A Critique on the Theory of Reference of Basic Self-Evident Premises to Intuitive Knowledge (In Ibne-Sina, Mesbah Yazdi)

Recognizing truthfulness of basic self-evident premises is one of the important concerns of epistemology. Ibn-e Sina considers these propositions as self-evident truths (classical theory). Among the contemporary thinkers, Mesbah Yazdi does not consider this solution as sufficient and has found it as problematic. According to his opinion, verification of the truthfulness and the true totality of the propositions are dependent on transcending concepts and using intuition knowledge instead. This is how one can make sure that self-evident premises are not abstract and mental textures, but objective and general truths. The following essay includes 3 parts: first is statement of problem. Second part is the explication and criticism of mesbah′s classic theory. And third part is dealing with resolving questions posed about it. There are two major issues in this sphere: first, both concepts of reference of basic self-evident premises to intuitive knowledge are true. The second issue is that verifying the truthfulness of general proposition over a specific one is due to a mistake concept in respect of significance for it in respect of existence. In conclusion, we think there are some traces of Mesbah′s theory in Avicenna's too.