A Deliberation on the Principle of Al-ta zīr fī kull-i ma ṣiya (discretionary punishment in all sins)

The relation between crime and sin is of much importance in religion-based criminal law systems. In these systems, sin against Allah have a pivotal role in realizing crimes. In the Imāmī School, the criterion for criminalization is committing sin against Allah; for this reason, this relation is of much more importance in this school than in others. The relation between crime and sin is worth noticing from two standpoints; on one hand, which crime is regarded as committing sin against Allah; and on the other, which sin is regarded as a crime. Concerning the second standpoint of this relation, the criminality of certain sins such as the sins deserving legal punishment, retaliated punishment (qiṣāṣ), and discretionary punishment have been considered as admitted tenets in Imāmī School. However, in respect to some other sins, about imposing punishment on whose perpetrator there is no specific clear injunction (naṣṣ), the jurists have different phrases with similar context based on permissibility of discretionary punishment in them. Some have extracted from those phrases a principle such as Al-ta‘zīr fī kull-i ma‘ṣiya or Al-ta‘zīr li kull-i ma‘ṣiya (discretionary punishment in [for] all sins). This principle has its proponents and opponents in Imāmī jurisprudence. Some have totally rejected it and some have absolutely accepted it and yet some others have added restrictions to it.
In this article, it is attempted to deliberate on the above-mentioned principle by gathering the statements of Imāmī jurists and critically reviewing their evidences.