فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال هفتم شماره 3 (پیاپی 27، بهار 1389)

The question of the essentiality of existence or quiddity is one of the most debated and most basic questions in philosophy. This issue is raised by Mir-Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā as an independent issue; however, its foundations can be traced back to other philosophers as well. The authors in this article try to investigate this issue in Ibn Sian and Shaykh Ishraq. They claim that Shaykh Ishraq was mistaken when interpreted Ibn Sina’s idea of the occurrence (‘urūḍ) of existence for quiddity as an external occurrence, as he made a mistake when he ascribed to peripatetic philosophers the idea that existence is both subjectively and objectively different form quiddity. Then he rejected such a difference in a way that led to the rejection of existence, and the idea that quiddity was the real thing in the world and the source for abstracting the concept of existence. The authors try to show that Ibn Sina had emphasized on subjective (and not objective) occurrence of existence for quiddity, and therefore, he admitted existence as the external thing in the world.

Mulla Sadra’s philosophical psychology has been criticized by Mullā Rajab-Ali Tabrīzi and Qāḍi Sa’id Qumi. Tabrizi believes that Nafs is either in need of matter from the outset or it does not need it. If it needs matter for its origination, it should be material all the way, and is incapable of becoming immaterial; but if it is not material at the outset, therefore, it is immaterial whether by the time of its origination or in its survival. He argues that there is no third option according to which, nafs is material in the beginning and then becomes immaterial.According to the author of this article, Tabrizi’s rejection of Mulla Sadra is based on lack of deep understanding of the principles of the Transcendental Philosophy of Mulla Sadra. This is also the case with Qāḍi Sa’id Qumi, who accepted the unity of the Knower and the known, the unity of the imaginer and the imagined, and the unity of the sensor and the sensed, on the one hand, and rejected the primacy of existence, the gradation of existence, and substantial motion, on the other! Most of his arguments are rhetorical.

The authors in this article try to suggest a new approach in Ibn Sina’s philosophical thought which is against the classical understanding of his philosophy. They suggest that Ibn Sina benefits from a mystical and intuitive mentality as well as his deductive methodology; but his intuitive approach is hidden under his rational arguments and discursive school. The authors assume the responsibility to explain the intuitive aspect, or the mystical experience of Ibn Sina which can be called “intellectual gnosis”. According to the authors, his intuitive treatises as well as three parts of his Ishārāt, have the same structure and goal. Furthermore, the whole of Ibn Sina’s philosophy is considered one philosophical system, and his intuitive writings are essential, rather than peripheral, parts of that philosophy. Therefore, Ibn Sina’s philosophy is distinguished form the philosophy of Aristotle in fundamental aspects.

According to the popular philosophical theories, the subject matter of metaphysics is “absolute existence” or “existent as existent”. For this theory to be correct, it is necessary for existence to be capable of accepting any judgment. It means that one should be able to judge on existence by some judgments or attributes. This article wants to argue that it is impossible to do that. Therefore, it is impossible for “existence” to be the subject matter of philosophy.

This article studies the stages in which Leibniz’s thoughts had been shaped about extension and place, and their interrelation. It shows how Leibniz considers “kraft-virtus-vis” to be the base of all things and extension, by rejecting any substance for extension. By going out of the Cartesian and Kantian dualism, he suggests a spiritual base for worldly entities. Leibniz assumes extension, matter, and place as phenomenal levels and derivative realities, and therefore, considers the world to be infinite on both sides (from within and from without). Hence, he rejects atom and void. He considers the base of things as metaphysical points called, “monads”, which have life and understanding, and have a comprehension of their environment. In this way he also explains the nature of connection.

The issue of modals (necessity, possibility, and impossibility) and modal propositions is discussed in both philosophy and logic. Muslim logicians very often, during their discussion of types of propositions, divide predicatory propositions into modal and non-modal (absolute) propositions, and then discuss about their subdivisions and their predicates. Philosophers also divide concepts or quiddities into three categories of necessary being, contingent being, and impossible to be. The question to be investigated pertains to the difference between the logical and philosophical meaning of matters and modalities, and whether it is essentially a logical or a philosophical issue. Muslim thinkers have answered in three ways: a) difference in meaning; b) same meaning in different spheres; and c) same meaning and sphere.In this article, the author reviews two former answers and then discusses the third option as the idea favored by Mulla Sadra. According to his theory, this issue is basically a philosophical problem, and if discussed in logic, it would be a peripheral discussion. Then the author criticizes this idea and tries to show its flaws, including the confinement of modals to specific types of predicatory propositions. Finally, he suggests a fourth option, according to which the difference between logical and philosophical modes is described by reference to modes pertaining to truth, and modes pertaining to existence.

For “right” to be established in the objective world, it is necessary to suppose a possessor of right to which it belongs. Without such an assumption, one is unable to imagine any right. This is why one of main issues in the domain of the philosophy of right is the question of who possesses the right; are any conditions required for the right holder? Is consciousness and life required for it? Can animals, plants, and inanimate entities be regarded among the possessors of right? The author in this article reviews different ideas in this regard, both in the western schools and in the Islamic main sources and concludes that, contrary to the ideas suggested by western philosophers, no condition is necessary for any being to hold some rights, and therefore, one can assume genetic as well as conventional rights for any being.