Classifying Propositions as Analytics and Synthetics

This article begins with a review of the literature on the classification of propositions as analytics and synthetics and the types of such a classification: as a method, as a differentiation between propositions, and as a philosophical school. Elaborating on the question as to what in this classification is divided, and distinguishing between such technical terms as sentence, statement, proposition, and judgment, it suggests that what is in fact divided is the proposition proper. Although Kant divides judgment into analytic and synthetic, the author believes Kant has focused on the psychological aspect of the question which is not an issue to be dealt with in epistemology. Then three criteria for analyticity are discussed and criticized: A) a proposition whose predicate stands for something embodied in the meaning of its subject; B) a proposition whose negation leads to contradiction; and C) a proposition whose truth is secured by the expressions employed therein. At the end, the classification of propositions as analytic and synthetic in the Western philosophy is compared to the classification of predications (ˆaml) as primary and practically common (shāye‘ ©inā‘i) in the Islamic philosophy.