فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال دوازدهم شماره 3 (پیاپی 47، بهار 1394)

Ontological arguments are arguments to prove the existence of Allah, in which His existence is proved, a priori, through a mere concept and without adherence to any objective entity. In the west, St. Anselm (1109-1033 or 1034) proposed this kind of argument in the Christian theology, and ever since it has had leading opponents and proponents. In the Islamic philosophy and theology, the argument has not had an outstanding place; however, in the words of the predecessors, and of Farabi as a frontrunner, traces of attention to this argument can be noticed. But, during the last half century, the attention to it is increasing. Some have accepted it, and some have negated it. In this article, after a brief review of the development of the ontological argument in the west, we have posed some Muslim philosopher’s views on the argument. Then, reconstructing Allameh Tabataba’i’s “argument of the truthful ones”, we suggest a new exposition of the ontological argument, which is immune from the critiques presented to Anselm’s ontological argument and its different narrations.

Aristotle attaches corporeal contingency to soul, and believes that the corporeal soul does not hold the qualification of intellection or the intellectual perception. The intellectual perception and intellectual form are immaterial objects, and intellection needs an immaterial entity. Therefore, Aristotle leaves intellection to intellect, but what is the relation between this immaterial intellect and the material soul, and how does it play a role in intellection? Aristotle’s theory is ambiguous, and this ambiguity should be cleared. Avicenna regards soul as an immaterial object; distinguishes its state of essence from its state of action, and attributes intellectual perception to the soul. He believes intellectual perception is an essential act of the soul, and soul is considered to be the same as the particular intellect. Avicenna calls the influence of Active Intellect on creating the intellectual forms in human intellective soul as effusion and illumination with regard to its quiddity and existence. This article is an analysis and explanation of Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s views on the problem of intellection.

The problem of the causal necessity is one of the important and fundamental problems of the Islamic philosophy, and it plays a central role in subjects such as determinism/free will, and temporal origination/temporal eternity. This article, after reviewing different kinds of causal necessity, explains the most important arguments suggested by the advocates of causal necessity. Scrutinizing the arguments, it concludes that they cannot prove their desired result. It argues that most of the arguments for causal necessity suffer from the fallacy of begging the question (the fallacy of petitio principia), and they unconsciously presuppose causal necessity before any argument. At the end, an argument against causal necessity is suggested; an argument that has not been employed so far by the deniers.

The argument from correlation is one of the arguments which Mulla Sadra made use of it to prove the theory of the union between subject and object of intellection. The philosophers after Mulla Sadra studied and argued for and against it in their works. Some of them have considered it incomplete to prove the theory, and some have insisted on its completeness. Among them Mahdi Haeri seems to have accepted the above mentioned argument, and has studied and analyzed it in detail. This article studies his viewpoints on the argument in ‘Surveys of Theoretical Reason’.

Advocates of religious science believe that sciences, whether natural or human, have emerged and developed in the range, and on the border, of metaphysics. Therefore, sceinces evolve as metaphysics develops. In other words, sciences will become divine by divine metaphysics, and sciences will become secular if metaphysics is a secular and this-worldly one. However, in order to bring change in sciences, some methods should be presented. This study aims to offer a method for evolution in sciences according to the framework of religious science. The research method of the article is analytical-demonstrative.

Nominalism developed as an answer to the problems of universals. In this article, we first begin by studying the kinds of universal, and then, examine three theories, discussed much in the area of universals. These three theories are realism, conceptualism, and nominalism. Strict nominalism, metalinguistic nominalism, metaphor theory, narrative nominalism, class nominalism, methodological nominalism, and social nominalism are among the kinds of nominalism which we study in this article. Considering his realist tendency, Allameh Tabataba’i’s view is in clear contrast with some kinds of nominalism. This contrast is shown in the fields of ontology, epistemology, propositions, and fundamental methodology through a deductive and analytical method.

The relation between religion and reason has always been controversial in the history of human thinking. Since the most apparent advent of reason is in philosophy, the discussion of religion and reason has led to the discussion of religion and philosophy. In this study, defining philosophy and religion, we examine some Muslim thinkers’ and Western thinkers’ views on them. Some thinkers who do not see any harmony between religion and philosophy believe that religion has precedence over reason, and resorting to reason to understand religion is not acceptable. Some also consider reason prior to religion. Most Muslim thinkers, however, do not see any conflict between reason and religion, and reject any inherent incompatibility between religion and philosophy. They believe that there is no conflict between a clear-cut and conclusive judgment of reason and a conclusive judgment of religion, and if there was a conflict between a conclusive judgment of reason and a speculative understanding of religion, the speculative understanding of religion should be reinterpreted.