فصلنامه روابط خارجی
پیاپی 3 (پاییز 1388)

The U.S. foreign policy under Obama has undergone drastic changes. It should be borne in mind, however, that there are some rather constant and unchangeable elements in the U.S. political behavior and foreign policy. Obama's approach to foreign policy could therefore be regarded as a return once again to the paradigm of security realism. The theories of security realism are based on the concepts of balancing and equilibrium. Within this overall framework, it could argue that Obama can develop a new model for foreign policy based on balancing, equilibrium, cooperation, participation and multilateralism. This article tries to study Obama's foreign policy towards Iran during his first year in office from a realist point of view and within the framework of a model based on balancing and equilibrium. It paper argues that the main characteristics of his realistic approach will go beyond “Wilsonian interventionism” and include consideration of some aspects of pragmatism in foreign policy by using result-based models.

The region encompassing Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) represents one of the richest parts of the world; it enjoys great potentials and opportunities for trade and economic cooperation, especially with respect to oil and natural gas resources. The region’s massive energy resources can be utilized by the ECO, both within the region - including to meet the growing energy needs of its landlocked members - as well as with other partners outside of the region. Utilization of the region’s energy resources constitutes an important part of the Organization’s strategy, particularly by its founding members – Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Iran, lying between two energy-rich areas - Persian Gulf in the south and the Caspian Sea in the north – and major oil and gas producing and exporting country, is one of the most important members of the ECO and its entire region. In this article, the authors discuss the role and importance of Iran plays in the energy market of this region.

Regional deterrence is one of the most important theories of international relations and strategic studies in the Post-Cold War period. In this period, states encounter new regional threats. Therefore, they need to design systems in order to manage and to control these threats. Regional deterrence system is one of these management systems with its logical and physical subsystems and a variety of complex and dynamic factors such as geographical barriers, structural constrains, military technology, structure of military forces, and so on. This article explains the different models of deterrence systems at the regional level and intends to have a critical look the regional deterrence system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Changes in the international arena and the increasing role of non-state actors and public opinion have led to the emergence of the new forms of diplomacy distinguished from but related to the traditional diplomacy. Conceptualization of Public Diplomacy has been associated with many ambiguities and confusion both in academia and policy circles in Iran. Concept of Public Diplomacy has been used interchangeably with concepts like soft power, public relations, propaganda, cultural relations and psychological warfare. Though related, these are different concepts that refer to different phenomena. Public Diplomacy, its significance, instruments, goals, audiences, players, communication patterns, evaluation criterions, as well as conditions and prerequisites of its success will be addressed in this paper. Misperceptions and the accompanied conceptual confusion have been instrumental in generating an unnecessary fear among decision makers about anything “soft” or “public” in diplomacy. Clarification of these concepts may facilitate a better understanding and it is hoped, would remove significant impediments for a more objective evaluation of them.

Globalization in recent decades has increased international trade and has also deeply influenced the political economy of countries. Simultaneously, and as a counter-trend, new regionalism has experienced a rising trend over the last two decades in different parts of the world, leading to increase in trade among the member countries of a regional organization and to the smoother flow of financial and human resources within the region. Some consider this to further expand and entrench globalization. For others, however, the new trend has resulted in overall global economic decline, lower volumes of trade between the regions, and further loss for other regions and countries. From this vantage point, regionalism is considered a major obstacle standing in the way of globalization. This article argues that new regionalism, despite its fluctuations, not only does not constitute an obstacle to globalization, but also creates a road map for engaging in global processes. It also attempts to suggest a basic mechanism for guiding and accelerating the process of globalization, especially in times of crisis in global systems, when, more often than not, regional unions tend to become more protectionists.

The shape, structure and features of the new international system and its structure in the Post-Cold War era have been the subject of intense debates among the scholars and students of international relations discipline. Notwithstanding, questions still beg to be answered on the structure of the new international system and how it impacts the foreign policy behavior of state entities, and in particular, that of a superpower such as the United States. The present article intends to look at the emergence of the new international system and its characteristics through the prism of relevant theories of international politics, with special emphasis on Kenneth Waltz’s neo-liberalism. It will also try to explain the pattern of behavior of major actors and great powers in the new system. Finally, the paper will analyze the role of the U.S. in the new system, and compare its pattern of behavior during and after the Cold War.

Coercive diplomacy, as a non-military strategy, tries to deter the target country through persuasion. In this strategy, any attempt to use force in the framework of an all-out war means the failure of coercive diplomacy. This article tries to look at and analyze the results of the U.S. resort to coercive diplomacy to exert pressure on Iraq between 1990 and 2003. It will be argued that the U.S. strategy during the period under review lacked the necessary balance for success. This imbalance in the U.S. strategy, as argued in the paper, specifically refers to the inconsistency between goals and means in the coercer's strategy on the one hand, and, on the other, lack of mutuality of influence between the two sides. The U.S. military attack in March 2003 made the failure of coercive diplomacy towards Iraq abundantly clear.