A Critical Assessment of Descarte's Anti-Teleologism in Physics

Descartes strictly asserts that he deduces his physical principles from his own metaphysic. While some scholars believe that his claim is exaggerative (or even misleading), some others take it as plausible (or even determining). This study, with regard to the latter, aims to explain Descartes’ anti-teleologism in physics based on his metaphysical principles. The authors suggest five different explanations. (1) Descartes’ approach to epistemic validity of propositions concerning external object requires his anti-teleologism; (2) for Descartes, our understanding fails to recognize any possible limit that belongs to indefinite subjects; that is why we cannot appropriately pursue the telos of natural object. (3) According to Descartes, contrary to Aristotelian tradition, we cannot always conclude telos from mechanism. (4) Assuming a telos for natural object, if it refers to “where the motion leads” or to “that for the sake of which the motion is being leaded”, is either self-contradictory or inconsistent with Descartes’ metaphysical principles. It is so, even if our assumption refers to “an end which the object is consciously pursuing” or to “one which the object is unconsciously pursuing”. (5) The role of non-deceiving God in Descartes’ metaphysics demands his anti-teleologism. At the end, authors explain how we must understand Descartes’ usage of “conclusion” if we are to get a consistent reading of his physics.