New Riddle of Induction and Natural Kinds

Goodman was the first one who answered his own riddle of induction, although a relativist answer which opened a way for his constructivist ontological project. Realists, concerned with inductive knowledge, however, attempted to retrieve this kind of knowledge by attacking his answer and providing alternative answers to the riddle. Here I examine three reactions, by F. Jackson, C. Elder and P. Godfrey-Smith. This examination proceeds concentrating on the idea of natural kinds; whether this idea can open a (realist) way to deal with Goodman’s riddle? Jackson’s suggestion is examined borrowing Elder’s and Godfrey-Smith’s critics. Then I will go to Elder’s suggestion showing that it involves begging the question. Then Godfrey-Smith’s suggestion, which is indeed a reconstruction of Jackson’s idea that appealed to rules of statistical methodology instead of a philosophical conceptualization, is examined. This suggestion seems to me a prpoer idea to deal with Goodman’s riddle, on the on hand, and deeply relies on the idea of natural kinds, on the other. However, it is cannot disable Goodman’s own suggestion, which is also weaker metaphysically.