نشریه فلسفه
سال چهل و سوم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1394)

The concept of subject is one of the most crucial concepts in Alain Badiou's philosophical thought. He uses this concept in connection with concepts such as event, truth and fidelity. in this paper we try to show that there is an obscurity or complication in badiou's use of this concept. There seems to be an inconsistency in his assertions about the nature of subject. Some phrases ascribe a human nature to it and some of them, conversely, have nonhuman implications. This inconsistency is caused various interpretations. We have recommended that it should be accepted that the concept of subject has two distinct meanings in Badiou's works. Otherwise, if we want to maintain a single meaning, some of his remarks about that concept will be ignored.

This article is an attempt to show that how the meanings of the words “philosophy” and “philosopher” change in Plato’s Phaedo in comparison with his early Socratic dialogues. The Phaedo is Plato’s interpretation of Socrates’ life, philosophy and death, in light of Orphic and Pythagorean eschatological doctrines. In this interpretation, Plato reveals his problem of epistemological pessimism and proposes its solution. He regards Socrates as the ideal philosopher, being aware of his own ignorance and the epistemic obstacles of this world, becomes capable to purify his soul from the human and corporeal concerns and make the soul ready for flying out of its bodily prison, so that the soul could gain pure knowledge in the supreme and divine realm of immateriality. Thus, Plato provides his own definitions of the words “philosophy” and “philosopher” in the Phaedo, according to which “philosophy” is the way of purification and salvation of the soul, and the “philosopher” is the one who is willingly training for dying in order to release his soul from confines of the mundane world in search of pure knowledge.

Linda Zagzebski presents a new kind of foundational moral theory in her exemplarist virtue theory which exemplary persons have considered as the foundation. In this theory all of the basic moral concepts such as good ends and right acts are defined by direct reference to paradigmatically good person. One of the most important consequences of this theory is that moral propositions are a posteriori and because of that the theory gives special attention to narrative ethics. By emphasizing the significant functions of emotions in morality, Zagzebski tries to show that paradigmatically good persons are identified by the emotion of admiration. She believes that the emotion is a kind of perception that has both cognitive and affective aspects. Since this theory is based on the attractiveness of the good, it can provide an attractive foundation for ethics. Because of this matter, Zagzebski considers this theory better and more justifiable than other moral theories. This article seeks to give a brief review of Zagzebski's moral theory, express the considerations of other philosophers about her theory and in the end show the important problems that undermine the justifiability and acceptability of it.

So far, moral features have been divided into absolute and relative, individual and social, temporary and permanent and so on. The least advantage of these divisions and separations is a help to moral studies and a better and systematic understanding of moral values and anti-values for moral doers. In this essay according to a cause and effect, and necessary relationship which might be among some virtues and vices, we try to divide moral features into two general categories of Dependent and Independent and relatively another category under the name of Dependent-Independent or Double-sided and consequently we will represent and explain a new category in ethics (and specifically meta-ethics). Moreover, for explanation and judging this division, hope and jealousy as two Independent moral features, and patience and self-righteousness as two Dependent moral features will be examined in order to represent the efficiency and righteousness of this division with more accuracy.

Divine Essence and explanation of his ontological place is an important problem for religious schools in conceptual and direct knowledge and both the philosophers and mystics concerns about it. Mystics believed the method of intuition, but afterwards the emergence of speculative mysticism, they try to translate the intellectual intuition to conceptual knowledge, attaining this purpose, they use conceptual issues and consideration of Being.In their opinion, Divine Essence is the divisible un-conditioned manner whereas the Islamic philosophers believe that God exist as negatively conditioned manner, hence this is one of the points of difference between mystics and philosophers. Mulla Sadra and others have followed him, by interpretation and coincidence between un-conditioned manner and reality of being, try to solve the apparent conflict between mystics and philosophers.In this paper, in a comparative-analysis method we have shown that, first: philosophers never agree whit mystics and basically, the divisible un-conditioned manner that mystics adopt, in philosophers view is a conceptual respect and According to their principles, cannot exist as an independent, real Being.Second: by a critical perspective view, we have shown that the mystics view derived from a mistake between epistemology and ontology.

The western philosophical thoughts in modern age underwent basic changes. Because of the priority of thought over being and conversion of human, God and world into idea in Descartes, the question arises that how the knowledge is possible, or in other words, how can we know ourselves, God and the world. As the ideas are not in the same and common existential context, the only way to acquire knowledge, Descartes believes, is reflecting on the ideas namely thought, perfection and extension by intellectual intuition. Reflection as Descarte's heritage, has a prominent position in western thoughts. The role of perfection in the thoughts of Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz and Kant is evident but in Fichte's philosophical system it is so crucial. Knowledge in Fichte's philosophical system is based on intellectual intuition while intellectual intuition is itself based on reflection. Fichte affirms that "Intuition is now determined, though only as such for philosophic reflection ", so he turned the reflection into method. This article investigates the relation between the reflective method of Fichte and Kant's System of thought and shows that the Fichte's philosophical system is nothing but a development and realization of Kant's Critique of pure reason.

The development of Hegel’s political philosophy is a direct consequence of his struggle with the previous philosophers. Among them, Fichte’s political philosophy, especially his conception of the ‘natural right’, is an important issue for Hegel. Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s political philosophy has been formulated in his 1802 essay ‘On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right’. While Hegel’s critique not entirely successful to unreliable Fichte’s political philosophy, it raises some problems for Fichte’s conception of the natural right. This paper has concentrated on Hegel’s 1802 essay in order to assessment of his critique of Fichte.