فصلنامه آینه معرفت
پیاپی 11 (تابستان 1386)

In this paper, after propounding the issue of corporeal resurrection and discussing its importance, the writer argues that Mulla Sadra's interpretation of corporeal resurrection is greatly influenced by the theory of the corporeal origination of the soul. Based on this theory and given the conformity between this principle and other principles in relation to corporeal resurrection, by emphasizing the issue of objectivity, Mulla Sadra concludes that, the soul is always administered by the body; however, by this body he means a vague and alternative one. The identity of the otherworldly and worldly bodies does not necessitate the consideration of worldly matter in the otherworldly body, which is, rather, a form without matter. His main key in this interpretation is the principle of the trans-substantial motion, upon which is based the origination of the soul. According to Mulla Sadra, all the existents of the material world are in trans-substantial motion. The soul, because of being material at the beginning of its origination, is also in trans-substantial motion, and in this process, like all the existents of the world, it is moving towards its end, i.e. the Hereafter. In addition to the principle of the trans-substantial motion, the immateriality of the soul at the level of imagination and the possibility of the journey of the soul in the three-fold worlds can also be clarified by means of the theory of the corporeal origination of the soul on the justification and interpretation of corporeal resurrection. Here, Mulla Sadra succeeds in demonstrating the existence of the intermediate body; nevertheless, his demonstration of the otherworldly body suffers from many problems. Of course, these problems do not lead to the separation of the fields of faith and intellect in relation to corporeal resurrection. Rather, one can still demonstrate corporeal resurrection by means of rational and philosophical principles, as both Hakim Zunuzi and Allamah Tabatabai did.

The division of propositions into verity and actuality propositions is one of the innovations of Muslim logicians succeeding Ibn Sina, such as Fakhr Razi and his students, Afzal al-Din Khawnji, and Athir al-Din Abhari. This division corresponds to Western philosopher's divisions of propositions into necessary and contingent ones (by Aristotle), analytic and synthetic ones, and a priori and a posteriori ones (by Hume and Kant). It also reveals Muslim logician's view of these divisions. It was first criticized by such logicians as Khwajah Nasir and his students; however, all later logicians agreed with this division and attached great importance to it. In recent years, a number of classifications for verity and actuality propositions have been presented in modern logic (by Hairi Yazdi, Muradi Ufusi, Kurdi, and Vahid Dastjerdi). In this paper, by means of revealing the weaknesses of these classifications in our logician's analyses of the issue, the writer has offered a new classification and demonstrated its correspondence with the elevated thoughts of Islamic logic.

In the Transcendent Philosophy, the issue of epistemology was first introduced by Allamah Tabatabai and was later followed by Mutahhari in particular. According to the later, only Islamic philosophy has been able to find a way out of the dead-end of knowledge. He explains the solution as follows: quiddities or primary intelligibles are the sources of abstracting such philosophical concepts as possibility, necessity, causality, etc. and since the mental existence of primary intelligibles conforms to what exists in the outside world, it is possible to attain knowledge. This paper provides an analysis and critique of the reasons given in the Transcendent Philosophy for the conformity between mental forms and external quiddities. Concerning this theory, we can accept that secondary intelligibles are abstracted from primary ones. However, the major problems regarding the issue of knowledge are the same primary intelligibles and the reasons that justify the conformity. Considering knowledge as being evident, in fact, means erasing the problem rather than offering a solution for it. If the objection concerning the conformity between the mind and the outside is advanced, the issue of secondary intelligibles cannot solve the problem of knowledge. In the Transcendent Philosophy, the issue of knowledge is not separable from the issues of existence and quiddity. Seemingly, the discussion of the conformity between mental and objective quiddities concerning the issue of mental existence is mainly based on the “principiality of quiddity” and not the “principiality of existence”. Presenting a solution for the problem of knowledge is, of course, the subject of an independent research, and this paper merely provides a critique of the theory of knowledge in the Transcendent Philosophy. It is hoped that, given the existing problems, other thinkers can arrive at convenient answers in this regard.

