Scrutinizing Jürgen Haberma's Analysis of Religion's Relation to Rationality in the Social Sciences

For social scientists, rationality is known as a symbol of modernity on the one hand, and a rival and substitute for religion on the other. Habermas, as an eminent defender of modernity, has done his best in his theory of communicative action to justify and argue for this thesis. Among Habermas’ presuppositions, the most critical are an evolutionary interpretation of rationality and an instrumental view of religion. By recourse to findings and hypotheses from a vast variety of scientific disciplines and techniques, he tries to match the process of the rationalization of worldviews with the process of a child’s cognitive development, and to suggest religion as a human-made instrument for solving some cognitive questions as well as life problems in a specific period. Therefore, upon the arrival of modern rationality, religion should acknowledge the end of its era, and give its position over to the new powerful foe. This article appraises Habermas’ arguments in this regard so that its weak and strong points are revealed.