مجله تاملات فلسفی
پیاپی 15 (پاییز و زمستان 1394)

Al-Ḥikmah al-mutaʻālīyah fī al-asfār al-arbaʻah is MullaSadra's first compilation. This book is his most significant book in terms of transcendent wisdom and its theoretical clarification. The book is very comprehensive as MullaSadra has emended its various sections until the final days of his life, having added his newest findings to it. The al-Ḥikmah al-mutaʻālīyah, like other books, has been studied in terms of both methodology and content. The current research is studying the third recognition of this book and recognition pattern of writing, first trying to prove a prior pattern in its writing and next, making clear the particular scope of the book. The result of this research, which has been obtained from a comparison between analysis written structure and MullaSadra’s sources of writing the four intellectual journeys, is proving prior and precise pattern in writing and afterwards making clear this pattern in three different well-organized steps.

Since the language, thought and reality are closely tied together, any statement on the realm of epistemology and ontology also implicates some statement in the philosophy of language. Accordingly, the study of epistemology and ontology of the past philosophers reveals their principles of the philosophy of language. This paper seeks to examine Mulla Sadra’s arguments of mental existence, based on which to reveal his view on the theory of meaning. According to results obtained in the study of Premises taken by arguments of mental existence, it seems that Mulla Sadra’s theory of meaning is similar to ideational theory of meaning. Because in his opinion, the meaning of a statement is the assumption or judgment the statement implies; the meaning is the mental existing; words are legislate for meanings; language portraits the world.

In addition to the immortality of the Soul (psyche) as a principal issue, there are other issues in the Phaedo. One of them is claiming that the pure knowledge is attainable only after death at the afterworld. In the first, the function of the present article is describing and explaining the claim. To this end, we must inquire the meaning of the pure knowledge in the Phaedo. Based on the point of view of the Object and the Subject of knowledge, we can issue two meanings: a) Pure knowledge means a Direct cognition, and b) Pure knowledge means the Form of Knowledge (Knowledge itself). In the second phase we are trying to reconstruct proofs for Plato's claiming. Why the Pure Knowledge in this world is Impossible? In attention to the two meanings of the pure knowledge, it seems that we can project two reasoning: a) Proof by the distinction of the direct cognition from the indirect and b) Proof by the falling short of the sensible things from their Forms (Ideas).

This essay is an attempt to understand the relationship between existence and death in Alain Badiou's philosophical system. Badiou is a pro-system philosopher and is among the rare group of philosophers who speak of the necessity of the revival of the discourse on ontology as the building block of philosophy. He seeks to accomplish this through establishing a multiple-based ontological system upon Cantor's set theory. This multiple-centered ontology helps him neither be entrapped by the radical relativism of the postmodern and poststructuralist philosophers, nor to overcome the limitations and weaknesses of classic ideology-plagued ontology. It is through the prism of this multiple-based ontology which Badiou tries to conceptualize the relationship between existence and death. Thus he defines existence as the degree according to which, in a situation, the multiple appears as identical to itself. Taken this way, he believes existence is not an ontological concept but it is a matter of logic of being. According to Badiou, a being's existence has nothing to do with its multiple identity. In other words, existence is not a matter of essence; rather, it is more related to the appearance of being. Thus he defines death as the minimality or inexistence of a being in its referential situation. Mathematically speaking, the death of a being is an indication of the fall of its function of appearance. Thus he depicts death as a logical and not ontological notion. Badiou believes that such analysis of relationship of existence and death has two outcomes:a)death is a change in exteriority of the function of appearance of a given multiple, and
b) the meditation on death is vain. For death is but a consequence, and what thought must turn towards is the event upon which depends the local alteration of the functions of appearance.

In spite of the fact that Prejudices, according to Gadamer, are “conditions of understanding”, their interference is not arbitrary. Understanding is not a one-sided relationship, imposing our own sense and subjectivity on others, but it is a dialogical approach. In this approach, unlike the Cartesian method in which the subject-object relationship is violent and immoral, we cannot overlook the otherness of the other. Appealing to the concept of play and distinguishing it from game, Gadamer reveals the reciprocating motion of understanding and its dialogical structure. Here, the other is not seen as an object; therefore, none of the interlocutors participate in dialogue is to dominate the other. Gadamer considers understanding and dialogue as a “fusion of horizons” in which each interlocutor engages with each other freely and has been involved in the issue. This authentic engagement in the process of understanding, according to Gadamer, means openness to the other. Openness, as a moral condition, is possible only in the dialectical structure of dialogue. Every questioning-answering dialogue begins with a real and serious question and indicates the ignorance of the truth of the matter. In fact, all our prejudices are evaluated and improved by listening to what the other says, we encounter others with the humility and patience that all are different expressions of an ethical process. To be open to Gadamer’s openness as a moral condition of dialogue and exploring its requirements are what we address in this paper.

Undoubtedly, the problem of “fact-value” gap should be considered as one of the most important issues in moral philosophy. Drawing the problem of “fact-value” gap has been ascribed to the skeptic empiricist Scottish philosopher, David Hume. Hume claimed that it is impossible to derive the ethical propositions containing “ought/ought not” from the ethical propositions containing “is/is not”. The moral philosophers have regarded the Humean doctrine as the "is/ought” fallacy. After Hume, the English analytic philosopher, George Edward Moore, revived the Humean doctrine. Moore claimed that the concept of “Good” cannot be defined in terms of non-moral concepts/natural properties. He challenged the philosophers who defined this concept in terms of the non-moral concepts/natural properties to committing the “Naturalistic Fallacy”. Some of the moral philosophers have tried to confirm the fallacies proposed by Hume and Moore, while some others have attempted to refute those fallacies. The American neo-Aristotelian philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre is among those who have tried to offer a specific explanation of how the theories of disseminating the “fact-value” gap have emerged. He has made some arguments to show the invalidity of that gap. In this paper, we will consider the doctrines of Hume and Moore on the “fact-value” gap, and then will examine MacIntyre’s considerations on the gap.

Truth is among the most controversial questions in philosophy. Heidegger turns truth from criteria of correctness to ontological position with his definition of truth as unconcealment. This essay considers the relation between truth and thing in his philosophy and argues that his orientation towards tool beings has a strict effect on his attitude of truth. We concentrate on part 44 of Being and Time, where the problem of truth is considered for the first time. The word Dialectic which is used in the title of the article seems to be the appropriate word to convey a mutual relation between two objects. So Dialectic of thing and truth is a horizon to critique the truth which is considered from the view of present-at-hand ontology. These two kinds of ontology explain two approaches towards things in the world. The aim of this essay is to show the connection of these two kinds of ontology and thinking to truth.