Cognitive Puzzle

The main Frege’s question in “On sense and reference” is that how we can understand the difference between cognitive value of a=a and a=b? “a=a” is analytic and a priori while “a=b” is a posteriori and has different cognitive value. Frege’s theory of sense and reference wants to answer to this question. Sense is mode of presentation of the reference. The difference between modes of presentation of reference can be a good reason for cognitive value of empirical identities. In analytic philosophy, this response is considered as some strength of Frege’s theory. We are going to argue that if we accept the suggested logical form by Frege and his theory of sense and reference, then empirical discovery is vanished. We ascribe other logical form to Frege’s intended sentences and this form displays the requirement for empirical discovery and it does not need to resort to his theory of sense and reference.