The Value of Knowledge from Zagzebski's Point of View

In Meno dialogue, Plato points to a problem, which, nowadays, is known as value problem among epistemologists. This problem stems from two accepted premises in the field of epistemology. Based on the first premise, knowledge is implicitly defined as true justified or warranted belief. The second premise also makes the point that the value of the justification or warrant at least appears to be derived from the value of true belief and thus it is reducible to the value of truth. Taking these two premises into account, Zagzebski claims that externalist theories and particularly reliabilist theories cannot escape from the trap of the value problem. Zagzebski’s suggestion for explaining the extra value of knowledge is the reconsideration of the relationship between knowledge and knower. Like acts, which gain extra value from the actor’s motives, belief gains extra value from the possessor’s epistemic motives and reach to the level of knowledge. She believes that love of truth is the most basic motive which makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. Although Zagzebski’s explanation of the extra value of knowledge has not faced the problems which reliablists struggle with, her explanation is subjected to serious criticisms of a different kind which are addressed in part in the present paper.