Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs
Volume:3 Issue: 4, Winter 2013

Using Hugh Heclo’s issue network theoretical framework and William Domhoff’s network analysis methodology, the present article aims to elucidate the roots of Obama''s Iran policy in the context of the Iran issue network the year prior to his election to the presidency in 2008. An in-depth study of the issue network associated with the debate over the United States’ Iran policy identifies 182 individuals who participated in the debate between January 2008 and January 2009. Based on their policy recommendations, the study uncovers the existence of the following four policy communities: Punitive Nonengagement, Hawkish Engagement, Strategic Engagement and Fundamental Change. While regime change is the ultimate objective of both the Punitive Nonengagement and the Hawkish Engagement policy communities, only the latter believes that negotiation is a useful tactic in gaining compliance from Iran. Both, however, view Iran as a major threat to U.S. and Israeli interests and see no role for Iran in solving regional challenges. The Strategic Engagement policy community does not share this abysmal appraisal of Iran; rather, its members see meaningful cooperation between the United States and Iran on key regional issues as viable if their relationship is based on mutual respect. The Fundamental Change policy community finds the underlying assumptions of U.S. Iran policy vitally flawed and believes that all policy options short of an overhaul of U.S. international behavior lack ethical and legal legitimacy. Both the Strategic Engagement and Fundamental Change policy communities argue U.S. should cease its pursuit of regime change in Iran and abide by its obligations under the Algiers Accord. The Obama administration’s Iran policy best fits the recommendations of the Hawkish Engagement policy community.

This paper seeks to address the impact of the Iran-Iraq War, which took place between 1980 and 1988, on Iran-U.S. relations. For Iran, the legacy of the war included the loss of a generation of men—hundreds of thousands died and many more were wounded. It also included the large-scale destruction of many Iranian cities, and especially their industrial infrastructure. During the eight-year war, U.S. foreign policy highly securitized Iran and its Islamic Revolution as an existential threat to world security. Therefore, war is the fundamental fact on which the antagonistic nature of Iran-U.S. relations has been shaped since 1980. Thirty-two years after the Iran-Iraq War, one might think that the mutual and extreme securitization of Iran in U.S. foreign policy might relent. But the narratives have taken on a life of their own, fed by rumor, rhetoric, and mutual threats. One of the greatest challenges will be to try to bridge the gap between the dueling narratives, and suggest realistic approaches that might begin desecuritize Iran-U.S relations, retrieve it from the domain of emergency politics and return it to the sphere of normal politics. Nothing could be more urgent. If the Americans or the Israelis, or both, attack Iran in an effort to destroy its nuclear facilities, the mother of all Iranian stereotypes of the West will seem to a wide sector of the Iranian population to have been confirmed.

The main question this paper seeks to answer is what the legal and political roots of the dispute between Baghdad and Kurds concerning Kirkuk are and what scenarios look more likely in the mid-term future in the region. It is noteworthy that after the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq at the end of 2011 and transferring of responsibilities to the Iraqi forces, a new wave of disputes has evolved among the Iraqi political factions. These disputes along with the new status of Syrian Kurds indicate the appearance of completely new and unprecedented conditions regarding the status of the Kurds. In this relation, the future of Kirkuk and conflict over control of the city represents the most serious controversy among the political actors involved in the governance of Iraq within the past five years. The Kirkuk developments seem to determine the political future of Iraq as well. There are a few scenarios about the future of Kirkuk, the most likely of which includes the establishment of an autonomous Governorate of Kirkuk, considering the political equations and the identity of main actors in the corridors of power in Iraq. The potentials of this scenario in preventing the outbreak of a civil war and the rise of a conflict between the disputing factions will be significant and it will not seriously contradict fundamental Iranian considerations in the region.

Artificial islands refer to offshore structures which are constructed by human beings in the territorial sea of nation-states, exclusive economic zones or even the high seas. The right to construct artificial islands has been recognized by international bodies and organizations. In this relation, several legal provisions including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Articles 11, 58, 60 and 82 have clearly provided states with practical guidelines on the construction of such islands. During the past decades, numerous states have expressed interest in construction of such islands and have started building them. In the Persian Gulf region, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been constructing artificial islands since 2001, the first phase of which included three artificial islands in the shape of a palm. The second phase includes the ‘World’ project, which consists of 300 islands in the shape of the Earth’s landmass. Exploring the legal implications of the construction of artificial islands, this research seeks to illuminate the loopholes and possible misuse by states of the existing rules of international law. Then it will analyze the political and legal consequences of the UAE’s construction of artificial islands for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The determining of the Western frontiers of Iran was a process that lasted almost 400 years. It indicates extensive maneuvers of the areas under conflict and interference of big powers, and Britain in particular. The intervention of Russia and the UK in determining the western boundaries of Iran since the mid-19th century resulted in the signing of several agreements regarding the demarcation of the Iran-Ottoman joint borders, which are presently the joint borders of Iran and Iraq, based on the same treaties, with little or no change. This article studies the process of determination of the Iran-Ottoman frontiers – and subsequently with Iraq as Iran''s new western neighbor after World War I – since the conclusion of the Erzurum Treaty in 1847 till the signing of the Iran-Iraq Accord of 1975, with respect to the role of the two big powers and the UK in particular.

The Middle East has always been influenced by internal changes in regional countries, existing interactions at the regional level and power equations in the international system. Similarly, today we witness how changes in the political systems of some Arab countries, although considered internal affairs, have influenced the nature of interactions at the regional level. Developments called an «Islamic Awakening» have led to regime change in some Arab countries and posed a serious challenge for other ones, undermining the regional status of some countries and enhancing that of others. This article aims at studying the impact of the Islamic Awakening on relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia as two major regional states. The author, while assuming that the Islamic Awakening has undermined Saudi Arabia''s regional status and in contrast has enhanced that of Iran, argues that Saudi Arabia has adopted a balancing policy against Iran in dealing with this problem. The main goal of this article is to study the different aspects of Saudi Arabia''s balancing policy.

Russia has been involved in the dispute over Iran''s nuclear program since its inception. The main argument of this essay is that the Russians see Iran''s nuclear dispute in the context of their interests. In fact, Russian leaders - within their own country’s national interests - have linked Iran''s nuclear dispute with some of the most important issues related to Moscow''s foreign policy and national security, including the issues of NATO''s missile defense shield in Eastern Europe, Moscow’s energy and economic security as well as regional security matters. In this situation, it seems that the continuity of Iran''s nuclear dispute is in the interest of Russia, because it is an opportunity for Russians to resolve some of the most important issues relating to their national interests.