The relationship between free will and causal determinism in the views of analytic philosophers

Are free will and causal determinism compatible with each other? This is one of the most important questions central to discussions relating to free will. The problem is that causal determinism makes us encounter challenging dilemmas, either way leading us to deny free will: (1) causal determinism is either true or not true; (2) if causal determinism is true, we do not have free will; since all of our actions (including free will), in that case, will be the inevitable results of their former causes; (3) if causal determinism is not true, we do not have free will; since all of the events will be accidental and thus cannot be attributed to a performer; (4) hence, we do not have free will. In response to these two extremes, one should either show that either one of the statements (2) or (3) is false, or instead deny free will. Looking back at the issues discussed by contemporary analytic philosophers on this question, the present paper aims to categorize and briefly introduce those views. And finally, the attitudes and views of Western philosophers are compared with those of Islamic thinkers, and the differences and similarities between them are examined