A critical investigation on Grice's account of truth functionality of conditionals in natural language on the basis of the idea of assertability

Sentential connectives in classical propositional logic, according to their definition, are truth function. Contemporary philosophers of logic and language propose two main theories regarding truth functionality of counterparts of the sentential connectives in natural language. Some (including Strawson 1952; Mitchel 2008; Young 1972; Read 1995) have argued that counterparts of the sentential connectives in natural language are not truth function; on the other hand, others (including Grice 1975; Clark 1971; Jackson 1979) propose arguments for their truth functionality. Grice's (1975) defense of truth functionality of conditionals ("if…then…") in natural language which is formulated on the basis of the ideas of assertability and implicature has had a central role in the literature of recent decades. The main goal of this paper is to consider and criticize Grice's defense of truth functionality of conditionals in natural language.