نشریه رهیافت هایی در علوم قرآن و حدیث
سال چهل و سوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 87، پاییز و زمستان 1390)

All the verses that the believers in the incidence of abrogation in the Holy Qur’ān’s verses have mentioned as the Qur’ānic evidences consist of four verses; i.e., 106 of Sūrat al-Baqara, 101 of Sūrat al-Naḥl, 39 of Sūrat al-Ra‘d, and 15 of Sūrat al-Yūnus. Irrespective of accepting or rejecting the very incidence of abrogation in the Holy Qur’ān’s verses, which requires a more comprehensive research, the examination of each one of these verses for their literal (sibāqī) and contextual (sīyāqī) comprehension and the collective understanding of the Qur’ān, indicates that these verses do not have any allusion to the incidence of abrogation in verses of the Qur’ān. Rather, the denotation of the first and second verses is the change and transformation of the miracles granted to the Divine Prophets; as it is generally stated in the verse of the Sūrat al-Baqara that God does not abrogate any miracle of the previous Prophet’s miracles or remove it from the memories over time except that He would grant a better or similar miracle in terms of influence to the next Prophet; and in the second verse, it is asserted that despite the transformation of miracles, the unbelievers would still fail to come to faith. In the third verse, it is stated that God has an ordinance and judgment in every time period that if He wishes He would efface it in another time and confirms another one. The fourth verse is related to the unbelievers’ demands from the Prophet (S.A.W.) for altering the content of the Qur’ān as his miracle or bringing another miracle.

Among the issues that have since long time ago been controversial and a subject of debate is the question, “Who knows the esoteric interpretation (ta’wīl) of the Qur’ān?” Thus, two viewpoints have appeared among the scholars of the Qur’ānic studies, both referring to the verse 7 of Sūrat Āl-i ‘Imrān as to whether rāsikhūn (those firmly grounded in knowledge) refers to Allah or not; and whether or not the rāsikhūn know the esoteric interpretation of the Qur’ān. Although by rational judgment and according to various scriptural evidences, the rāsikhūn’s knowledge of the esoteric interpretation of the Qur’ān is obvious, what is subject to debate here is who the rāsikhūn are in this verse. Since our only sources in this respect are the traditions related from the Infallible Imams (A.S.), we have examined and analyzed these traditions in the present writing and checked the validity of these traditions in terms of their chain of transmission (sanad) and evidentiary proof (dilāla). As per the fact that the traditions sound in sanad and explicit in diāla also testify to it, the Prophet (S.A.W.) and the Ahl al-Bayt (A.S.) are regarded to be the only ones knowledgeable in the science of ta’wīl and the real rāsikhūn in the knowledge of the Qur’ān.

Ḥarīz b. ‘Abd Allāh Azadī Kūfī Sīstānī, one of the companions of Imam al-Bāqir (A.S.) and Imam al-Ṣādiq (A.S.), has had a leading role in the heritage of Ahl al-Bayt’s school of thought. His reported traditions in al-Kāfī, Man lā Yaḥḍirahu al-Faqīh, Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām, and al-Istibṣār according to my statistical survey amounts to 1800 in number. Najāshī has considered his nickname as Abū Muḥammad and it is implied from his statements that he is from among the genuine Arabs of Azad in Yemen. Quoting from Yūnus, he has regarded his narration from Imam al-Ṣādiq (A.S.) as restricted to one or two instances and has also asserted that because of his armed uprising, Ḥarīz was rejected and isolated by Imam al-Ṣādiq (A.S.), and that the Imam (A.S.) broke off his relation from him. Najāshī’s approach to him caused some later sources to employ such phrases as madhmūmun fī al-riwāya (reprehensible in transmission of traditions), madhmūmun dhamman mā (somehow reprehensible), and ram-yi bi al-dham (condemned to reprehension), which consist of invalidation, in relation to Ḥarīz.In this article, according to Kashshī’s Rijāl, which Ṭūsī has edited and rewritten, his (Ḥarīz’s) nickname is considered to be Abū ‘Abd Allāh and it is pointed out that Ṭūsī has regarded him to be a wilā’ī and ilḥāqī Arab (both refer to a non-Arab becoming naturalized as an Arab) and “originally Persian”. It is also added that the Ḥarīz’s recorded traditions (ma’thūrāt) quoted from Imam al-Ṣādiq (A.S.) in the four Shī‘a books of tradition (kutub-i ‘arba‘a) are over 230 and not just two; and according to other sources, this number amounts to a considerably greater number. Exploration and examination of sources reveal that Ḥarīz did not draw sword in person; rather, he stated the initial legal ruling and, besides, Imam al-Ṣādiq’s (A.S.) rejection does not necessitate invalidating and debilitating him and has taken place for guarding and preserving his and others’ life and property. On the other hand, Shaykh Ṭūsī and some others have considered him to be among the reliable Shī‘a jurists.

