فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه
سال هشتم شماره 1 (پیاپی 29، بهار 1391)

In the history of Islamic Philosophy, since Farabi's time to the present, the faculty of imagination and imaginary forms have been among so important issues that some scholars have claimed that this is one of the distinct featuresof the Islamic philosophy. Farabi has explained his theory of prophecy based on the imaginal world. Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, and their followers succeeded to reconcile religion and philosophy, intuition and argumentation, transmitted sciences and reason based on the idea of imaginal world. The main issue discussed in the present article is states of the soul in the station of imagination; and the most important issue discussed here is arguments posed to prove immateriality of the soul which is of paramount importance in "knowledge of the soul" and is regarded as an important development in philosophical "knowledge of the soul". When immateriality of the soul in the station of imagination is somehow proved, it will be proved that, in spite of views posed by the Peripatetics and Illuminationists, man is not a two-dimensional being (consisted of body and reason); but rather, he enjoys three dimensions and three existential modes: material and corporal mode, formal and purgatorial mode, and rational mode. For the latter, Mulla Sadra has posed many arguments and, as he stipulates, he is the first one in the history of philosophy who has proved some immateriality and independence from body for the faculty of imagination. These arguments are studied and discussed in the present article.

One of the most basic metaphysical doctrines is the "Oneness". We are, in this paper, coming to introduce this doctrine in Aristotle; and, so, at first, we mention basic differences between him and his formers, and distinguish Aristotle's "multiple" view from their "monistic" view. Then, counting the meanings of "one" in common Greek language, we receive to two kinds of oneness: material and formal. We will see that perfection, oneness, and form are parallel to potentiality, multiplicity, and matter; and oneness, in its foremost sense, is the formal "one", not material; and this formal "one" is the principle of individuality. Finally, we will see that how immovable movers, and most of all the first immovable mover, are abstract individuals and the first "Ones".

The present article is an attempt to assess the views of those philosophers who are the exponents or founders of a particular school of thought on emanation or making. In the beginning, it seems that we can generally divide the philosophers only into two groups: one group consider causality and making in its usual sense within the framework of multiplicity and differences of beings, hence consider making as emanation, which results in the expansion of the scope of being or beings. The other group with respect to the pure unity of being think that the augmentation of the scope of being is impossible and interpret causality as manifestation or expression of that pure one being. But, despite this initial impression, we will find that in the second group thinkers like Mulla Sadra, despite their notion of the oneness of being and considering the exalted origin of being as al-fail bil-tajalli (agent by expression), advocated the possibility of being made the nature of being, and this idea is a noticeable view. On the other hand, we have philosophers, like Suhrawardi, who consider quiddities as made, and unlike others founded a system based on 'light' rather than 'being' or 'existence', and at the same time think about both 'light' and 'darknes's as something emanated or made. In this way, practically we are concerned with philosophers with different strains in this regard. Even if they are included within the first two divisions, because of their particular features, they will be separated from others in other sub-divisions. At the end, we will conclude that some philosophers never carried out a profound and comprehensive study on the meaning of emanation and making as fitted with rational and philosophical standards, and it seems that they dealt with the issue of causality insufficiently. With reference to their effective foundation, we considered that issue in order to show that some of them even failed to base this issue on their own ontology, so that they had two different approaches.

The renowned post-modern philosopher,Julia Kristeva, tries to depict the world and flowing subject through her psychiatric and linguistic approach towards the fundamental concepts of philosophy. So, based on the concept of Chora, she tries to explain her theory. This concept was used for the first time in Plato's Timaeus in order to elaborate the development of the world, but inKristeva's thought it turned out to be the first origin of the subject. This article is an attempt to explain the concept of Chora in Kristeva's thought and it's relevance to Plato's Chora.

Although in Koran, other Divine books and a lot of Traditions, God has been negated of similar and like; but He has been described to have model and exemplar. To representing the soul to God has been more noticeable inGnostists’ statements, and has been used by various terms. Among them, MollaSadra by utilizing from mystical and religious doctrines, has considered particularly modeling the human self, and in his works has achieved two-way results. Since the human soul has been considered for nature, attributes and actions as example of God; so by knowing the self can conceive God better; as by knowing God, may access to self-cognition, and other consequences. The signification note is that the use of such attitude by MollaSadra is deliberate and exactly methodical, and includes of much ontological, anthropological and epistemological consequences; So it seems that its understanding and satisfying value is better than intellectual arguments for solving some philosophical and doctrines problems, and in cases, it has substituted instead of certain intellectual reason or has covered its deficiencies.

As a result of going behind tradition and criticizing its foundations and based upon objective and subjective elements established through centuries, modern rationality has determined a special kind of life-style, an important feature of it is the technical dominance of man over the nature. Some thinkers like Heidegger (1889-1976) thought that technology had risen out of foundations of the western world-view. Thus, he thinks that it isimpossible to achieve the human and sublime goals through philosophical content of technology (essentialism). Karl Popper (1902-1994), at the other side, refuses the essentialism and insists upon the instrumental feature of technology. The analysis of modern media as a kind of technology which has its own affection on world public opinion with taking into account the semiotic various levels gets us beyond this challenge.

First, we shall scrutinize Modal Generalism and Modal Particularism, two main metaphysical approaches to modality, and recount their differences. Second, we’ll explain epistemic and metaphysical possibilities and how they are explicated at generalism. There, we’ll show that metaphysical necessity, nemed to broad logical necessity, is a kind of logical necessity. By this definition of metaphysical necessity, the relation between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility is partial-general-and-specific. Third, on the one hand we’ll critique the modal generalism in which our intuitive perception of modality will be refuted and on the other hand, some accounts of modal particularism like Possibilism and Haecceitism are confronted with some kind of Ungroundedness. Next, we’ll present a new account of modal particularism. In this new account, the concept of “being a possible world”, as a modal concept, is counted as Primitive concept. With the help of this new account and the concept Conceiving, we’ll present a new definition of Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility. At last, we shall show that in this new definition, the relation between epistemic and metaphysical possibility is absolute-general-and-specific.