فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال یازدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 41، پاییز 1392)

In Philosophical books, under the topic of Intelligibles, there are so many discussions on various types of ‘essences’ and ‘accidents’. However, there is no separate discussion on the relation between essence and accident. Rather, this has been discussed, inter alia, in a passing way. The issue suffers some complexities and contradictions; and there are disagreements concerning it. Accordingly, here, we have dealt with it as a separate discussion.Here, after the introduction, various views on the relation between essence and accident have been mentioned. Then, the drawbacks of each view have been reviewed; and finally, by presenting some solutions and implicitly comparing them we have prepared, in an attempt to set a criterion for accident, the ground to substitute the “separability” of essence from accident for their “existential polarity”.

The theory of the particular gradation of being is one of the main foundations of transcendental philosophy. In some writings, this theory has not been rightly explained. Thus, a reconsideration of it can give us a better picture. According to the present study, discussions such as ‘univocality’ and the ‘gradation’ of the concept of existence, ‘essentiality of existence’ and ‘simplicity of existence’ are among the foundations of this theory; just as the real unity and plurality of existents as well as the sameness of unity and plurality of existence are among its parameters. Based on this theory, all orders of existence, despite their plurality and diversity, may be considered as a personal running continuous unit extending from the highest order of existence (Necessary Existent by essence) down to the lowest order (the prime matter). Therefore, the unique and personal reality of existence, despite its unity and simplicity, is plural with longitudinal and latitudinal orders. It seems that Mullā Sadrā’s theory of particular gradation is different from his own theory of personal unity, and they may be well differentiated.

Considering the relation between the worlds of existence and the nature of that relation is one of the necessities of a systematic philosophy. Plato’s theory of ideals focuses just on finding the intellectual “individual” for different physical species. Apart from the challenge of gradation in quiddity, the theory is unable to determine the ideal individuals or the divine individual for physical species. With the florescence of the Islamic philosophy in transcendental philosophy and the development of the theory of essentiality and gradation of existence, however, a more precise explanation called the theory of collective existence has been offered that brings about the correspondence and conformity of all the worlds.

The philosophers of science believe, in the present age, that the word ‘cause’ used in the translations of Aristotle’s works is erroneous; and that he never meant, by the Greek word ‘aition/ aitia’, what understood by the Muslim philosophers, and later by scholastic philosophers, who used the word ‘cause’ for it. The philosophers of science believe that Aristotle was just thinking of explaining the way different phenomena emerged, and he had nothing to do with the supernatural causes for those phenomena. Thus, ‘cause’ for him was nothing but explanation, and the four causes are the four explanations used by Aristotle to explain the emergence, movement and alteration. These philosophers have used ‘explanation’ instead of ‘cause’ to correct the misunderstandings resulted from Aristotle’s thought. By studying Aristotle’s works as well as the deficiencies in the theory of ‘explanation’, we may well prove the inaccuracy of the idea suggested by the philosophers of science and show that Aristotle not only wished to analyze the quality of genesis, but also cared about the reason for it.

Justification of knowledge is one of the most important issues that have occupied the philosophers and epistemologists since long ago. This has led to presenting a variety of related views. Foundationalism is one of the oldest and the most important views among them. Thus, the present study is seeking to investigate the arguments for foundationalism as well as the most important challenges it faces. To do so, it investigates the arguments by the impossibility of infinite regress as well as contingency and certainty to show that only some interpretations through the impossibility of infinite regress are capable of proving the claims of the foundationalists. However, the foundationalists are not to obtain anything by arguing through contingency and certainty. The present study continues by investigating the most important challenges the foundationalism faces. These are as follows: unreasonableness of the basic arguments, the relationship between the basic propositions and the reality, and the inconsistency of the knowledge system based on foundationalism. It will be clarified that the abovementioned challenges are all resolvable.

There have been four theories for discussing the necessity of distinguishing or not distinguishing between three modes in philosophy and logic. Some have basically denied any distinction while some others have determined different domains of usage of the three modes. A third group has regarded this distinction as a necessity, proposing a criterion there. The present article is seeking to suggest a forth theory to find a solution for the following two problems: firstly, why should we distinguish the three modes in logic from the contingency and necessity in philosophy? Secondly, what is the criterion for this distinction in logics and philosophy? To answer the former question, the authors argue that some important objections, including that of Hume and that of Kant, have been put forward for the metaphysical argumentations such as ‘ontological argument’ and ‘the argument from contingency and necessity’ and ‘the argument of the truthful ones’. The way out of this challenge is the distinction between the three logical modes and the philosophical contingency and necessity. To answer the latter question, they show that according to the criterion of the three modes in logic, if the predicate is the essence, one of the essentials or one of the requisites of the essence of its subject would be necessary. On the other hand, if the predicate is the opposite of essence, the opposite of one of the essentials or the opposite of one of the requisites of the essence of its subject would be impossible. And if the predicate is something other than the subject’s essence or its opposite, other than one of its essentials or its opposite, the proposition would be contingent. The criterion for contingency and necessity in philosophy, however, is being dependent or independent of cause. Since the philosophers’ analyses of causality are different, here we focus on interpretation presented by Avicenna and Mullā Sadrā.

The present article claims that through explaining the nature of human sciences by considering the reality of the human being, one may find out that human sciences are indeed human-making sciences. This necessitates that human sciences be, in a true sense, Islamic. Here, the abovementioned claim is resolved into two other cl firstly, defining human being as an animal with merely theoretical intellect (one who is capable of understanding the universal concepts) is not a complete definition. Rather, human being is an animal that must necessarily follow the practical intellect too, while enjoying the theoretical intellect. Secondly, based on a complete definition of the human being, human sciences are those sciences which are not inconsistent with human’s eternal felicity. If a proposition contradicts the true religion, it is out of the scope of human sciences, although it may be considered similar to them.