مجله مطالعات فقه امامیه
پیاپی 8 (بهار و تابستان 1396)

When studying the nature of religious dues and tax levied by the government, the religious dues are divided into two types one of which is unchanging and fixed and the other one is variable and subject to change. Indeed the nature of the tax levied by the government in the Islamic Republic (of Iran) is not different from the religious tax; rather it is the very changing tax that has been legitimized due, mainly, to necessity and expediency on whose basis, receiving tax becomes lawful. However, since the initial taxes in the overall sktech of the Islamic tax system, are the fixed unchanging taxes and expediency or necessity is considerable where the tax revenue does not meet the need of the Muslim community, this waiver or absolution in regards to the initial taxes must be amended and must, therefore, completely comply with the procedure introduced by Islam. By studying the similarities and differences, it has been concluded that the initial taxes have all the effects of the taxes levied by the government, not to mention some of the positive features which the government-levied tax does not have. Hence, the replacement of a fixed balance by another fixed balance does not seem to be a difficult task keeping in view the fact that the initial Islamic taxes have numerous positive features.

In Islamic tradition, the shadow has been considered an indicator through which the time is determined. Given the various interpretations in the Islamic narrations in this regard, there are three main juridical opinions that are dealt with in this study. The frist opinion states that when the shadow of the indicator reaches two third of its length, it is the time for nafila of noon prayers and when it reaches four seventh, it is the time for the nafila of afternoon prayer. According to the second opinion, the shadow of the indicator should equal its lenghth or must get double the length of the indicator for the noon and afternoon prayers, respectively. According to the third opinion, to offer the nafila prayers in a prescribed time is recommended. Based on the principle of conventional understanding of the outward meaning of narrations, the stature of a human being has been said to be equal to seven steps and one arm's length is said to be equal to two steps. However, we have objected to the second and third opinions and accepted the first one. The theological objections concerning the conflict between science and religion as well as the other criticisms made against the religious standards have been answered through an analytical – descriptive method and it has been demonstrated that these standards within the Islamic jurisprudence are in no way in conflict with what has been proved through science. The scientific observations about the realtiy of the rotation of the earth and emregence of the shadows are harmonious and are the best possible hypothesis in this regard.

The religious rules are divided into al-hukm al-taklifi (defining law) and al-hukm al-wadh`ei (declaratory rules). The taklifi rules are those which pertain to the servant's actions and deeds which are either mandatory or optional. As for the wadhei rules, they do not pertain directly to the servant's action. According to Mohaqiq Isfahani, a taklifi rule is "a dictate that is made with the motivation of creating a motive". He believes that wadhei rules are not limited to a certain number as it includes every unbinding rule. The important question about the wadhei rules is whether or not they have been independently legislated or they derive from taklifi rules. In the latter case, is it correct to say that they are Sharei rules at all? Does the term 'sharei rul' apply to them in the real sense or in a figurative sense? In response to this question, there exist several opinions among legal theorists. Some of them such as Shahid Thani, Sheikh Bahai, Fazel Toni, Wahid Behbahani and others are of the view that wadhei rules, like taklifi rules, have been created and considered by the Lawgiver. Therefore, the expression 'sharei rule' applies to them in the real sense. On the contrary, some legal thoerists such as Shahid Awwal, Sharif al-Ulama, Sheikh Ansari and others maintain that wadhei rules derive from taklifi rules and that the expression 'sharei rule' is not applied in the real sense. There is also a third view which somehow reconciles between the two groups of legal theorists.

Among the important and pratical but contended topics which have been discussed and debated by Muslim jurists is the subject of Khums. The contention among the various schools of law revolves around the word "ghanimtum" (gained) in verse 41 of chapter al-Anfal. Shia and Sunni schools unanimously believe that Khums is payable on what is acquired or gained in a war. In other words, Khums should be paid from the spoils of war. However, the most important difference is that the Sunni Muslims claim that Khums should be paid specifically from the spoils of war whereas Shia Muslims are of the view that it is payable on anything which is gained. As well, Sunnis believe that the share of the close relatives are for the Banu Hashim where as Shiites are of the view that the entire Khums is for the family of the Prophet (S) and their descendants.
The importance of Khums as a religious obligation and then as something that helps maintain justice and the controversy that exists as to what things khums can be paid from, make it necessary to reinvestigate this subject based on the foregoing verse as well as on the reports transmitted in this regard.

Although discussions concerning 'suspension clause' have taken place in fiqh (jurisprudence) while dealing with contracts, it seems the effects of the promisor's intervention in the non-fulfillment of a suspension clause are not preceded by anything and they are, by extension, as such in law as well. Despite the jurists and experts of law and civil code remaining silent, it seems there must a difference between the occurrence of a requirements of a condition and a pending contract. When it comes to a pending contract, if a promisor causes the requirment of a contract not to be fulfilled and realized, it seems that in this case the contract can be viewed as null and void irrespective of whether his action is deliberate or inadvertent. As for the annulling condition, in case the the promisor or any action prevents the realization of the requirment of that condition and eventually prevents the cancellation of the contract, the contract can be considered as 'dissolved' in the realm of consideration (etibar).

Today new horizons have been opened up and explored and new methods of medical treatments have been made available thanks to the increasing advancement of medical science. One of the current issues in medince is the possibibility of animal-to-human transplants (xenotransplantation) which can resolve many of the problems facing human beings, given the paucity of human organs. The present descriptive analytical study seeks to examine this issue from the perspective of both medicine and medical jurisprudence. Anaylizing and critically assessing the problems facing xenotransplantation, it has been concluded that there is no problem in such a method of treating ailing people. The results show that medical experts have been able to explore some medicines and the extensives research conducted by them has, to a large extent, solved the problems associated with this type of transplantation. Also, according to jurisprudence, given the purport of certain jurisprudential rules and principles such as the principle of 'no harm' and that 'necessities know no law', such transplantations are permissible and lawful in the eye of the Islamic Shariah.