence"; therefore, truth and falsehood should occur in a former stage, and then they may become the object of affirmation. Belief in the sense of "the object and the content of belief" is not something parallel to a sentence too. It is, rather, the same thing called "proposition". Taking into consideration all stages of a proposition, the article concludes that the real and essential truth-bearer is: the comprehended proposition or the subjective stage of a proposition that refers to the objective reality.

The article begins with a quick review on the history of epistemological debates over the degrees of knowledge and philosophical interpretations of probability, and then it explains the author's intention of probability in this article. The author divides probability into psychological and non-psychological, and the latter into logical and epistemological. Having explained the traits of each type, he examines the consequence and significance of inquiring about them with greater emphasis on epistemological probability. The article concludes that although knowledge and rational behavior are based on logical probability, however, only the degree of epistemological probability of knowledge is justifiable and can be the basis of a justifiable behavior. The outcome of this debate is applicable in determining the authentic conjecture in jurisprudence.

In the case of intuitive (shuhūdi) and presentational knowledge, not only error does not occur, but also, one can claim, it is not imaginable. Despite this characteristic, there are instances that suggest failures regarding intuition or knowledge by presence. The author reviews major instances that may be regarded as breaches in the inerrancy of intuitive knowledge. He finds that these instances can be resolved by appealing to either the different levels of knowledge by presence concerning its weakness and strength, or the accompaniment of knowledge by presence with various interpretations and explanations that need to be distinguished from one another. Proper attention to the imparity between the notion "error" when it is used in the case of intuitions and when used with regard to propositions—which means not corresponding to reality—would lead to solutions for some remaining cases. The end result, according to the author, is that none of the possible oppositions are strong enough to make any flaw in the inerrancy of knowledge by presence as its major epistemological trait.

The debate over the material and immaterial being has occupied a major portion of Islamic philosophy. It has always been a central concern for philosophers to come up with accurate definitions of these terms, establish their existence, inquire about their typologies, and determine the relation between material and immaterial beings.The author in this article begins with a quick review on, and criticism of, the peripatetic and illuminative philosopher's reflection on the nature of material and immaterial being. Then he suggests a third alternative, supporting it with rational and relational evidences. Since the apparent meaning of some narrations (from the infallibles) are considered by some thinkers as opposing the third alternative, the author tries to explain and criticize them, while emphasizing on his preferred theory regarding the definition of the material and the immaterial.

The semiology of "Ḥikmat" derives its significance from its influence on determining, as well as correcting, its paradigm and the way it is shaped. The author probes the issue on the basis of the foundations of the Transcendental Philosophy, and regards it helpful in a genuine understanding of al-Ḥikmat al-Muta'ālīyah. The article examines ten definitions for ḥikmat in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā, among them are: "acquaintance with the reality of things," "acquaintance with Allah," "acquaintance with one's self," and "seeking the perfection of human soul". In the conclusion, it is suggested that Mullā Ṣadrā's main concern is to introduce al-Ḥikmat al-Muta'ālīyah as a comprehensive paradigm and system of thought, incorporating modern disciplines, and its guiding role in understanding new scientific issues.