فصلنامه حکمت معاصر
پیاپی 15 (بهار 1394)

This essay critically studies one of the important criticisms of the existence predicate، i. e. the referentiality/ non–referentiality proof. Also، it wants to show some of the weaknesses of the following views: (1) existence by no means is a predicate; (2) existence is not a logical predicate; and even، from some aspects، the more acceptable view that says that; (3) although existence by no means is a logical predicate in a subject–predicate way، it is a logical predicate in a non–subject–predicate way. Thus، the paper by means of the equivalence of referentiality and existence offers a strengthened version of existence predicate in Muslim philosophy and logic، and shows that in (1) and (2) Muslim philosophy and logic is defensible and in (3) the current views are not preferable to Muslim philosophy and logic. Again، by reconstructing the foundations of Muslim philosophy and logic it accepts the rational referentiality of nonbeing in an indirect way.

The problem of the unification of the intellect and intelligible can be found in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, it has been explained more clearly in Plotinus’ philosophy and the Neo-Platonic School and its followers. This problem has also been tackled by the thinkers of the Islamic world however it reached its culmination in the Transcendent Philosophy. To prove the unification of the intellect and the intelligible, Mulla Sadra adduced two proofs, the ‘Argument of correlation’ and the ‘argument of light and obscurity’, which in the first one, he analyzes intellect existence and in the second analyzes intelligible existence. Misbah Yazdi in some of his philosophical books criticizes the mentioned proofs. In this article, after stating each of his refutals, I will evalute and cosequentley reject them.

Error occurs frequently in everyone's sensory perceptions, and decoding the error quality and origin could influence many issues in epistemology. Reading the works Allameh Tabatabaei and Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi, one finds out that both philosophers believe that sensory perception is the effect of sensible on the sensory organ. In Khajeh and Allama's words, error in sensation is impossible. The origin of sensory perceptions errors has to be traced back to the correspondence of sensible with external reality which is itself a task fulfilled by human reason, though according to Khajeh and Allameh, sensory perception is among the conditions of rational judgment. Sensory perceptions, Allameh argues, have to be traced back to presential knowledge and this is an indication of their essential infallibility. However there is no sign of this view in Khajeh's works.

The present article studies Paul Ricoeur and Mulla Sadra's views on imagination, particularly its influential role in knowledge. Though their philosophies differ in principle, they share certain ideas in common. Ricoeur, contemporary philosopher and hermeneut, utilizes semiotics, linguistics, structuralism, and so on, to enrich hermeneutics. Language, thus, gets a central role in his philosophy. The basic difference of Ricoeur’s idea on imagination which distinguishes him from Mulla Sadra is that ‘language’ is used as a basis to explain imagination; he explains the role of imagination in knowledge through language. But Mulla Sadra does not directly deals with language, but considers act of imagination in constituting knowledge as an act of certain faculty of the soul. But in spite of this basic difference, both philosophers consider imagination as a mediator between external world and internal world of the mind and both explain this possibility by the notion of integration of two different issues.

This study aims to examine the applicability of Mulla Sadra’s theory of Substantial Motion in translation. To begin with, it starts with the concept of motion as the move from a state of potency into act and investigates time and motion in the tripartite categories of text, translator, and the process of translation. With a view to the theory of Substantial Motion, this study offers a definition for the source text which involves the concepts of ‘essence’, ‘substance’, and ‘motion’, by which it explores the semantics of the source text and its ontological levels and investigates the very concepts of polysemy, homonymy, and plurality of meanings and multiplicity of translations. In pursuit of meaning and gradation of the substance of the source text, it also explores the intellectual and cognitive motion in the mind of the translator, and borrowing Sadra’s methodology finds translation as a permanent process of evolution in which every translation is in a state of flux awaiting retranslation.

God’s Names and his attributes and their appearances in the semantic, ontological and anthropological dimensions are one of the most important issues in Islamic mysticism. In the Quran and Islamic tradition, the names and attributes of God are used as an immanent and transcendent way of recognizing the transcendence of time, and researchers have tried to understand and explain the relationship between the divine nature, and his names and traits. In this way, the Quran’s verse of ‘There is nothing like God’ considers Mohammad as one of His holy names which nothing can be found like him. The word ‘like’ have been considered in the verse, presumes that the Holy Prophet, peace upon him, is like Him and nothing can be like him as well.