فصلنامه آینه معرفت
پیاپی 43 (تابستان 1394)

The theory of conventional perceptions proposed by Allameh Tabatabaie is undoubtedly related to the functions of mind and reason. The issue is that, knowing the three types of Intelligibles in the Islamic philosophy (the two kinds of philosophical intelligibles and the logical one), what kind of relation can be established between the aforementioned theory and the three intelligibles. It is also of significance to identify the different interpretations made of his theory before and after his death. Delineating the origins of the issue of intelligibles in Islamic philosophy and the causes of its realization, the present article attempts to answer the above-mentioned questions making references to the functions of practical and theoretical reason as perceived by contemporary thinkers. The conclusion is that conventional perception is the function of practical reason and was proposed as a different type of intelligible.

In dealing with the system of thought of Aristotle and Avicenna who are considered the peripatetic philosophers, the following questions are raised: What is the role of causation in the formation of their thought and opinions? Is it possible to come to a rational explanation of creation, change, movement and knowledge without recourse to causation? Studying the works of Aristotle and Avicenna, one can well understand that the causation has an important role in the creation of things and their understanding. In the other words, the causes have a major ontological and epistemological position. Aristotle's four causes are necessary for the existence and its explanation. It is rather a connecting element between all creatures and their Creator and the element which is a necessary conjunct of the ordered universe. So causation is an element which goes beyond movement. It has not only changed the agent cause from potentiality to actuality it but has also a major role in knowing things through definition and argument. These two peripatetic philosophers, in spite of their agreement on the importance of causation in creation and  understanding of the world phenomena, differ in some of the details of the issue.

It is commonly accepted that most influential philosophers of recent centuries in the east and the west are Molla Sadra-ye-Shirazi, and Kant, the renowned German philosopher, respectively. The evidence for this claim comes from the fact that, in any field, all succeeding philosophers have either made descriptive annotations or critical commentaries on their works. Each of these two philosophers have their own special principles and terminology of which some are comparable. The present article is an attempt to compare and contrast Sadra’s “existence” and “essence” with Kant’s “noumenon” and “phenomenon”. To this end, first three interpretations of the corresponding pair of conceprts are presented, followed by a discussion on their similarities and differences. In interpeting Sadra’s existence and essence, special attention is paid to “aspects” and from among the numerous interpetion of Kant’s nouemenon and phenomenon, the psychological and epistemological interpations are emphasized.

The present article is concerned with the fundamentals of interpretation as developed in the school of Ibn Arabi and the views expressed by Allameh Tabatabai. In mysticism, interpretation is an integral element in understanding the holy Qur'an and hadith texts. What is achieved in a mystical interpretation is the inner meaning which can be validated without recourse to the outward aspects of the text. The purpose is to identify the fundamentals of the Mystic thought in interpretation. In addition to the fundamentals of mystical interpretation, the doubts concerning interpretation are dealt with in a comparative way. For comparative purposes, we have consulted Allameh Tabatabai's perspective as a great interpreter of the holy Qur'an. Accordingly, the mystical views of the mystics and the interpretative views of Allameh are compared and the intellectual affinities of a Mystic and an interpreter are presented. Therefore, the present article aims at investigating Ibn Arabi’s views on the fundamentals of interpretation and comparing them with those of Allameh Tabatabai. The method adopted in this paper is a combination of tradition and mystical rational analysis.

At the surface, atomism, which is commonly widespread nowadays, is similar to the theory of indivisible particles and the proof of prime matter depends on denial of the indivisible particle. The present paper provides answers to the following questions: Did the proof for disproving the particles refute atomism? Did the philosophers directly initiate disapproving atomism? In either case, is belief in prime matter compatible with atomism? The answer is that refutations of the indivisible particles constitute an independent element and they neither affirm nor deny atomism. So the philosophers were wrong in refuting Democritus’ theory as affirming the prime matter is not related to refuting atomism.

The present paper proposes a hypothesis about the cause of error which creeps unwittingly in an honest and wise understanding of the Qur'an. According to this hypothesis, any understanding of the Quran is inevitably based on a set of principles and premises and the premises of understanding the text can not be enumerated because they are so numerous and variant and the possibility of some hidden aspects being revealed is so high that recovering of all premises is practically impossible. As a result, in interpreting the Qur'an, any interpreter may inevitably use, in addition to conscious premises, some premises which are not apparent to him as he may have failed to investigate them properly. As some of the premises for understanding the text may be left unchecked and remain hidden to the interpreter, it is possible that the incorrect premise create an incorrect interpretation.

The present article, consistent with Husserl’s last work under the title The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, highlights two main categories. On the one hand, the science as devoid of human life and culture leads to crisis. Through his identification of the roots of the crisis adopting a teleological-historical inquiry into the primal meaning of science and his search for original self-evident primacies upon which science rest, Husserl made an attempt to find a way out of this problem. On the other hand, he presents life-world as the meaning-fundament of science and strives to shift back to science’s intuitional origins through the realization of the priority of life-world as the source of ontic validity. The life- world as the meaning-fundament of the modern science implies the historical sediment meanings and being conscious of these meanings involves awareness of intentional history. Accordingly, Husserl’s later phenomenology puts emphasis on both the role of historical reflection as an approach for the identification of the historical route of thought and science and on history as the horizon and context of science. The main thesis of the present article is that in order to plan a philosophy of history for science in the framework of Husserl’s later thought, the concept of crisis plays the major role. How does Husserl make use of history to deal with the crisis of science? Upon his realization of the crisis, does he relinquish the concepts of reason, philosophy and science and make an appeal to relativism and historicism or does he likewise believe in the dream of “philosophy as pure science” and strives to revive reason and improve science?