نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال چهل و هشتم شماره 1 (پیاپی 96، بهار و تابستان 1395)

Gadamer’s critique of methodologism is one of the fundamental teachings of his philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer sees truth much beyond the ability of method to grasp it completely. He criticizes the exclusive restriction of truth in methodical processes but does not reject the need for methodical work.The present article explores the origins of methodologism in ancient Greece and modern times, and studies Gadamer’s review on the extra-methodical thoughts of Greek philosophers. Then, the following issues are articulated: Gadamer’s phenomenological critique on Cartesian subjectivism, and Kantian epistemology, and the methodologism of classical hermeneutics including the separation of subject and object and the failure of methodologism in accomplishing academic goals and the inability to get to the whole truth and its inner contradictions. Gadamer finds a wrong understanding of logic and a lack of knowledge about its limitations and the boundaries of its capabilities as one of the causes for misconceptions about method and inappropriate expectations from methodologism, including the attainment of truth. And in its critique he reaches back to the Greek roots of methodologism and distinguishes between scientific logic and philosophical logic in the dichotomy of Apollonian and Dionysian ideas among Stoic philosophers and the followers of the Old Academy. Gadamer seeks to prove that the expectation to reach truth by resorting to methodologism is naive and suffers from fundamental errors and problems. He introduces extra-methodical thought and hermeneutical rationality as an alternative to methodologism and methodic rationality and defines an attention to dialectic, practical wisdom, eloquence, and the fusion of horizons as the strategy to achieve those parts of truth that lies beyond methodologism.

The truth about Divine Names and the meanings of Divine Names and Attributes have always been regarded as key issues in Islamic theology and philosophy, and their surrounding debates have so far triggered controversial and challenging ideas. In this context, the difference of opinions between Ibn Sina as the head of the Peripatetic School and Mulla Sadra as the founder of Transcendental Theosophy have been underestimated. Therefore, in the beginning of the article, some principles in relation to the issue of Beautiful Divine Names have been shortly mentioned in order to set the ground for the primary discussion, i.e. the disagreement between Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on unity and the conceptual differences of divine names and attributes. Then, the ideas of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra are analyzed and their disagreement is reviewed.

The problem of evil is one of the important problems considered in the philosophy of religion. This paper considers the problem of evil from the viewpoint of the contemporary philosopher, John Hick, and explores his arguments for proving the compatibility between the evil in the world and the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient God. By analyzing Hick’s viewpoint about the relationship between evil and free will, this paper demonstrates that Hick negates irreparable evil, and emphasizes not only that the existence of evil cannot be considered as a barrier to human evolution from the philosophical perspective, but also that those human capabilities which cannot be activated because of the existence of evil in the earthly life will be activated in the afterlife.

Every one of the scholars in theology, philosophy and mysticism has their own methodologies for explaining and proving the necessity for the existence of the perfect man. Theologians have applied the ‘Rule of Grace’ in this regard. Philosophers tend to prove the existence of the perfect man by means of ‘the holy capability of the acquired intellect (aql al-mustafad)’ as well as ‘Divine Wisdom’. However, the mystics consider the reason for the existence of the perfect man to be the necessity for the emergence of ‘the Mystery of Mysteries (ghayb al-ghuyūb)’ and the complete revelation of Allah as ‘the Supreme Name (ism al-a‘zam)’.From the viewpoint of mystics, including Imam Khomeini, the reasons for the necessity of the perfect man’s existence are as follows: the necessity for the emergence of Divine Essence in a complete manifestation; the necessity for the existence of the Highest Similitude of the Divine Essence; the necessity for the existence of a connecting link of Divine Essence with the pluralities; and the necessity for the emergence of the pluralities and the universes.

Are free will and causal determinism compatible with each other? This is one of the most important questions central to discussions relating to free will. The problem is that causal determinism makes us encounter challenging dilemmas, either way leading us to deny free will: (1) causal determinism is either true or not true; (2) if causal determinism is true, we do not have free will; since all of our actions (including free will), in that case, will be the inevitable results of their former causes; (3) if causal determinism is not true, we do not have free will; since all of the events will be accidental and thus cannot be attributed to a performer; (4) hence, we do not have free will. In response to these two extremes, one should either show that either one of the statements (2) or (3) is false, or instead deny free will. Looking back at the issues discussed by contemporary analytic philosophers on this question, the present paper aims to categorize and briefly introduce those views. And finally, the attitudes and views of Western philosophers are compared with those of Islamic thinkers, and the differences and similarities between them are examined

Although the concept of the ‘Rule of Grace’ can be accurately deduced through some Qur’anic verses and traditions (Hadiths), the Mu‘tazilites among all theological denominations pioneered in its extraction, compilation and application within the context of theology. The present article discusses the attitude of Shi‘ite theology toward the above-mentioned rule within the framework of three historical periods. In the first period, including the beginning of Shi‘ite theology to the time of Khawaja Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, the mentioned rule remained more or less the same as that of its Mu‘tazilites structure, where grace was divided into two folds: Providing and Determining Grace. In the second period, i.e. from the time of al-Tūsī until the late 14th century A.H., those two kinds of divisions were reduced to one: Providing Grace. In the same era, Allameh Helli did not acknowledge the sending of the prophets and the proclamation of religious obligation as part of the instances of Grace. As a result of this position and in addition to a series of doubts denying the necessity of Divine Grace, the logical credit and validity of sending prophets was gradually weakened and lost in the perspective of certain theologians. A third group of Shi‘ite theologians, from the late 14th century up until now, have attempted for nearly five decades to overcome the mentioned problems and objections in order to recreate the validity of the rule. Thus, the present article studies and explains the details of the three periods and seeks to shed some light on relevant historical developments and transformations.

Gaining knowledge of the different existential aspects of human being counts among some the most important issues in psychology (‘ilm al-nafs) and anthropology. In this respect, philosophers in philosophical psychology or knowledge of the self have discussed the different degrees of soul and its faculties, whereas ancient philosophers used to deal with such issues in discussions over natural sciences and recent scholars have placed their thoughts on this topic in the framework of theology. In these contexts, there are different discussions in relation to the faculties of human soul, including theoretical and practical reason or theoretical and practical faculty. Discussions regarding the significance of theoretical reason and its degrees are abundant; however, there is no consensus over practical faculty and we encounter different views in that regard. Since practical reason along with theoretical reason has a great role in the perfection of man, in this paper we have tried to examine the different dimensions of this human faculty. Four viewpoints have been proposed in this regard: some have considered that as the faculty for recognition, while others have regarded that as the source of understanding and activities; there are also those who have rejected such a faculty, and finally those who considered it as the source of human motions, will and non-cognitive affairs. According to the last view, which is also supported in the present paper, human beings possess both cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions, with the latter being the source of our non-cognitive faculties.