فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال دهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 38، زمستان 1391)

We face three well known philosophical schools i.e. Peripatetic, illuminative, and transcendent ones in the field of Islamic philosophy. An internal look at various issues raised in these schools and their analysis have formed the major part of books and articles in this regard. However, the external and holistic look at these schools and study of components forming a philosophical school and the process of its realization in a span of time are also very significant. Therefore the main questions are: 1. What are the features of a philosophical school distinguishing it from other ones? 2. Why do we face only three schools in Islamic philosophy? Explaining and analyzing these features, the present article seeks to apply them to the peripatetic and illuminative systems. The authors claim that the peripatetic and illuminative schools have a starting point, an especial philosophical method, necessary instruments for achieving their goals, and a harmonious ontological system. Carefully considering the teachings of these two schools, we can find out these elements and analyze why they are designated as philosophical schools and what distinguishes one from the other. Two points would be concluded from this analysis: firstly the macro foundations necessary for founding a philosophical school are explained. Secondly it becomes clear that the mere unity of the philosophical method of two philosophers or their consensus on one or more issues does not imply that their philosophical systems are one and the same. Thus the existence of even one new component can form the identity of a new school quite distinguished from the earlier ones.

Emergence and development of any branch of knowledge depends on creativity and innovation. Philosophy as the outcome of intellectual considerations towards essential and ultimate questions on any issue is one of the fields requiring study of development and innovation. By innovation here is meant taking a new theoretical step towards developing, spreading, and deepening a discipline or emergence of a branch of knowledge. Philosophy like other fields of human thought has developed through innovations. However, a glance at the history of philosophy indicates that this field has suffered from a type of stagnation in certain stages of its history. Consideration on the questions raised in this field can pave the way for a solution. Some of the questions are as follows: Is innovation something possible in philosophy? How can we make innovations in philosophy and what are its mechanisms? What are the causes of and obstacles before innovation? What method of education and research in philosophy may lead to innovation? What disciplines or branches of knowledge can contribute to innovation in philosophy? Is any kind of innovation desirable? Does believing in innovation have mutual concomitance with skepticism and relativity in knowledge? Is contemporary Islamic philosophy moving towards innovation? The present article offers considerations on this sort of questions. It investigates into the necessity of innovation, its domain, its preparatory grounds and obstacles, and the elements taking account of which in philosophical education and research can lead to innovation.

Philosophy deals with the “existent”. Existent is usually analyzed into existence and quiddity. Investigating into existence and quiddity, philosophers have attached principality to existence. Some of them have considered existences as heterogeneous. However, transcendent philosophers have turned to gradation of existence denying heterogeneity of existences. On the other hand, men of mystic knowledge have considered existence as a particular one. Having a more profound consideration, Mulla Sadra has referred the multiplicity of existence to manifestations of the reality of existence, and like the men of mystic knowledge has counted the reality of existence – the very existence of God- as a particular one. Hence he has referred the hierarchical multiplicity to existences and effects which are the manifestations of that reality, and there is no gradation between the reality of existence and its manifestations but based on subjective consideration. The claim of the men of mystic knowledge that the reality of existence is a particular one, and the rest are its manifestations can be proved in three ways: Firstly through the infinity of the necessary being, secondly through the pure connection of the beings other than the necessary being to Him, and thirdly through the definition of gradation and the property or quality of the necessary by itself. Therefore, beginning with the principality of existence and reaching the particular unity of existence, Mulla Sadra’s philosophy has considered the multiple existences as manifestations of that particular one.

While a large number of Quranic verses and traditions suggest the creation of soul prior to body, Mulla Sdra -like most of Muslim philosophers- considers temporal origination of soul contrary to intellectual proofs and requiring numerous dilemmas, hence denying it. However, owing to his big concern of indicating the compatibility between intellect and textual proofs, and respecting the outer aspect of textual proofs, he has sought to present a more profound meaning of verses and traditions through a sort of modification and interpretation of arguments beyond their literal and prima facie signification, hence resolving the problem. He held that all the arguments suggesting the creation of soul prior to body seek to indicate the various stages and modes of the soul in transcendent worlds, describing soul as a stage of perfection among the perfections of supreme beginnings and a being among transcendent beings. In other words, these arguments suggest the intellectual existence of the soul rather than its spiritual one. Explaining and affirming the teaching of “intellectual existence of soul”, the present article responds to certain rational as well as textual problems concerning this problem.

Stating various types of composition of conjunctive and disjunctive conditional propositions from elements such as categorical and conditional propositions in chapter 8, section 3 of his book “Al Isharat wa al Tanbihat”, Ibn Sina gives several examples the first of which is the conjunctive proposition composed of a conjunctive and a disjunctive proposition. This very example is the core of a noteworthy controversy between two commentators of this book i.e. Khajeh Nasir al Din Al Tusi and Fakhr Razi. Fakhr Razi holds that any cogent conjunctive proposition is equivalent to only one exclusive disjunctive proposition, a view somewhat identical with what is raised in modern logic. In contrast, Khajeh Tusi believes that this exclusiveness is not right and any cogent conjunctive proposition can be reduced to an inclusive disjunctive proposition or incompatible disjunctive one without distinction or preference. Judging the views of Fakhr Razi and Khajeh Tusi and explaining the view of modern logic in this regard, the present article benefits from modern logic. Finally, explaining the difference between the view of Fakhr Razi and modern logic, it concludes that the right view is that of Khajeh Tusi confirmed by modern logic.

Since studying mathematics develops and activates the mental system, it may be claimed that the profound understanding of mathematics can be effective in finding the facts and in true understanding of the phenomena. Thus mathematical understanding can help the individual perform his tasks with better knowledge and insight. In other words, benefitting from mathematical concepts, one can achieve the capability of deducing facts. Having stated the cognitive position of mathematics based on Plato’s and Des cartes’ quotations, the present article introduces a type of mathematical knowledge, which is the outcome of profound understanding of mathematical concepts, as mathematical cognition and insight. Determining the domain of this kind of knowledge based on the concept of the word” algorithm”, it also deals with the quality of the stages of achieving it. The article closes with giving certain examples for the cognitive aspect of the concept of function, and the graph structure in the theory of graphs.

Recognizing the influence of religious teachings on the human sciences in the three fields of objective, method, and problems, the present article divides the human sciences into descriptive and prescriptive ones, and deals with the role of eschatology in the methodology of prescriptive human sciences. Criticizing the prevalent methodologies in the study of the human sciences, including positivism, falsificationism, historicism, Dilthey’s hermeneutics, and critical realism, and stating their incompatibility with believing in the hereafter, the article studies the methodology consistent with the idea of eschatology, and concludes that in studying prescriptive human sciences, it is necessary to benefit from revelational methodology as well as rational one.