Sanai is one of the prominent Persian poets who has benefitted from more theological and religious beliefs in his works in comparison to others. In spite of the dominance of Sunnite religions, such as the Asharite and Hanafite, in his time and place of living, the Shiite theological beliefs are vastly reflected in the works of this philosopher so that he has accurately referred to many of the religious principles of this group alongside those of others and defended them as theological and religious realities. The purpose of this paper is to show that in the middle of the lines of his gnostic and religious poems, Sanai has extensively dealt with theological issues, particularly, those in Shii theology, and in many cases, he has preferred them to the beliefs of other religious branches. In doing so, the writer initially propounds the issue of oneness, in which, by rejecting “vision” and turning to esoteric exegesis and the interior of the Quran, he goes far from the religious principles of the Asharites and comes close to Shii beliefs. Then he poses the issue of “leadership” (Imamat) and, by referring to a number of rational and traditional arguments, aggresses with Imam Ali's wilayah (guardianship) and being the successor of the Holy Prophet (pbuh). In this regard, the writer declares his solidarity with Imam Ali's friends and household and denounces his enemies. In what follows, he emphasizes that the element of “acknowledging act”, like the element of affirmation by heart, is one of the main pillars of faith. Of course, the writer also discusses Sanai's ideas of other theological issues, such as justice, favor, the knowledge of God through God, and the best system, which reflect his Shii viewpoints, by resorting to his poems and valid theological sources so that it comes to light that, through research and without any prejudice, as he accepts the theological realities of other religious groups, he also acknowledges important Shii theological truths. In fact, we can infer from Sanai's theological discussions that, through posing, collecting, and presenting the theological beliefs of various groups, particularly the Asharites and Shiites, in his works, he intends to establish a kind of proximity between them.

In spite of the great differences concerning their beliefs as indicated in their works, there are many similarities between Shaykh Saduq and Shaykh Mufid, two of the most prominent Shii theologians regarding the principles they have introduced. It is difficult to place Shaykh Saduq as a muhaddith, whose works are mainly narrative, beside theologians such as Shaykh Mufid and some of his successors, such as Seyyed Murtada. However, a study of his basic principles can reveal a very close relation between him and the link connecting traditional theology and the Shii rational theology, i.e. Shaykh Mufid. The purpose of this paper is to search for the differences between Ibn Babwiyyah and Shaykh Mufid among elements other than their philosophical principles. In other words, it intends to demonstrate that the differences that distinguish them from each other merely lie in how much they employ their principles in their works. Moreover, the end or purpose of each in posing the discussions in relation to that of the other enjoys a different kind of breadth or restriction.

Temporal origination is one of the issues that demands our attention in relation to the consequences and concomitants of the theory of the trans-substantial motion. Mulla Sadra has presented a new concept of the origination of the world through this theory. He believes that the components of the world are temporally and essentially originated and, therefore, agrees in this regard with philosophers. However, his disagreement with early theologians and philosophers lies in the fact that, like theologians, he believes in the temporal origination or createdness of the world; however, unlike them, he maintains that the creation of the world was gradual rather than sudden. In his view, the world is in a state of gradual origination and annihilation. On the other hand, like philosophers, he believes that a possible thing bears an equal relation to existence and non-existence; however, his interpretation of essential origination is other than that of philosophers. According to Mulla Sadra, made existences enjoy a kind of posteriority and origination which is the same essential indigence of possible existents. When propounding the issue of the relatedness and pre-eternity of the world, Sabziwari, who is one of the disseminators of Sadrian philosophy, poses the theory of nominal origination, attributes it to himself, and explains it briefly.The present paper intends to analyze the solution offered by Mulla Sadra concerning the issue of the origination of the world based on the trans-substantial motion. It also posits Sabziwari's theory on clarifying the origination of the world and explores the effects of the ideas of early philosophers about this theory.

The place of ethical propositions is one of the issues that has occupied the minds of theologians, philosophers, and other thinkers for centuries. It has also given rise to various ideas. In this paper, the writer has tried to present Ibn Sina's view in this regard. The issue of ethics is, on the one hand, interwoven with theologian's discussions of goodness and badness and, on the other hand, closely related to the discussions of propositions, different types of syllogism, and its components in logic. Here, the writer, firstly, examines the place of ethical propositions in the field of logic and, then, briefly continues this discussion in the field of theology. Some of the questions tackled in this regard include whether ethical propositions are among indemonstrables or certainties, whether ethical attributes are objective or mentally-posited, and whether the origin of ethical propositions is divine order and prohibition or independent rational criteria.