فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال دوم شماره 4 (پیاپی 8، تابستان 1384)

There has been always a propensity towards mysticism and spirituality among different nations, whether in the form of mystical traditions or individual tendencies. As an example, one can mention such ancient Eastern traditions as Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim mystical traditions. Both philosophy and mysticism are nowadays, as ever, among favorite and popular subjects in Islamic circles and seminaries. The philosophy of mysticism, however, is an unattained subject in modern times, consisting of rational reflections on mysticism. A philosopher studies mysticism from without, exploring its reality, rudiments, methodology, and its relations with other disciplines. The present discussion covers such issues as the nature of mysticism, the validity and epistemological value of mystical findings, the problem of mystical language, the difference between an experience and its interpretation, and the relation between mysticism and reason, religion, and ethics.

On account of the depth and complexity of its intuitions, mystical experience raises some questions for philosophers entering the province of the philosophy of mysticism; questions like the paradoxicality of such mystical doctrines as personal unity. Mystics sometimes speak of the facticity of existence as being both identical with and different from things. In some occasions, they express their intuitions as revealing that He (God) is both singular and plural by being present in the midst of plurality. He is both personal and impersonal, united with everything, and even He is everything, manifest while hidden and hidden while manifest. Are these statements that originate from mystical intuitions, really contradictory, or they only appear to be so? If there are contradictions lurking in the essence of mystical realities, they will not be commensurable with rational laws, because reason is based on the principles of identity and non-contradiction; therefore, reason will not be able to penetrate mysticism, understand its objective realities, and argue for them. Thus the question is whether or not mysticism is compatible with reason and philosophy, and in general, whether mysticism is rational or irrational? W.T. Stace has treated this problem in Mysticism and Philosophy, chapter five. This article tries to elaborate, compare, and scrutinize Stace’s points of view in this regard.

The existence of the Absolutely Perfect, or the Infinite Being, is one of the fundamental convictions of all monotheists, especially Muslims. Such terms as Subˆān-Allah, al-ˆamd-u li-llāh, yā Subbūˆ, and yā Quddūs refer to the reality of God as the absolutely perfect. In order to establish such a fundamental conviction, religious (including Muslim) philosophers, have introduced rational arguments and philosophical reasons, which are critically reviewed in this paper. The author also introduces other arguments that have not been sufficiently articulated in the existing philosophical works.

In the discussion about the necessary and sufficient knowledge in religion, three important questions are raised in the Islamic epistemology: first of all, which type of knowledge can be achieved regarding the Islamic teachings? Is it possible to achieve certainty in its narrowest sense in religious matters? Secondly, given the possibility of such knowledge is it necessary to acquire it, or it is sufficient to have a guess, an ordinary type of knowledge, or conviction? Thirdly, if an ordinary knowledge or confidence were sufficient, what are the criteria for its validity? Providing definitions for the terms “religion” and “epistemology” and their applications, and dividing certainty into common, specific, and the most specific one, the article argues that achieving the most specific certainty, is possible in some areas of religion, though acquiring such knowledge is not necessary. The views of some Muslim scholars, namely, Ayatullahs Qā„i _abā¬abā’i, Mīrzā-yi Qumi and Ma´āheri, as the only ones explicitly dealing with the issue, are discussed. The author criticizes Qā„i _abā¬abā’i’s view that achieving the most specific certainty is necessary regarding the basic beliefs of Islam. Although others have not clearly addressed this issue, there are evidences in their writings pointing to the idea that achieving the most specific certainty is not necessary in matters of religion.

Peripatetic Philosophers believe that sensory perception is the result of the imprint of external objects in sense organs. Regarding vision, two views have been put forward: a) the flow of light, and b) the imprint of a visual image in the eye. Suhrawardi repudiates the idea of the flow of light, as he rejects the theory of imprint arguing that major cannot be imprinted in minor. Hence, he believes that it is through knowledge by presence that external objects can be seen. Rejecting Suhrawardi’s view, uadr al-Muta’allihīn suggests that in all types of sense perceptions, an object is perceived when the soul (nafs) creates its sensual image in the associated world of forms, that is, the object of visual perception is itself a material being. However, one can claim that on the basis of the principles of transcendental philosophy, sense perception should be considered as a type of knowledge by presence, and the immateriality of the object of knowledge—because of the immateriality of knowledge and its subject—does not contradict its being material, because the division of beings into material and immaterial, as its division into objective and subjective, is a relational division.