فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال دهم شماره 3 (پیاپی 39، بهار 1392)

To indicate the value of perceptions and the representation of universal concepts, Allamah Tabatabai in principles of philosophy and realistic Method has sought to introduce them through sense perception relevant to objective realities, thus giving a special analysis of sense perception. According to him, sense perception is the outcome of the influence of objective sensible on the organ of sensitive faculty and the formation of a material phenomenon in it. This material phenomenon is known intuitively and gives rise to creation of a sensible form in the sentiens and formation of sense perception. However, in Bidayah al Hikmah and Nihayah al Hikmah he considers the influence of the sensible on sensory organ and the resulted material interplay as the preparing cause of presence of sensory and imaginative forms in the soul. Sensory and imaginative forms are self- existent forms known to soul intuitively making them into acquired knowledge by taking certain subjective considerations and comparing them to external sensible things which are the source of external phenomena. His theories in these books are not the same and may be regarded somewhat inconsistent. The books Bidayah al Hikmah and Nihayah al Hikmah being the final works of Allamah Tabatabai, his final theory is the one raised in them rather than his other books. Therefore, sense perception is a specific consideration which mind takes towards abstract ideal form known intuitively.

As the best known defender of coherentism in justification, Keith Lehrer- refers to the tripartite meaning of knowledge in English and introduces the third meaning, i.e. confirmation of certain information, as the one recognized in epistemology. However, he does not consider this literal analysis sufficient, and turns to the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge. Contrary to the current view in western epistemology, he introduces a fourth element, i.e. indefeasibility in addition to the three conventional elements of belief, truth, and justification. He regards designalizing as the reality of truth, replacing the condition of belief with that of acceptance, aiming at ascertaining reality and avoiding falsehood. Declaring access to adequate reason and evidence as the purpose of justification, he adds the condition of indefeasibility to the tripartite components of knowledge in order to escape the Gettier problem. According to the authors, there are certain problems with the four elements of Lehrer, including the following: first, interpretation of truth as designalizing is insufficient. Secondly, with regard to acceptance, there is confusion between confirmation by heart and mental confirmation. Thirdly, there are certain ambiguities in Lehrer’s words concerning justification.

The issue of "convention" (I‘tibar) is one of the significant issues in the realm of topics raised particularly in the philosophy of right, philosophy of politics, philosophy of law, and philosophy of ethics. The Reality of convention and conventional subjects, distinguishing between its various meanings, the relation of convention and construction, convention and gradual appearance, categories of conventionals, conventionals and reality, and the issue of truth and falsehood in conventionals, are among the most important topics which are to be dealt with in discussing conventionals. Many scholars have dealt with the above issues putting forward valuable achievements. However, two outstanding Muslim thinkers, i.e the late Ayatollah Esfahani and Allamah Tabataba’i have raised the most precise discussions in this field. The present article explains the views of the Late Mohammad Hosein Gharavi Esfahani concerning the issue of conventionals.

Confining "being existent" in the sense of "having objective realization" to the essence of Almighty God and attributing all other than God to Him, Muhaqqiq Dawani considers quiddity as the made one. Mulla Sdra has criticized his foundation and principles. However, it seems that the theory of Muhaqqiq Davani is the same as the final theory of Mulla Sadra concerning the unity of Allah. Thus Muhaqqiq Davani’s views are susceptible of true interpretation, since in case of accepting the particular unity of existence, existence cannot be subject to making. However, quiddities would have manifestations and all other than God are considered manifestations of Almighty God attributed to Him. Principality of quiddity requires that the made one is quiddity rather than requiring quiddities to have external and objective realization next to Almighty God.

Perfection of the soul is something recognized in religion and philosophy. What is controversial here is the quality of the perfection of the immaterial soul. Knowledge and practice are considered the elements of perfection of soul in philosophy. However, the question arises as to how these two lead to the perfection of soul. Furthermore, does this perfection continue after death, and if yes, how? The present article seeks to explain the process of the perfection of the soul according to Mulla Sadra and to answer the above questions. To do so, it studies the relation between intelligible forms with soul as well as the quality of the relation of the soul to active intellect. Explaining the way souls can perfect after death, Mulla Sadra has studied the quality of perfection of different types of the souls.

At the outset, the present article defines humanism and clarifies the reason behind and the wide variety of definitions in this field. It continues to explain the history of modern humanism, referring to three phases of humanism, i.e. renaissance, the enlightenment, and modern humanism, and their features. It also deals with different types of humanism, i.e. religious humanism and secular humanism. Explaining the principles of humanism such as naturalism, considering human as the source of values, freedom of the human being, rationalism, and tolerance, the article continues to present certain criticisms raised against humanism.

One of the questions in the context of possible worlds is whether an individual may exist in more than one world. Some scholars like David Lewis have denied the existence of an individual in more than one possible world while some others like Alvin Plantinga believe in inter world individuals. Raising Lewis´s approach concerning denial of inter world individuals, the present article explains the counterpart theory as the substitute one. Based on the counterpart theory, although each individual exists only in one possible world, he has counterparts in other worlds. In contrast, based on the theory of Plantinga, any individual may exist in more than one possible world. Therefore Plantinga´s words entail that an individual must have certain essential qualities leading to his distinction in each of the worlds. The last part of the article deals with the point that the issue of individual essence can refer to that of personification according to Muslim philosophers. Since personification, in its final analysis, does not refer to anything but existence, the hypothesis of individual essence resting on specification of universal by universal can not be accepted.