A Different Research on the Traditions of Istiṣḥāb with the Approach to Reviving the Rule of Certitude

The rule of certitude has been brought up as one of the five pivotal principles of jurisprudence، which in itself includes several principles such as istṣḥāb (presumed continuity)، but over time it has been dissociated. Similarly، the rule of istṣḥāb has been mooted as discretionary (ijtahādī) reason; however، after resorting to traditions for its authenticity (ḥujjiyat) it has turned into one of the practical principles due to its being devotional to the extent that Shaykh Anṣārī regard those traditions only consisting of istṣḥāb and not the rule of certitude، which has been renowned as an inclusive doubt. This remark of him has been accepted by most of the (legal theorists) uṣūlīs، although some of them have given other reasons than his reasons for this claim. The total sum of these reasons are categorized into two states of approval and affirmation، which، upon being critically reviewed it seems that none of these reasons are sufficient and the traditions of istṣḥāb in general include both of the rules. A study of the traditions، rather، implies that their instances are not made exclusive to istṣḥāb، but such rules as the rule of certitude and indebtedness (ishtiqāl) are instances of these traditions، as well.