فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال سیزدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 50، زمستان 1394)

One of the important discussions of moral epistemology is the epistemology of "moral obligation" wherein such issues as the possibility of knowing "moral obligation", regarding sentences containing "moral obligation" as affirmative or imperative, and the absoluteness or relativity of such sentences are dealt with. Allama Tabatabaie, the famous Muslim philosopher, has no explicit statement on the epistemological discussions of "moral obligation". Thus, the expositors of his statements are in high disagreement. However, most of them have considered him as a imperativist and non-cognitivist, while some others have introduced him as a relativist!
The present study uses an analytical-philosophical method to define affirmative and imperative statements in moral epistemology, and to prove that Allama regards the sentences containing "moral obligation" as affirmative statements. Besides, this article defines cognitivism and non-cognitivism in moral epistemology, and regards Allama's theory on sentences containing "moral obligation" as a cognitivist and absolutist theory.
Considering three ways of recognizing moral sentences in Allama's theory is one of the evidences for his being a cognitivist.

Considering the fact that any mind, in the first place and directly, contacts just with its individual world, how has human mind believed that there is an external world independent of our consciousness? To answer this question, Walter Stace investigates the stages of logical development of the mind, beginning with empirical data, and concludes that a belief in the existence of an independent external world must be a mental construct and an expression of sensory representations that various minds have cooperated to create in order to have a common and simpler world.
In the present article, it will be clarified that, first, Stace clearly ignores some instances of mind's direct knowledge (which are starting points in the logical development of the mind); secondly, he is not bound to the principles he himself has specified; and, thirdly, he pays no attention to some methods of argumentation such as reasoning through the best explanation.

Human innate realities are worth investigating from many aspects. The present article explains, ontologically, the innate realities of the human being. Innate entities are human potentials that gradually appear in the realm of theoretical and practical reason. Innate affairs are subject to the philosophical rule, "any contingent being is preceded by a potentiality and a matter conveying it"; which shows their need for a material place (subject). The need of an abstract entity (such as intellectual understanding) to a material subject is not explicable through philosophical principles common in philosophies before Mullā Ṣadrā. However, one may, using the philosophical principles of transcendental philosophy, prove that innate affairs are potentialities existing in human soul, gradually actualized through substantial and intensifying motion. Based on Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical principles, innate realities are modes of human existence, not attributes happening to his existence.

Dividing knowledge into "knowledge by presence" and "knowledge by representation" is one of the most important divisions of knowledge in Islamic epistemology. Epistemologists believe that knowledge by presence is an immediate encounter with "the known" itself, and thus, it has an absolute epistemological value, without the possibility of any error penetrating it. On the other hand, many doubts have been put forward in this regard so that infallibility in this type of knowledge may be denied. The present article relies on negating any intermediary in knowledge by presence, and stresses its infallibility to remove the doubts which have been put forward.

The present article deals with one of the important philosophical discussions on "right". The question is whether "right" in "having right" is an existential one or conventional? In other words, when we use "having right" in politics, law and ethics – disregarding the legislation of the legislator – is it an actual reality or a conventional one? Considering the fact that Allama Tabatabaie is a prominent authority in humanities and his view on "right" is an effective one, the present article investigates his view in this regard, and is seeking to prove the claim that according to his principles and ideas in his Tafsīr Al-Mīzān, "right" does not have just a conventional nature; rather, it enjoys a dual nature (existential and conventional). In this study, data explanation was done through rational and critical analysis, and the data collection was in documentary form.

The principle of non-contradiction is the most basic principle of human knowledge. Denying it will lead to denial of all sciences and falling into sophistry and skepticism. In the present article, we have attempted to recognize the nature of contradiction and some of its less-known aspects which may, if neglected, lead to numerous sophistries. By a precise analysis of contradiction, we conclude that the reality of contradiction is nothing but "agreement and exclusion of negation and affirmation belonging to a single affair", and this is rationally absurd both in agreement and exclusion. Although the abovementioned principle is axiomatic, reaching the dependent of contradictory statement may – in proportion to what is negated or affirmed – become complicated and, as the result, discerning contradiction will become difficult. Generally speaking, the principle of non-contradiction has three other branches each of which is applicable in a certain sphere depending on its belonging. Sometimes, what is negated or affirmed are the individual essences and sometimes what the concepts say of their instances and sometimes the truth and falsity of propositions. We have called those forms of contradiction "contradiction of essences", "contradiction of qualities" and "contradiction of propositions" respectively, and investigated the related precepts.

The basic question answered in this article is as follows: what is the basis and method of relationship between Islamic philosophy and humanities? In this article, we attempt to show the terms of Islamic philosophy and humanities so that we may find a way for systematic durability of Islamic philosophy in theorizing in humanities. To do so, the path is covered step by step. The main innovation of the article is formed according to Allama Tabatabaie's theory on "philosophy". According to Allama's theory, philosophy is responsible for proving the existence of subject in any science. This is while for well-known Islamic thinkers, the subject of any science is a better criterion for identifying it than two other criteria, i.e. "method" and "goal". For Allama Tabatabaie and Murteza Mutahhari, the main duty of philosophy is to prove the existence of the subject of any science as well as to produce method of theorization proper to the subject of that science. The whole findings of the product of proving the existence and the mode of existence of the subject as well as the proper method make up the philosophy of humanities. If the philosophy of humanities is systematically extracted from the related Islamic teachings, we will have an Islamic approach in the realm of philosophy of humanities, and consequently, a starting point for theorization.