فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال پنجم شماره 3 (پیاپی 19، بهار 1387)

Various definitions can be found in the western philosophy regarding analytic propositions (or judgments). Some of the most important definitions belong to Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Ayer, Mill, Frege, and Quine. According to their scope, such definitions can be classified into three sets: the most particular, particular, and the most general ones. In order to find the correct definition, we have to look for the one which fits best the goals and the foundations of the division of propositions into analytic and synthetic.Having determined the goals and the foundations of these western philosophers, the article shows that their definitions neither satisfy their goals, nor are congruous with their fundamental principles. One of the crucial ends of such a division is dividing facts into intellectual vs. real facts, and differentiating between primary and derived intellectual facts. This goal is the same for predicatory and conditional propositions on the one hand, and for affirmative and negative ones on the other, and for true and false propositions on the third. But all the above-mentioned definitions (among other deficiencies) stay short of encompassing all these propositions. The author suggests an alternative definition, more particular than the most general definition, and still more general that the particular one, compensating for faults of the previous definitions.

The article examines the division of concepts into axiomatic and speculative ones as the epistemologically most useful division of concepts. Although this division is questioned form an ontological point of view, but there is no doubt, according to the author, about their epistemological realization.Having defined the terms “axiomatic” and “speculative”, the author appraises such doubts. Then he enumerates axiomatic and speculative concepts, and analyzes their relation to thought. The problem of “the criterion of self-evidence” shapes the core of the article, in which, the author evaluates, in detail, major Muslim ideas about conceptual foundationalism.

Induction is one of the most important methods available to human being for gaining knowledge of the world. This methodology, despite its import and advantages, seems to lack the potential for philosophical certainty. Philosophical certainty is gained only if there were a logical, and thus productive, relation between premises of an argument and its conclusion (the same as in the case of deduction). This is while there is a logical gap between the premises of an induction and its conclusion, leaving them with no productive connection. The question, then, arises as to how one can rely on an induction, and still admit of the fact that its result is not definitive.The author in this article reviews, compares, and briefly criticizes different attempts at resolving this issue. He juxtaposes the technical term, induction, in the both Islamic and Western intellectual environments to show their divergences and to reveal confusions that have arisen from lack of sensitivity to such differences.

In today logic, it is common place to consider conjecture reliable only for the one who has it, while Ibn-Sina regards it as the source of all, or at least some of, human knowledge. Therefore some questions arise about the essence and the function of conjuncture.To find an answer to such questions, the author in this article studies the definition of conjuncture, its relation to the middle term, as well as its relation to comprehension, education, thought, logic, and experiment. He believes that some generalizations made by Ibn-Sina transformed logical conjuncture into mystical intuition. The result of conjuncture, i.e. cognition intuitiva, has had a different history, and most often are deemed unreliable except for the one who has experienced it. The author enumerates three cognitive functions for conjuncture, namely, conjecture as a method, as a source, and as a type of knowledge that leads to a kind of foundationalism. The last part of the article deals with the scientific function of conjuncture and its similarity to “inference to the best explanation” and concludes with at least three differences (in content, in form, and in function) between the two.

For Ibn-Sina, the Almighty Creator knows everything, whether particular or universal, before they are created. He considers such knowledge to be a requisite of His knowledge of His essence. It encompasses other things through their causes and by the imprinting of their forms in His essence. The theory of “imprinting” in Divine knowledge has raised criticisms from both Muslim philosophers and theologians (mutakallimin).The author in this article tries to show that Ibn-Sina was aware of such possible misunderstandings about the theory of “imprinting”, and explained the theory in a way that does not imply the affectedness of His essence from others. The article accomplishes this task by reviewing Ibn-Sina’s viewpoints and his explanations of the theory of “imprinting” in his different works.

The author tries in this article to assess “rationality” in Descartes’ philosophy based on his works. First, meanings of rationality are examined. Having determined the best meaning, the author provides an analytic review of Descartes’ philosophy. By dividing his philosophy into ontology and epistemology, the article evaluates “rationality” in both parts. In his epistemological system, Descartes starts a journey towards skepticism—as a stage of irrationality—by introducing “methodological doubt”. Then he tries to return to the realm of rationality by way of cogito. In his ontological system, however, he becomes close to the zenith of rationality, i.e. belief in the One Real Essence, through cogito. Afterwards, Descartes’ ontology distances itself from rationality by its tendency towards plurality and the essentiality of quiddity

The author of this article believes that Kant’s view of knowledge, especially of empirical knowledge, and its progress, and his view of metaphysics and its critique had a great impact on later philosophers. Kant under the influence of empirical sciences suggests some criteria for certainty, such as the possibility of synthetic judgment, being experimental, limitation in experiment, etc. and consequently expels metaphysics and religion from the realm of definite knowledge. Kant, on the other hand, fulfills the idea of humanism. Therefore, the human being in his mentality is the pivot of the whole being and reality, who tries to create his own morality and religion, while deprived of any rational metaphysics. This process leads to a humanistic morality, in the service of human interests, and devoid of Divine values. The same happens to Kant’s religion, which is based on morality, and deprived of its Divine origin. This is exactly the humanization of Divine realities and the disenchantment of the world by Kant, which leads to relativism.