The Universal and the Particular

Logicians have, since Aristotle, agreed upon dividing “concept” into universal (kulli) and particular (Juz’i). The criterion of such a classification is based on whether or not a concept is applicable to the plenty: on the one hand, this criterion calls for a close examination of such concepts like god (ilāh), necessarily existent (wājib al-wujūd), and assumed universals like nothing (lā-shi’) and not possible (lā-mumkin). This is important in order to determine whether these concepts fall into the realm of the universals. Logicians sought to verify the universality of these concepts, and despite the futility of their attempts, their claim seems plausible. On the other hand, the particularity of such concepts as "Zayd" (or John Done) is deemed uncertain. Accordingly, some logicians have considered the universal-particular dichotomy as groundless, arguing that every concept is universal. This essay deals with how Mullā uadrā and Allāmah _abāabā’i have treated this issue. uadr al- Muta’allihīn, viewing concepts from a certain angle and Allāmah _abāabā’i, observing the relationship of imagery and sensory concepts to the objective (‘aini) world, were able to justify the particularity of particular concepts, and thus confirming the idea that “concept” is in fact of two types: universal and particular.