The Place of the Problem of the Restoration of Non-being in Avicenian and Sudrian Philosophy

One of the important subjects in Islamic thought is the discussion about the impossibility or permission of restoration of non-being. The main issue in the present article is that unlike some theologians, Islamic philosophers are in agreement on the impossibility of the restoration of non-being. By reviewing the problem and the consideration of its place it is known that despite agreement among philosophers on the restoration, there is a fundamental disagreement between Avicenian and Sudrian philosophy in the analysis of it. It has to be noted that the basis and focus in the discussion of restoration of non-being is the subject of individuation and indentity which in the philosophy of Ibn Sina there is no proper analysis of it; because essence was considered the orbit of individuation and essential properties. For this same reason, on the basis of peripatetic philosophy an appropriate interpretation can not be offered of the restoration of non-being. As Shaykh al-Rais could not analyse the individuation of object in substantial movement and voted against it. On the contrary, by setting forth the principality of existence and making it the centre of individuation in Sadrian philosophy it is clear that despite general changing of essence, individuation of fluid and moving being is preserved and in ease this existential connection is broken, restoration of essence is not the same as the restoration of non-being. Given the relation of the subject with substantial movement, and that annihilation is only conceivable in the world of nature and in the course of movement, the place of the topic of the restoration of non-being should be left from the section on general topics of being and be placed alongside the other topics of movement and following the topic of substantial movement.