نشریه مطالعات اصول فقه امامیه
پیاپی 9 (بهار و تابستان 1397)

Considering the special place of reason in religious knowledge and jurisprudence, as well as the necessity of paying attention to rational sciences in the fields of religious sciences, this study seeks to investigate the effect of rational sciences on three main areas of study such as "logic", "philosophy" and "theology", albeit with reference to related sources. Given that some of these branches of knowledge including logic, Usul-e Fiqh and logic of Fiqh deal with the appropriate method of inference and correct argumentation, the article considers them instruments which a jurist must use to derive legal rulings from the most authoritative sources such as the Quran and prophetic tradition. Philosophy too plays a special direct or indirect role in jurisprudential ijtihad since it helps identify and introduce the ontological and deontological foundations of metaphysics, anthropology, cosmology and so forth. A jurist who benefits from philosophy better understands legal theories which he, then, applies to linguistic and analytical issues. Depending on the jurisprudent's outlook and understanding of religion, Shari'ah and the lawgiver, his inferences and deductions also become varied. Therefore, a lack of attention to the rational sciences sometimes leads to misgivings and deviation in the path of deduction causing some juridical issues and problems to remain unanswered as well as the jurisprudence to be rendered inefficient.

The concept of legal addresses (khitabāt qanuniyah) is one of Imam Khomeini's scientific innovations in the field of Usul-e Fiqh or legal theories. He has presented this concept as a part of the discussion concerning the methodology of legislation and issuance of legal rulings. Thus, those instructions or messages which are not directed to a particular person and are common and general have been issued with the intention of establishing a law not taking into consideration the power and knowledge – as the different situations of the duty-bound (mukallaf) – as qualifiers. In fact, the ordinance is directed to the general title postulated in the address. Since this theory enjoys tremendous importance and has far-reaching implications in legal studies, the article seeks to examine its important effects and implications in the principles of jurisprudence. This research has been conducted using descriptive and analytical method and referring to library data. The result of this study is the clarification of the implications of this theory in a number of important issues and topics of the principles of jurisprudence.

One of the basic and highly practical discussions in jurisprudence and legal theories is the authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness of those evidences and principles which help substantiate and corroborate a reason. The indications (amārah) and practical principles (usul-e 'amaliyah) can have both direct and indirect legal implications. The credibility of these implications is discussed under "substantiating arguments" or what is generally termed in Ilm al-Usul as "muthbatat adillah". Discussing the indicativeness of the amārāt (indications), some scholars of Ilm al-Usul have considered the things which are proven by those amārāt as valid and authoritative but they rule the things which are proven by the principles as invalid because of them not being exploratory (kāshif). Some other scholars are of the view that the reasons concerning the validity of the indications are general and that they extend to their implications while the practical principles are not general and that is what makes the principles different from the amārāt. Some other scholars are of the view that the reason why the facts proven by the indications are valid is not because of the generality of the reasons or owing to them being revealing; rather it is because of the normative conduct of wise men that things proven by the indications and practical principles are different and distinct and are thus treated as valid. Therefore, if the muthbatāt of indications are authoritative, it is because the sensible people consider the indications as trustworthy. Thus, when one places his trust in something, he should trust its implications as well. As for the things proved by the principle of Istishab (presumption of continuity), since the narrations impose the effects of what is certain on the certain thing itself and what is certain is certain in itself alone, not its implications, therefore the implications and effects, whether they have rational or ordinary means (wāsita) or legal means are technically out of the range of istishab.

The assumption of the wise people enjoys significance in inferring and deriving laws because of the validity of a report by a trusted person as well as the validity of the apparent meanings of words and statements. What the scholars of Ilm al-Usul have said regarding the authority of the wise people's assumption are varied and even discrepant. That is because according to some scholars the authority of the wise people's assumption is inherent and essential and according to some others, it is not essential. In addition, some others are of the view that the assumption of the wise people is nothing but the intellectual judgment of a man with a sound mind while others believe that it is not man's intellectual judgment. These differences originate in two things: 1- The wise people as regular people have not been differentiated from the wise people "as wise people". The first one is not based on anything but a strong probability while the second one originates in a particular reason, or habit or instinct. The second one is decisive and emanates from common sense. The authoritativeness of the intransitive has not been differentiated from the authoritativeness of the transitive because when the origin of the assumption of the wise people as regular people is from a particular intellectual perspective, it will not be concomitant with Shari'ah. As for the assumption of the wise people "as wise people", there is concomitance between it and the transitive authoritativeness.

The discussion concerning the use of a word in more than onemeaning is one of the important topics of Ilm al-Usul, as well asconsidered to be one of the practicable,useful discussions injurisprudence,legal theories. In a part of the discussion dealingwith the juridical benefits of the topic, examples of such uses injurisprudence have been mentioned. Generally speaking, two veryimportant notions,approaches are noteworthy in this regard. Somescholars permit the use of one word in more than one meaning whileothers are of the view that it is impossible. The argument offered bythose who forbid the use of one word in more than one meaning isbased on reason while those who allow such a use argue that theArabs have practically used one word in more than one meaning.What is important is that the clue,main point in the topic is tounderstand the reality of the use,the relationship between oneword,another. The existing dispute revolves around the sameissue. Therefore, understanding the nature of the usage of a word andthe relationship between the word,its meaning can help untie theknot,resolve the dispute.

Muhammad Rida Muzaffar's Usul al-Fiqh features a special and scholarly organization in terms of the contents. The introduction, goals and conclusions have been written in a fluent well-researched, well-crafted and scholarly way. Based on the findings of this research, Muzaffar's Usul-e Fiqh enjoys a special and brilliant status among the books taught as part of the curricula of the Islamic seminary; it is considered to be one of the basic books that have been used for decades as an important source for studies in legal theories. This book features the rational and narrative methodology of late Naeeni, and the comprehensive and organized plan of his teacher Muhammad Hussein Isfahani Company as well as the accurate supervision of late Milani, albeit with the scholarly pen of Allamah Muhammad Reza Muzaffar, the learned scholar of his time. These features have made his work valuable and lasting.