فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
پیاپی 1-2 (پاییز و زمستان 1382)

For social scientists, rationality is known as a symbol of modernity on the one hand, and a rival and substitute for religion on the other. Habermas, as an eminent defender of modernity, has done his best in his theory of communicative action to justify and argue for this thesis. Among Habermas’ presuppositions, the most critical are an evolutionary interpretation of rationality and an instrumental view of religion. By recourse to findings and hypotheses from a vast variety of scientific disciplines and techniques, he tries to match the process of the rationalization of worldviews with the process of a child’s cognitive development, and to suggest religion as a human-made instrument for solving some cognitive questions as well as life problems in a specific period. Therefore, upon the arrival of modern rationality, religion should acknowledge the end of its era, and give its position over to the new powerful foe. This article appraises Habermas’ arguments in this regard so that its weak and strong points are revealed.

The main question with which this essay is concerned is the fundamentality of existence (A©ālat al-wujūd). It does not follow the typical procedure, that is, by explaining the technical terms first, but both the meaning of “the fundamentality of existence and conventionality of quiddity” and the argument for them, are demonstrated through a philosophical dialogue, employing no technical terms. The content is arranged in such a way that if the reader begins, as the text proposes, to deal with it as a respondent and then as a critic and questioner, he/she will have no difficulty in grasping the depth of the idea. However, the next part, which supplements the work, illustrates the idea in technical terms. To do so, some terms like “quiddity”, “existent”, “accidental”, “substantial”, “conventional” and “fundamental” are defined before the main idea of the discussion is reviewed. The final part of the essay sheds light on the differences and consequences of the two competing theories, i.e. the fundamentality of existence and that of quiddity.

Logicians have, since Aristotle, agreed upon dividing “concept” into universal (kulli) and particular (Juz’i). The criterion of such a classification is based on whether or not a concept is applicable to the plenty: on the one hand, this criterion calls for a close examination of such concepts like god (ilāh), necessarily existent (wājib al-wujūd), and assumed universals like nothing (lā-shi’) and not possible (lā-mumkin). This is important in order to determine whether these concepts fall into the realm of the universals. Logicians sought to verify the universality of these concepts, and despite the futility of their attempts, their claim seems plausible. On the other hand, the particularity of such concepts as "Zayd" (or John Done) is deemed uncertain. Accordingly, some logicians have considered the universal-particular dichotomy as groundless, arguing that every concept is universal. This essay deals with how Mullā uadrā and Allāmah _abāabā’i have treated this issue. uadr al- Muta’allihīn, viewing concepts from a certain angle and Allāmah _abāabā’i, observing the relationship of imagery and sensory concepts to the objective (‘aini) world, were able to justify the particularity of particular concepts, and thus confirming the idea that “concept” is in fact of two types: universal and particular.

This article begins with a review of the literature on the classification of propositions as analytics and synthetics and the types of such a classification: as a method, as a differentiation between propositions, and as a philosophical school. Elaborating on the question as to what in this classification is divided, and distinguishing between such technical terms as sentence, statement, proposition, and judgment, it suggests that what is in fact divided is the proposition proper. Although Kant divides judgment into analytic and synthetic, the author believes Kant has focused on the psychological aspect of the question which is not an issue to be dealt with in epistemology. Then three criteria for analyticity are discussed and criticized: A) a proposition whose predicate stands for something embodied in the meaning of its subject; B) a proposition whose negation leads to contradiction; and C) a proposition whose truth is secured by the expressions employed therein. At the end, the classification of propositions as analytic and synthetic in the Western philosophy is compared to the classification of predications (ˆaml) as primary and practically common (shāye‘ ©inā‘i) in the Islamic philosophy.