Designing a Model and Explaining Persuasion Techniques in Disclosure Financial Reports by Companies with Job Acquisition Incentives Bias CEO

Increasing the regulatory environment and expanding the scope of the regulatory standards for financial reporting has, over the past few years, reduced the cost of representation and information asymmetry and increased the level of corporate disclosure of corporate financial statements. But one of the endogenous dimensions of quality that prevents the disclosure of financial statements is a matter of persuasion is reporting. The Purpose of this research is designing a Model and Explaining Persuasion Techniques in Disclosure Financial Reports by Companies with Job Acquisition Incentives Bias CEO in Tehran Stock Exchange companies. In this research, which was a hybrid research, in the qualitative section of the 18 accounting, human resources and financial management specialists, panel members were involved in the two sections of the critical evaluation and Delphi analysis with the researcher, and in a small part of the number 160 directors of Tehran Stock Exchange companies were selected through a simple random sampling for a period of 6 months From December 2017 to May 2018. In order to analyze the designed model, we used Structural Equation and Software (PLS). The results of the research showed that persuasive methods of promoting corporate financial reporting with three motivations for managerial occupation, namely, the motivation for power, motivation for self-affirmation and group and political motivation, have positive and significant advancements, while between persuasion in the disclosure of financial reports Companies have a negative and meaningful relationship with professional motives.