The Concept of Reality in Schlick's Perspective

Moritz Schlick divides our knowledge of reality and independent external world into two domains of conventional knowledge needed in everyday life, and scientific knowledge. Relying on this division, he shows how logical positivism is not in need of metaphysical confrontation with reality and external world in either of these realms.
The present article studies Moritz Schlick’s academic trend and the turning points of his scientific life, from the tradition of philosophical physicists to succession of Ernst Mach, and to his association with Vienna Cycle; and meanwhile attempts to answer the question of what has been his image of reality and independent world as ontological issues? What always has been taken into consideration about logical positivists is limited to their epistemological and methodological aspects. Here we intent to reproduce the ontological aspect of Schlick’s thoughts, taking into account the challenge that he and the Vienna cycle pose to metaphysics