that while ruining man’s purposeful endeavors, it discourages human psychological health as well. It is believed in positivistic psychology that some factors such as hopelessness can lead to different types of illnesses. Therefore, in the last two decades, psychologists have in light of a theory called “hope theory” proceeded to treat depression through concentration on hopeful thinking. On the other hand, in respect to the efficacy of an individual’s worldview in overcoming different types of illnesses, the role of religion in overcoming hopelessness cannot be neglected.The present research is intended to conduct a comparative study on hopelessness in the Snyder’s theory and its retrieval in the concepts of the Qur’ān and to pinpoint the overlapping of these two areas in explaining the above issue. In conclusion, it has been found out that the commonalities concerning hopelessness in the above two areas are more than their differences and that the human findings are very similar to the Revealed ones; and since science is basically the statement of the beings and non-beings, therefore the relation with spirituality in stating the values and their do’s and don’ts has a very influential impact in confronting hopelessness. Of course, more experimental and objective studies remain to be conducted to make any judgment concerning more or less efficacy.

The end of the holy verses of the Qur’ān embody many beauties and semantic subtleties, which demand extended and wide-ranging discussions. This article seeks to examine and find the wisdom behind the literary trans-norms and the structural changes made in the intervals of the Qur’ān. Three viewpoints are presented in this respect: some attribute it to the coordination between the intervals of the verses; some look for other semantic and rhetoric points by underestimating the role of the intervals; and yet others regard these two as equal.The writer proceeds to carry out a semantic and aesthetic analysis of some examples of trans-norms of the end of the verses and follows it up in four axes of increase and decrease of some letters and words in the intervals of the verses, transformation in the arrangement of speech and selection of certain speech structures instead of others. With the analysis of various instances, it is concluded that the role of verbal beauties and semantic points is different with respect to the kind of changes and the phonic aspects become stronger with the increase or decrease of some letters in the intervals of the verses; however, in the arrangement and selection of speech structures, meaning is considered as the main element. Nevertheless, along with aesthetic interpretation based on coordination of the intervals, it is also attempted to seek for other semantic beauties and Gnostic and rhetoric points.

Muslim theologians have since long time ago been debating over the application of created (makhlūq) to human actions. This debate has also appeared in exegetical explorations. In this respect, the approaches of the three schools of Mu‘tazilite, Ash‘arite, and the Shī‘ite to the afore-mentioned issue from the viewpoints of three exegetes, Zamakhsharī, Falkhr al-Rāzī, and Ṭabarsī, are thought-provoking. Zamakhsharī does not regard human actions as created by God and considers it as incompatible with the Divine justice and human will. Ṭabarsī’s view is also similar to that of Zamakhsharī. It is observed in this article that these two exegetes have entangled in the challenge of presuming human actions out of the circle of God’s creatures. In Fakhr Rāzī’s exegesis, however, although God is mentioned as the Creator of all the created things including the good and evil actions of the servants of God, his viewpoint has not manged to solve such dilemmas as Divine justice and human freedom.