فصلنامه حکمت معاصر
پیاپی 6 (پاییز و زمستان 1391)

Amongst Muslim philosophers، Gharavi Esfahani was the first one who invented a statement of the ontological argument for the existence of God. But Dr. Mahdi Haieri yazdi، who is one of the advocates of this argument، does not agree with this statement and criticizes it. This article aims to explain and survey these statements and critiques

This paper tries to answer to these questions: what is Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s solution to state the problem of non-existent objects and what are their similarities and differences and، moreover، challenges of these views. Following affirmation to “being” and “thing” concomitance، Williamson brings forward “necessary existence” theory in which “possibility” is referred to properties، including concrete existence، of things. But “necessary” is referred to logical existence for the solution to state the non-existent problem. On the other hand، Mulla Sadra’s solution، following graded unity of existence theory، is based on “mental existence”. In this case، mental existence is one of the ontological stages of “equivocal unique truth” of existence and “quiddity” is preserved in mind and exterior of mind. Therefore، since we express some statements about external non-existents، they must be existent in mind and their quiddities are manifestations of their mental existence. But، each of these solutions has some philosophical challenges: Mulla Sadra has not said how non-existents can be conceived; moreover preserving of quiddity in philosophical structure of Mulla Sadra is unjustified. On the other hand، “necessary existence” theory can’t be an explanation of reality. Allameh Tabatabaii، notwithstanding Mulla Sadra’s point of view، says that reality is absolute or limited existence (not existence and quiddity) and quiddities are mental (not external) manifestations of limited existents. Then non-existence can be abstracted by human mind from limited existents. On this basis، we do a mental act related with reality، when we state a proposition with a non-existent subject. This paper shows that Allameh’s theory can obviate the challenges of Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s theory.

The proof of the existence of spiritual sharing and mutual funds Hkma deny its literal، have argued that the reasons can be particularly important and Three reasons are as follows: 1. despite being part of the divider and Necessary and possible. 2. Doubt in the minds and the properties of objects entities Dogma and with absolute certainty. 3. despite the lack of a single mixed. However، among the contemporary wisdom، the late master، Mr. Manouchehr Bozorgmehr، in an article that I share with no verbal، the printing and has been publishing، The reasons for the criticism and rejection And then there claiming to be a literal and its negation are spiritual sharing. But the writer of this article has tried to review and analyze data on their critics and to criticize a member of a spiritual existence، Remains constant and persists. Based on the principles Sadraean rejected the criticism that a void and shall And the reasons for the desired triplet Pros and accuracy reveal In the last Contrary to vote and comment Bozorgmehr I therefore Subscription spiritual.

The present paper is the first essay which investigates Charles E. Butterworth’s interpretation of Islamic political philosophy. Butterworth’s main concern is to understand and interpret Islamic political philosophy based on interpretive approach، according to which Islamic political philosophy has originality. However، Butterworth’s dual interpretation of Islamic political philosophy and particularly incomplete understanding of contemporary Islamic political philosophy caused him fails to withdraw himself from the historical approach، according to which Islamic political philosophy has no originality

There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism، which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom، and incompatibilism، which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii proposes a specific version of compatibilism based on the notion of “comparative contingency” (al-imkan al-bilqiyas). According to his theory، the principle of causal necessity does not require more than that the human free action possess comparative contingency in comparison with the human agent and comparative necessity in comparison with its complex perfect cause (al-illah al-tammah). Moreover، the very nature of the human freedom is nothing but the action’s being contingent in relation to his agent. Therefore، the causal comparative necessity of the action in relation to its complex perfect cause does not contradict its being free. This compatibilist view has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers. In this paper we first give a short explication of Tbatabaii’s theory and then examine the arguments of its critics.

In science of logic equivocation and content participation has been described on the basis of the literary contractions among men of letters، but Mulla Sadra referring to that philosopher doesn''t pay attention to these contractions، explains the two terms on the basis of realities of things and the relation of single word (wujud) with them. As a result of the «graded unity of being»، the concept of existence is content participated; since it indicates on a single truth that is common in all creatures. But according to «particular unity of existence» that Ibn Arabi found it through intuition and Sadra proved it in discussing about cause and effect، the only extension of existence is God and thus، all discussions of equivocation and content participation will be meaningless. Therefore، we cannot really predicate «existence» to the possibilities، but we have two options: either predicate it to them by using a special gnostic term called «entity»، or predicate the existence to them، metaphorically. A metaphor mulla Sadra names it as a ''gnostic metaphor'' which is different from verbal one.

One of the specific aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought، as one of the founders of existentialist philosophy، is the paradigm of anxiety، which has a very special position in the concept of faith. He believed that it is the most important way to receive the product of faith، and even considered it in the same level of importance as the faith itself. On the other hand، in Islamic mysticism، including Risalah al-Qusyairiyah، a similar approach in the reading of the concept of khowf (fear) is observed. Placing emphasis on the concept of anxiety as an innate matter، Kierkegaard views it in three interdependent scopes which are: freedom، possibility and paradox. These can be called the motifs of anxiety، which bear structural similarities with Abu al-Qasim al-Qusyairi opinions in his Risalah al-Qusyairiyah if considered through a comparative reading. Al-Qusyairi too puts stress on the dependence and correlation between the concept of khowf in mystical system and the topics of possibility، freedom and eternity. This research tries to prove this hypothesis.