The critical assessment of Putnam, Dennet and Searl approach to philosophical significant of AI

This paper has two main parts. The first part is devoted to the following problem: what is the philosophical significant of AI? By scrutinizing Putnam, Dennet and Searl’s views on the topic, I will suggest that, from the philosophical point of view, there are at least two canonical questions which are closely associated with AI researches: 1. The question in the philosophy of science: would it be plausible to think that AI programs can pass the unrestricted Turing test? 2. The question in the philosophy of mind: If it is the case that an AI program can pass the unrestricted Turing test, would it be reasonable to think that the program has mind? With this framework in mind, in the second part, I will discuss the main problems which we face when we want to respond the questions at issue. In order for responding the first question in a positive way, it is necessary to find a solution to the so-called frame problem which concerns how an AI program should manage unexpected events. I put forward that the frame problem was originally formulated in Dreyfus’s phenomenological research, before it became a central topic in AI. Also I discuss three arguments i.e. Homunculus fallacy, Chinese room argument and arguments based on Godel’s theorem, each of which poses a problem for responding second question in a positive way. I will end up by suggesting that connectionism is in a better position to encounter with the arguments.