A Second Reflection into Avicenna's Sediqin Argument in Al-Najah

In 2013، in an article entitled “Formulations of Avicenna’s Sediqin. Argument in Al-Najah. Argument by the Use of Classical Predicate Logic in Nejat Based on First-order Predicate Logic” Ranjbar، Hosseini and Saeedimehr presented a formulation of Avicenna’s Sediqin Argument in the book Nejat. In this paper we، once again consider the formulation of the former paper، and we will show that the assumptions of this formulation، along with the two assumptions of the transcendent unity of necessary being and the existence of at least a possible being، leads to a contradiction. With the analysis of three possible solutions to resolve this paradox، namely the definition of total causal sequence، the principle of transitivity and the change of the principle of causality and explanation of how the height of contradiction was created with the help of their modification، the correction of the definition of total causal sequence is preferred to other solutions. This change، along with some other minor changes، such as the removal of the predicate “sequence” in the definition of the total causal sequence and the predicate “being” of all premises in the last proof، leads to a new formalization that is based on less assumptions rather than the previous formulation.