نشریه فلسفه
سال چهل و ششم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1397)

The concept of “hegemony” in political thought has different philosophical-theoretical foundations and semantic dimensions. This concept should not be perceived merely and necessarily in a way which discloses another ways of perception. This concept should not be perceived in a way which traps us in the abyss of metaphysical disclosure. There is not one way of perception which overcomes other alternatives. Therefore, this article deconstructs this tendency to “the One” and lightens the way of perceiving this concept in “one of the possible ways”. Hence, this article concentrates on the political thought of Ernesto Laclau and hereby probes the philosophical foundations of this concept in the philosophy of Jacques Derrida and reveals the signifiers which construct the articulation of this concept as its semantic dimensions. As we will see, the mentioned signifiers are articulated among a master signifier or a nodal point which is contingency of hegemony. “The undecidable” and “the untouchable” are two Derridean concepts which are the philosophical foundations of these signifiers. However, this contingency does not mean inaccuracy or instability or lack of an ontological basis. Therefore, the contingency, undecidability and untouchability of hegemony should be understood as lack of an "ultimate foundation" and not "the foundation". Contingency and lack of an ultimate foundation have relationship with the aporetic nature of hegemony and its presence in the absence and its absence in the presence.

Schelling’s philosophical orientations has undergone many changes during his lifetime; But it would be justifiable to be said that he has one fundamental issue, according to which being or absolute identity is not within the reach of mind. In the middle of 1790s, Schelling's philosophy begins with his engagement with Fichte’s attempts to pursue Kant's transcendental philosophy, granted priority to the activity of consciousness in the formation of the recognisable world. Together with this comes the starting of an everlasting unanimity with Spinoza’s belief that philosophy must begin with a self-sufficient Absolute. Near the beginning of the next century Schelling produces the Naturphilosophie, which gives the role of activity of a subject to the nature and names it 'productivity'. So, he rejects all approaches which regards nature inanimate and strictly contrary to living thinking. He comes to the 'identity philosophy' in the early 1800s according to which 'mind' and 'matter', the 'ideal' and the 'real' are only different degrees, or outlooks, of the Same. During this period, he eventually dissents from Fichte, whom he considers as failing to move out of the realm of self-consciousness to a being as the foundation of consciousness.

Distinguishing intuitive method from what is called Kantian regressive method , Husserl was sought to original transcendental knowledge. According to Husserlian phenomenology , although Kantian categories pursuit foundations of scientific experience but merely result in formal knowledge that has no concrete content with respect to transcendental domain. that Kant leaves unnoticed that empirical science is resulted from subjectivity lead to positing subjects that , on enduring necessity, act in unknown way to make up world of experience that its validity itself is under suspicion . For Husserl, returning to life-world is the only way to clarification of transcendental domain in order to explain how the subject is part of world and at the same time is involved in constitution of world. But this returning confront him with paradox : if transcendental subject is ultimate and fundamental truth, then world and everything mundane get its meaning from this transcendental subject that from the other side, itself is in world. How can transcendental subject be subject of world and subject in the world? We try to show that how Husserl's analyse of meaning and function of life-world and the ways that ego is disclosed in the course of epoche, clarify transcendental domain.

Unity of the intellect and the object of intellection (intelligible), where the intellect thinks something other than itself, is one of the most important innovations of the Sadraean philosophy. But there are two main approaches in its interpretation. According to the first, this unity means that the intellect and the intelligible are realized by one and the same existence, whereas according to the second, this unity implies that the intelligible is a description of intellect, so that the ineligible is not external to the intellect. Furthermore, one argument for this unity, known as matter and form argument, proves this unity by supposing a) the congruency between receiving form by matter and receiving the intelligible by intellect and b) the unified composition of form and matter. But some, rejecting the first premise, objected to the soundness of the argument. Reviewing the premises of the argument, this paper will try to demonstrate that the disagreement on the soundness of this argument is due to two different conceptions of prime matter and the unified composition of form and matter, hence the soundness of the argument. Moreover, two different conceptions of the unity of the intellect and the intelligible is provable, resulting from two conceptions of unified composition of form and matter.

Kant divides logic into two main fields: general logic and transcendental logic. General logic abstracts altogether from objects; and it concerns only the rules of self-consistence of thoughts. Thus it contains merely the negative criteria of truth. On the other hand, Kant considers general logic in its Aristotelian formalization as finished and complete. This logic grants the law of excluded middle, which says for any proposition either it or its negation is true. But is such a law a merely negative condition for truth? In this paper we show that it is not. In this respect we mention historical issues raised by Cantor’s proof and more importantly discuss about the phenomenological nature of this law. We will show that the positive use of this law brings forth a challenge for the Kantian viewpoint. We explain the possible ways to confront this challenge. By means of a compression between the main views developed in regard to this law, namely those of Husserl, Brouwer and Heyting, we will explore the phenomenological status of this law. We will show that on the basis of Husserl's analyses in Formal and Transcendental Logic and in Experience and Judgment, about the nature of valid judgments and that of negation, the law of excluded middle is not generally valid.

Deleuze’s theory of desire is based on the concepts of positivity and creativity; in fact this theory opposes the common Freudian psychoanalytical theory of desire in which desiring functions on the basis of an initial and primordial Lost, i.e. the experience of castration and losing the Mother because of Father’s prohibiting intervention in the infant’s relation with her. Deleuze, collaborated by Felix Guattari, try to give an explanation of desire in which, satisfying the Spinozist condition of immanence, there is no external and metaphysical force such as Freudian Oedipus complex which could universalize the structure of the desire and make its realization something merely repetitive. For this purpose, they introduce the formulation of desiring-machine. The creative and contingent aspect of the function of Deleuze’s desiring-machine, contradict to the fundamental subjection of Freudian desire to some kind of universal law and coercion. Furthermore, while the main normal Subject in Freudian theory of desire is the Hysteric, in Deleuzian formulation the default structure of subjectivity is schizophrenia; in other words, while Freud thinks of schizophrenia as a disorder and a deviation from the normal state, Deleuze sees it in most accordance with the creative nature of the Being; in his thought the centrality of the Hysteric in the Freudian theory of desire is a result of applying the Oedipus model coercively. Against, for Deleuze the subject is not an already being entity; it is merely the result and residue of desiring itself.

Derek Parfit argues the central normative belief that “all suffering is bad in itself” is held by all of us and known by intuition. Furthermore, given the intuitive statue of this normative belief, he argues that in ideal conditions everyone, including ordinary people, thinkers and philosophers would agree on it. He, then, must show that Nietzsche, famous for his claims about the goodness of suffering, doesn’t fundamentally disagree with this belief. Parfit’s take on the issue is so simplistic, in my view, showing that Nietzsche’s relevant serious remarks can be reduced to an instrumentalist view on suffering. After considering Parfit’s paraphrases and interpretations of his arbitrary selection of Nietzsche’s remarks, I will show that Nietzsche’s real view about suffering should be understood under a psychological interpretation of the will to power as a second order drive or desire for overcoming resistance. Suffering itself is not anything except a resistance or an obstacle against our first order desires to be overcome by our active will to power, as an important constituent of it. And then the normative belief that “at least some suffering is good” finds its significance in Nietzsche’s philosophy, strongly contradicting Parfit’s position about the intuitive statue of the belief.