نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال چهل و هفتم شماره 1 (پیاپی 94، بهار و تابستان 1394)

By considering as incomplete the peripatetics’ method in achieving reality، Shaykh Ishrāq (Suhrawardī) has chosen the method of insight and intuition. But what position do thought and proof have in his method? It is implied from some of his statements that thinking and proof have no place in his method and some of his other statements imply the opposite. One of the solutions of this apparent incompatibility is to distinguish between the personal method of achieving reality and the method of transferring concepts to others. According to this viewpoint، the method Suhrawardī himself uses to achieve reality is through insight and intuition; whereas using thinking and proof is only for instructing others and not for personal reassurance. However، by mentioning three reasons، limitation of the status of thinking to the status of transferring concepts to others is repudiated. Consequently، in order to personally achieve the truth، the philosopher of illumination can use both the intuitive method and the argumentative method and when transferring truths to others، he is to use the argumentative method.

Contemporary philosophy is replete with various theories about rationality; however، the general concept of rationality is ambiguous. Through exploring into the renowned schools of epistemology and philosophy of science، Richard Foley finds out the purpose and perspective to be constant elements in all theories of rationality. The purpose is the entity needed or desired by the individual and can be either practical or theoretical. The perspective is a collection of ideas and its various types are determined in relation to the person or persons holding these ideas. Presuming the purpose-centeredness of the concept of rationality and negating the premium perspective، Foley undertakes to plan the theory of rationality and draws the conclusion that، depending upon the purposes and interests، rational evaluation is possible from various perspectives. Therefore، the rationality assumptions in reality have different topics and are not regarded as competitive. He deems as appropriate the provision of the comprehensive planning of rationality with the fulfilment of two requirements: inclusion of all the purposes and not presuming as premium the adopted perspective. The basic criticisms raised against Foley are: relativism، non-defensiveness، instrumental look at rationality، and leniency.

In this article، while bringing up the phrase ‘aqrab al-nās ilayha ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib، we would touch upon the important controversy concerning the rest of the phrase and would examine the viewpoints of both the proponents and opponents; then، we would draw a conclusion of this debate and explain that various phrases have been quoted from Ibn ‘Arabī and it is most likely that this difference is due to the fact that the first copy of Futūḥāt had been robbed by the highway-robbers or transcribed by the copiers and its being rewritten by Ibn ‘Arabī in Minor Asia. Furthermore، the predicates of the phrases are the same، because in all the quotations the first part of that which is ‘aqrab al-nās ilayha ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib، is unanimous. Either the phrase is in the form of imām al-‘ālam and sir al-anbiyā or in the form of asrār al-anbiyā ajma‘īn or imām al-‘ālam and sir al-anbiyā ajma‘īn، does not impair the original use and denotation of Ibn ‘Arabī’s phrase; the utmost feature of the term imām al-‘ālam is its emphasis on the essential proximity and competences of ‘Alī (A. S.) that neither Ibn ‘Arabī nor any of the impartial Sunnī scholars would deny.

In Shī‘ism، the Imams (A. S.) have been the perpetuators of the Holy Prophet’s (A. S.) Prophetic Mission. Clarifying their role in perpetuation of the above-mentioned mission is among the questions that the thinkers have always inquired about. Given the undeniable doctrines of the finality of the Prophethood، this question has to be answered in a way that no other prophets are made out of the Imams. This writing is a deliberation on this topic. Searching into the verses of the Qur’ān and the traditions، the writer has made the conclusion that the Imams (A. S.) are neither in a position to legislate religion nor receiving religion; rather، they have received the whole religion from the Prophet himself or the Imams before them، have expressed it to people، and undertaken to interpret (tafsīr) it and present esoteric commentary (ta’wīl) on it.

Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn Shīrāzī is the founder of a school known as Transcendental Philosophy. Employing the heritage of his predecessors، he has opened a new way before seekers of the Truth. One of the features of his philosophical school is the frequent use of the verses of the Qur’ān and traditions of the Infallibles (A. S.) in his philosophical works. On the basis of the philosophical principles that he himself has managed to establish، he has presented a specific explanation of narrative sources، including traditions. In this article، first the reason for Mullā Ṣadrā’s turning to the traditions is examined and then by making some examples the impact of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles in his impressions of the traditions are dealt with through focusing on the discourses of nafs (soul) and ma‘ād (return).

In his discourses concerning perception of universals، Mullā Ṣadrā has brought up various issues. On one hand، he says that in sensory and imaginative perceptions، the soul (nafs) is the originator and creator of images and then with its substantial and ontogenetic motion it achieves its higher level of perception، i. e. rational perception، unites with the rational non-material substance named active intellect، observes the universal images in active intellect، or the active intellect imparts the universals’ images to it. (Peripatetic viewpoint). On the other hand، sometimes he talks of the unification of the soul with ideas (masters of species) and the vertical intellects. (illuminationist viewpoint). In some instances، with his specific outlook، he points out that the soul in its higher levels of ontogenesis becomes annihilated in the very Essence of the Exalted God and sees the truth of object as they are in the Essence of God. While stating Mullā Ṣadrā’s final viewpoint based on the principles of transcendental philosophy، this article points out that in order to reconcile between these two viewpoints the two approaches of philosophical and mystical interpretations can be used in proposition. Perception of the universals with the annihilation in the Essence of God is compatible with the mystical interpretation; and the reconciliation of the two peripatetic and illuminationist viewpoints is possible mainly by relying on Mullā Ṣadrā’s specific philosophical viewpoint.