مجله تاملات فلسفی
پیاپی 16 (بهار و تابستان 1395)

Philosophical theorizing based on religious texts and the related rational interpretation of these texts are among the sublime objectives and a continuous tradition of religious philosophers in their intellectual pursuit. After Sadra, these objectives and traditions have been followed and Agha Ali Modarres is one of the outstanding scholars committed to them. He has referred to some verses in his special theory on bodily resurrection and his most important reference is this verse: “Say: He will revive them Who produced them at the first, for He is Knower of every creation (Ya Sin, 79)”. He believes that this verse is enough to prove that bodily resurrection is done to collect the body parts from the physical world and to transfer it to the other world to join the soul. Moreover, by referring to the verse 62 in ChapterVaghee, he rejects Asharites’ view on element resurrection because they tend to believe in returning of the soul to the physical world. The other verses he has referred to without any explanation are verse 10 in Chapter “the Prophets” and the verse 27 in Chapter “The Romans, The Greeks” based on whichhe considers his theory provable regarding the concepts of source and resurrection. This outstanding scholar follows Molla Sadra’s teachings as far as he refers to the Holy Text for consolidating the foundations of bodily resurrection. However, he tries to present a new approach in sublime philosophy that has made him well-known as the “founding philosopher”. In order to ascertain his success in having accurate references to verses in the Holy Quran, his interpretations should be analyzed carefully. In so doing, a reflection on the verses preceding and following the verse 79 in Ya Sin Chapter casts doubt on Agha Ali Modarres’s views in terms of their agreement with content of those verses.

Moral relativism does not acknowledge any universal moral principle and regards ethics as subject to the cultural purposes and changing circumstances. Allameh Tabatabaei reviews and critiques an account of moral relativism in Al-Mizan. The question this paper addresses is the way Tabatabaei critiques moral relativism. The paper surveys the three types of fallacy elaborated by Tabatabaei to reject relativists’ claim: 1. Fallacy of confusion between moral principle and matters of fact; 2. Fallacy of confusion between generalization and continued existence; 3. Fallacy of confusion between objective and hypothetical. Also, it seems that Tabatabaei’s stand in critiquing moral relativists, is moral intuitionism which is based on the innate disposition. This Intuitionism is confirmed, interpreted and elaborated by reason and religion.

Applying the presence science and intuition are of high importance in Ibn Sina’s thought. The theory of Hanging Man is a remarkable example of applying intuition. Corresponding to this theory is the theory of human nature. Similarities between these two theories, including their applying of the same words for referring to the presence science, has encouraged the authors to compare the two theories. The results of this comparison show the priority of the theory of Hanging Man to the theory of nature in a linear relationship in terms of principles, consequences and criteria. In this context, the theory of Hanging Man belongs to the ontology domain while the theory of human nature belongs to the epistemology domain. The contemplation on the criteria for perceptions of the soul shows that Razi’s criteria epistemologically precede to Ibn Sina’s criteria, because Razi’s criteria are based on the medium or the lack of medium in the recognition of primary premises. In this regard, the firm foundationalism of Fakhre Razi, Khajeh Tosi, and Allameh Helly, which is based on specifying primary premises as the only kind of evident and justified to self, can be based on cognitive of the soul perceptions and perceptions of the soul and the post-soul.

Descartes strictly asserts that he deduces his physical principles from his own metaphysic. While some scholars believe that his claim is exaggerative (or even misleading), some others take it as plausible (or even determining). This study, with regard to the latter, aims to explain Descartes’ anti-teleologism in physics based on his metaphysical principles. The authors suggest five different explanations. (1) Descartes’ approach to epistemic validity of propositions concerning external object requires his anti-teleologism; (2) for Descartes, our understanding fails to recognize any possible limit that belongs to indefinite subjects; that is why we cannot appropriately pursue the telos of natural object. (3) According to Descartes, contrary to Aristotelian tradition, we cannot always conclude telos from mechanism. (4) Assuming a telos for natural object, if it refers to “where the motion leads” or to “that for the sake of which the motion is being leaded”, is either self-contradictory or inconsistent with Descartes’ metaphysical principles. It is so, even if our assumption refers to “an end which the object is consciously pursuing” or to “one which the object is unconsciously pursuing”. (5) The role of non-deceiving God in Descartes’ metaphysics demands his anti-teleologism. At the end, authors explain how we must understand Descartes’ usage of “conclusion” if we are to get a consistent reading of his physics.

The main objective of this study is to investigate the epistemological foundations of action research from the perspective of the critical and interpretative philosophy. To this end, the ideas of Stephan Kemis and Wilfered Carr (members of the intelligentsia committee of critical philosophy) and John Dewey and Richard Rorty, (members of interpretive philosophy) were studied. The method used in this research is Comparative analysis. We draw on the pattern of the Polish Z.F. George Beredy, which consists of four steps: description, interpretation, neighboring and comparison. It became clear that the two philosophical approaches emphasize the link between opinion and action in action research, dialectical connection between them and their endeavor on the recovery of the probable gap between opinion and action in action research. The observed differences were related to the relativity of truth from the perspective of interpretive philosophy and the reliance of the critical philosophy of Kanty’s on transcendental wisdom. Another outcome was that the main concern of interpretative philosophy was the increase of efficiency through experience and the main concern of critical philosophy was the teaching of reflexive thought.

This paper tries to describe, analyze and critique John Mackie’s metaethical views. Mackie’s metaethical views and his skeptical stand, along with his ideas on the philosophy of religion, are highly influenced by the English philosopher, David Hume. However, his ideas, at least on the realm of ethics, are more complex than those of Hume’s and thus more difficult to challenge. Mackie’s ideas, regardless of their similarities to other skeptical views in Ethics, have their own complications, so much so that some of critics who work on various aspects of moral nihilism have failed to fully address it. Hence alternative arguments are needed in order to defend moral knowledge and critique Error Theory. This paper argues that first, some of Mackie’s arguments are fundamentally distorted, and second, even if they were not, they hardly result in moral nihilism.

Most mathematicians are reluctant to accept the visual proof as a genuine type of mathematical proof. In this paper, I paraphrase 10, common or new, objections to this type of proof and evaluate them separately and critically. On each of the objections, indeed, at least one of these central features is absent from the visual proofs: formality, symbolicness, rigority, reliability, surveyability, universality, legitimacy, self-sufficiency, uniformity, and fertility.
The paper argues that none of these objections are accurate. So the rejection of this kind of proofs is mostly due to psychological and sociological factors, especially domination of formalistic attitude among the mathematics community, rather than logical, or methodological reasons. There are not any strong reasons to reject these kinds of proofs, as a pattern of reasoning in mathematics; on the contrary, there are good reasons to accept and recognize them. An awareness of the role of this type of proof in the mathematics as a whole, no less and no more, is of critical importance.

Plato’s commentators have had different interpretations of his view on women; because they have faced with the inconsistent, complexed and fragmented pieces in dealing with Plato’s works on the issue. On the one hand, Plato held a few social rights for women and marginalized them. On the other hand, when elaborating his utopia, he accorded important social roles to women and, therefore, considered them equal to men, in terms of nature and talent. What we seek in this paper, is to understand Plato’s motive and purpose for discussing on the issue, especially because he has adopted a monistic view in his ethics and politics, which is dependent on his metaphysical views. Thus, we will try to examine Plato’s philosophical views of women and their different interpretations till our times, with a look at the socio-historical world of ancient Greece. Finally, we conclude that Plato has regarded the happiness of society as a justice which has the one form in all human beings, without considering their gender and their abilities. Therefore, his concern has not been increasing the women’s rights.