نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال چهل و چهارم شماره 1 (پیاپی 88، بهار و تابستان 1391)

Abd al-Wahhāb b. Aḥmad Sha‘rānī (898-973/1492-1565) is to be considered as one of the most important advocates of Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī (560-638/1164-1240). He has written significant books in defense of and under the inspiration of Ibn ‘Arabī, the most important of which that can be mentioned are Al-Yawāqīt wa al-Jawāhir, Al-Kibrīt al-Aḥmar, and Al-Qawā‘id al-Kashfiyya. It is worth mentioning that, with respect to his sharī‘a-oriented Sufi background,Sha‘rānī has turned to Ibn ‘Arabī’s views in the above works and regarded what has seemed to him to be contrary to sharī‘ (religious law), as intrigues by Ibn ‘Arabī’s enemies and exonerated him of them. In some cases, he has rightly exonerated Ibn ‘Arabī of such ideas as incarnation, the unity and monotheism of Satan, and superiority of Wilāya over Prophethood; but he has not been able to sufficiently exonerate him from unity of existence, belief in the eternity (khulūd) of the faithless, and Pharaoh’s faith. However, by defending him, he has prevented from his calumny and excommunication by his hostile opponents.

Given the importance of theology and best ways of knowing it in the Islamic culture, this article is intended to examine the method of self-knowledge according to the ḥadīth, man ‘arafa nafsa faqad ‘arafa Rabba (he who knows himself knows his Lord) from the viewpoint of the Shī‘a scholars and try to recognize the components of this noble ḥadīth by way of analysis and examine its different experimental, philosophical, mystical, and Qur’ānic readings (qarā’ats). It is concluded that any of the above-mentioned readings of the ḥadīth would cause us to reach God but its Gnostic value is different, in a way that the Qur’ānic gnosis is the most sublime gnosis and the experimental cognition stands lowest in rank.

Researcher at Cnter for Comparative Studies of Occultaion Era The origin of the duality of the world of creation from Plato’s point of view is based on the fact that he classifies the world into two categories: the world of senses (ideas = muthul, generalities = kulliyāt) and the world of intelligibles (image of ideas, particulars). Thus, by bringing up the issue of ideas and stating that these ideas are the realities of the beings of the intelligible world and the origin of the material world, he seeks to find an explanation for his philosophical and moral ideals. Plato’s luminous ideas, in terms of their reality of being, is not distinct from the reality of Ḥaqq (Truth, God), but is persisting in His essence (persistence by emergence) and is indeed one of the requirements of Divine essence and attributes. Mullā Ṣadrā’s different paraphrasing and arguments about ideas, explain the kind of the relation of ideas with Divine essence and attributes. Although immutable entities (al-a‘yān-i al-thabita) have many similarities to Plato’s intellectual ideas, they have significant discrepancies, as well. The theory of muthul, in general, is accepted by the Muslim philosophers; Mullā Ṣadrā, however, believes that none of the Muslim philosophers has been able to understand the theory of ideas. Based on his philosophical principles and with the help of such arguments as comprehension evidence and substantial motion, he tries to prove his impression of this theory. In this article, the writer tries to clarify the relation between Plato’s theory of ideas and Mullā Ṣadrā’s immutable entities through examining the Islamic philosophy’s interpretations of the theory of ideas and stating Mullā Ṣadrā’s arguments in proving this theory.

Analysis of the meaningfulness of the language of religion is one of the most important issues concerning the language of religion. Despite the multiplicity and variety of viewpoints common in this field, the prevailing common ground in these viewpoints is the implicit acceptance of the positivistic standards of the meaningfulness of language. The existence of basic criticisms to these standards and the collapse of logical positivism bring up the basic question as to how and on the basis of what questions the analysis of the meaningfulness of the language of religion is examinable. Reviewing briefly the theories concerning the meaningfulness of the language of religion, this article first presents a definition of the meaningfulness of language, and then, on the basis of this definition, examines the meaningfulness of the language of religion on three pivots, i.e. the possibility of the meaningfulness of the language of religion; the possibility of incorporating the revelatory meanings into human words and propositions; and the possibility of understanding the revelatory meanings by the addressee.

In Aristotle’s view, the explanation of an object or an issue is carried out according to the real form or reasonable essence and the utmost objective (ghāyat) it has and the goal it achieves. For instance, why do objects fall? According to Aristotle and his followers, motion is explained as per the innate tendency of anything seeking to return to its natural resting place. The resting place or “natural station” of fire is up and that of the earth is down. The heavier objects have a stronger tendency downward, hence should fall faster. The motion’s utmost objective – in both meanings of extreme and purpose and objective – is more of interest than the trends that take place in the meantime or prior to it. Thus, causality is described with respect to the future goals (ultimate causes) and essential inclinations (formal causes), rather than by the impressions of past events (efficient causes), which act upon passive and talented matters (material causes). The above words do not mean that observation had no place in Aristotelian science. Aristotle had personally done considerable researches on biological classification, which involved accurate observations. However, the issue of ultimate objective, i.e., assuming everything and every action as purposeful and with an ultimate goal, had not yield theories that can be tested by earlier experiences.

Department of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom, University of Zanjan The “mashriqiyya principle”, trusted by the Persian theosophists and the basis for their light wisdom that Suhrawardī tried to revive, is the principle of light and darkness. Philosophy of illumination (ḥikmat ishrāq), as a discursive-intuitive philosophy, is a light-oriented metaphysical wisdom. In this wisdom, light is the secret of “awareness” and “self-consciousness”. Thus, the focus of attention in Suhrawardī’s philosophy is “knowledge” and the Illuminationist Philosopher is preoccupied with nothing but “Illuminationist knowledge”. In this metaphysical system, ma‘rifat (divine knowledge) is like a principle, which other discourses originate from and end up to. Pleasure, in this system, is not an entity apart from ma‘rifat. Illuminational Resurrection (ma‘ād), like perception and pleasure, is also analyzed on the basis of the mashriqī principle of “light and darkness”. Therefore, the ranks of the people, after being released from their stronghold of darkness, are determined and explained in terms of their enjoyment of rays of knowledge or the degree of their attachment to the darkness of purgatory.