The concept of reality in Wittgenstein's attitude

Analyzing any concept in Wittgenstein's thoughts has a strong relationship with his contemplation on "language". And analyzing the concept of reality is not an exception; especially because the reality is the closest concept to the language as a key element in Wittgenstein's thought. And perhaps it may be possible to pose the main question of his two periods of contemplation in this way: "how does language reflect the reality to us"?
In this paper I have tried to, by referring to Wittgenstein's intellectual framework, analyze the relativity of language, mentality (thought) and reality. And I would like to, by comparing the Wittgenstein who is seen in the Logical-Philosophical treatise with the second Wittgenstein who is divulged in the philosophical studies, to reconstruct the traversed route in the treatise and analyze the reality in a hypothesis and finally pose this question that "is it possible to achieve an illustration of reality in the latter Wittgenstein's thought from the functional hypothesis of meaning or language in the guise of function?"
This route ends in two different schools: realism and anti-realism. It seems that both attitudes are not adaptable about Wittgenstein and a kind of relativism in confronting with reality can be observed in Wittgenstein's thought which is largely semantic and in some layers it is also ontological but it never ends in extreme realism.